
Qass. 
Book 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



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Publications of the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Division of International Law 

Washington 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 



The European Background of the 
Monroe Doctrine 



BY 

W: P. CRESSON, Ph. D. 

Formerly Secretary of the American Embassy in Petrograd 



NEW YORK 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

AMERICAN BRANCH, 35 WEST 32D STREET 
LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY 

1922 






^ 



COPYRIGHT 1922 

BY THE 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 



-8 IS22 



GIBSON BROS., INC., PRINTERS WASHINGTON 



©JI.AB8JL6 98 



FOREWORD 

The Monroe Doctrine, which in a few months will celebrate 
its hundredth anniversary, is one of the few foreign policies 
advanced by any one of the nations taking part in the World 
War which bids fair to survive that great catastrophe. While 
the American and British phases of the Monroe Doctrine are 
familiar to students of diplomatic history, the materials have 
hitherto been lacking for an adequate appreciation of the rela- 
tions between President Monroe and John Quincy Adams, on the 
one hand, and the Tsar, Alexander, on the other, against whose 
Holy Alliance President Monroe's message of 1823 was chiefly 
directed. 

Mr. Cresson has laid students of history, and more especially 
of international organization, under a deep and abiding obliga- 
tion by his researches in the archives of the Russian Foreign 
Office immediately following the Revolution of March, 1917. 
He was Secretary of the American Embassy at Petrograd at 
the time when Professor F. A. Golder was preparing his inval- 
uable list of documents in the Imperial archives relating to Amer- 
ica, and, knowing Mr. Cresson's interest in the history of Russian- 
American relations, the authorities of the Provisional Govern- 
ment invited him also to examine the Imperial archives. Mr. 
Cresson's work more especially related to the personal dispatches 
of the Tsar, Alexander, and the memoranda in his private 
diplomatic papers, which had never before been open to stu- 
dents. 

In the midst of these labors, Mr. Cresson put aside the more 
leisurely task of writing history for the more arduous task of 
observing history in the making. He resigned from the diplo- 
matic service, entered the army, served with the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces, and ended the war as Chief of the American 
Military Mission at Belgian Headquarters in Flanders. Upon 
his demobilization he resumed his interrupted task, and he has 
recently been able to bring his work to a conclusion by researches 
in the archives of the Department of State. While Mr. Cres- 
son's work is complementary to the labors of others in the same 
field, it covers — as its title implies — negotiations carried on in St. 



vi THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Petersburg and Washington, which form the European back- 
ground of this American doctrine. 

The value of the little work is out of all proportion to its size. 
It makes clear the aim and purpose of the Tsar, Alexander, in 
forcing the Holy Alliance upon his unwilling confederates, it 
shows the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Holy Alliance, 
and it enables the unprejudiced reader of the Old as well as the 
New World the better to understand both. 

It is to the credit of our common humanity that at the end of 
the greatest of wars attempts have been made to devise some 
scheme whereby a recourse to arms might be less likely to occur, 
if it could not be wholly avoided. The Thirty Years' War is 
responsible for the Nouveait Cynee of Emeric Cruce. the Law of 
War and Peace of Hugo Grotius, not to speak of the Great De- 
sign which Sully foisted upon his master, the good King Henry 
IV. The wars of Europe culminating in the wars of the Spanish 
Succession and ended by the Treaties of Utrecht (1713-14) and 
of Rastadt (1714) produced the Project of Perpetual Peace of 
the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. The wars of the French Revolution 
following these at the space of a century gave birth to the Holy 
Alliance. The World War, a hundred years later, has brought 
forth a League of Nations, conceived in the same generous spirit. 

Will history repeat itself? History alone can tell. 

James Brown Scott, 

Director. 
Washington, D. C, 
July 14, 1922. 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The author desires to express his thanks to the following gen- 
tlemen for their aid and criticism: Professor John Bassett Moore 
and Doctor Julius Goebel of Columbia University; Professor 
F. A. Golder, under whose expert guidance he carried on his re- 
searches at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Doctor 
James Brown Scott, Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace; and Mr. Raymond Buell of Princeton Uni- 
versity. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

1 



Introduction 

Chapter I.— The Reception of the Holy Alliance 37 

Chapter IL— The Early Policy of the Holy Alliance: The 

American Monarchy 55 

Chapter III.— The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle 69 

Chapter IV.— The United States and the Political Recon- 
struction of Europe, 1815-1820 83 

Chapter V. — The Era of International Congress 95 

Chapter VI. — Europe and the Monroe Doctrine 113 

Appendix I. — Territorial Guarantees at the Congress of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, 1818 133 

Appendix II.— World Revolution after the Napoleonic Wars: 

Troppau *■" 

Bibliography 139 

Index *^o 



INTRODUCTION 

Within a few months will occur the one hundredth anniversary 
of the reading of President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message 
to Congress. The three great Continental Powers to which its 
warnings were chiefly directed are today prostrate as the result 
of the World War. Yet the principles it defined have continued 
to furnish the basis of the foreign policy of the United States. 
Morever, the eclipse of Russia, Prussia and Austria has but re- 
sulted in a renewal of the fundamental problem which confronted 
the diplomatists and statesmen of the Republic in 1823 — a prob- 
lem which in the words of Monroe regards essentially "the condi- 
tion of the civilized world and its bearing on us." 

The international questions which the trained diplomacy of 
Monroe and Adams was called upon to meet and decide a cen- 
tury ago were similar in a remarkable degree to those of the pres- 
ent day. Again the measure to be arrived at is : How far the con- 
ditions of the international situation justify the United States in 
departing from a system of isolation imposed by geographical 
conditions and a generally accepted, time-honored policy? How 
far may we abandon the restraints of this safeguarding principle, 
and at the earnest solicitation of friendly nations bear a part in 
agreements intended to maintain the general peace? At such a 
moment as the present one, to use once more the language of 
Monroe, "a precise knowledge of our relations with foreign 
powers as respects our negotiations and transactions with each" 
is indeed "particularly necessary." 

The trend of American diplomacy towards a return to the 
"traditional prejudice" in favor of an American system apart 
from the affairs of Europe, has offered one of the chief problems 
confronting the statesmen of the Allied Powers since the close of 
the War. It is the author's belief that in the light of a renewed 
study of the events which led to the declarations of the Monroe 
manifesto, the motives underlying recent policy tend to justify 
themselves as the continuing result of historical experience. Ex- 
amination of the archives of the Department of State and docu- 
ments which have but recently become available in the Imperial 
Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prove the 



2 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

similarity of earlier negotiations to those of the present day. 
Yet the story of the attempts made by the statesmen of Europe to 
detach the United States from their traditional policy (notably 
the efforts of the Tsar Idealist, Alexander I, to induce the govern- 
ment in Washington to accede to the pact of the Holy Alliance) 
forms an almost forgotten chapter of American diplomatic his- 
tory. 

A misunderstanding of the policies in opposition to which the 
Monroe Doctrine was formulated has frequently arisen from a 
failure to apprehend the nature of the strange pact known as the 
"Holy Alliance" or to establish its true relation to the series of 
treaties known as the "System of 1815." The latter formed 
the basis of the diplomatic reconstruction of Europe after the 
Napoleonic wars. The "Holy Alliance," or "Holy League," 
was, in its inception, an expression of the highly idealistic personal 
policy of a single powerful sovereign, the Tsar Alexander I of 
Russia. Of its three signers the Tsar, and the Tsar alone, affixed 
his seal without mental reservations concerning the principles it 
invoked. The System, of 1815 resulted from a long series of 
debated agreements, beginning with the politico-military pacts 
of Toeplitz, Reichenbach and Chaumont, continued by the two 
Treaties of Paris and the Acts of the Congress of Vienna. The 
Tsar's "League of Peace" was suddenly imposed upon his allies 
at a time when the prestige of his military power was essential 
to their cause; when to do otherwise than humor his doctrinaire 
theories of international solidarity might have resulted in a seri- 
ous breach in the ranks of the Grand Alliance. 

In the perspective of history, the internationalist aspirations 
and purposes of the Russian autocrat may be viewed in their true 
sense and value. His contemporaries, however, may well be par- 
doned for considering his policies as contradictory and irrecon- 
cilable. Metternich and the reactionary statesmen of his school 
saw in Alexander a dangerous dreamer, a "crowned Jacobin" at 
almost the same time that Canning and Monroe were uniting the 
policies of the "Constitutional Powers" to protect the principles 
of free government from the interventions he set on foot in the 
interests of monarchical legitimacy ab antiquo. But in order to 
understand the Tsar's conception of his own diplomacy, a brief 
biographical study of the varied personal influences and relation- 



INTRODUCTION j 

ships which accompanied the changing phases of his political 
beliefs becomes essential. 

Alexander was born in St. Petersburg on December 12, 1777. 
His celebrated grandmother, the Empress Catherine, undertook 
the entire direction of his early education, to the exclusion of his 
father, the morose and unpopular Tsarevitch Paul. With his 
brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, his studies were regulated 
by an elaborate plan, drawn up by the great Tsarina herself after 
a long correspondence with the philosophers Grimm and Diderot 
in Paris. It seems to have been the deliberate intention of this 
remarkable woman to make the young heir of the Romanovs — if 
not a prodigy of learning 1 — at least a well educated man, an 
attainment far above the level of the court circles surrounding 
him! That this intention was even in a measure carried out 
was largely due to her fortunate choice of a tutor for the little 
princes in the person of a French Swiss scholar, Frederick Cesar 
Laharpe, whom she found was occupying a subordinate position 
in the household of a brother of the reigning favorite, Count 
Landskoi. 2 

Laharpe was at this time thirty years old. He was an avowed 
republican, strongly influenced by Voltaire in his youth, and later 
an enthusiastic disciple of Rousseau. Strangely enough, none of 
these qualities were likely at this time to injure his prestige in the 
eyes of the autocratic Catherine. When, at a later date, the 
excesses of the French Revolution had disillusioned the Empress, 
her fashionable approval of liberalism (which she shared with 
the aristocratic salons of Paris) changed to a violent hatred of 
all that recalled the doctrines of Jacobinism. Until 1789, how- 
ever, she saw no contradiction in choosing, for the important 
position of tutor to the heir of the absolute Tsars, a man of 
Laharpe's ultra-liberal convictions. 3 

From the beginning of their intimate relationship, the young 
master and his pupils appear to have been charmed with each 

1 Rain, Un Tsar ideologue Alexandre l<*, pp. 7 et seq. 

1 For a vivid picture of the dissolute court which surrounded the youth of Alex- 
ander, notably the regime of Catherine's ignoble "favorites," see The Diaries and 
Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury. 

3 Rain, op. cit., pp. 16-19. Laharpe must not be confused with the critic Jean Fran- 
cois de Le Harpe (1739-1803), whose Correspondence with the Grand Duke of Rus- 
sia, noiv Emperor (the Emperor Paul), was published in five tedious volumes in 
1801. This work, generally concerned with the petty jealousies of the French 
literary world, was probably addressed to Paul in a spirit of pure snobisme. 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 



other. Laharpe, filled with youthful enthusiasm for his task, 
recognized its importance and the responsibility it entailed. In 
order to fulfil his mission to the best advantage, he soon obtained 
entire direction of all matters touching the education of the young 
Grand Dukes. History and a philosophical interpretation of the 
events it records was a favorite method of study for both the 
republican teacher and his imperial charges. 

Besides Laharpe, several other foreign "governors" and teach- 
ers were attached to their household. Kraft taught them experi- 
mental physics and "science." Pallas taught them botany and 
took them on long excursions near Pavlovsk. Masson taught 
them mathematics. But regarding matters essentially Russian, 
Catherine wisely insisted that her grandchildren should remain 
under the control of their own compatriots. Muraviev taught 
them Russian history and "moral philosophy," while their reli- 
gious education was placed in the hands of their confessor, Father 
Andrew Samborski. Alexander's devotion as a pupil foreshad- 
owed the generally "suggestionable" character which he devel- 
oped in after life. His teachers not only found him a diligent 
student — a great contrast to his brother Constantine — but he 
also appears to have become ardently attached to all those who 
could satisfy his precocious curiosity. 1 

In 1791, when Alexander was barely fourteen, the Empress 
Catherine decided upon his marriage. Besides the importance 
of assuring the succession in direct line, she impatiently awaited 
the moment when it would be possible to give the Grand Duke 
a separate court and household, thus increasing his prestige at the 
expense of the Tsarevitch, his father. Catherine's choice fell 
upon the Princess Louisa Augusta, the third daughter of the 
reigning Grand Duke of Baden. The princess and her sister 
were subsequently invited to visit the Court of St. Petersburg, 
where the docile Alexander promptly fell in love, with a sincerity 
which at least did honor to his grandmother's perspicacity. 2 

Alexander's marriage, which took place September 25, 1793, 
at first scarcely interrupted Laharpe's philosophic discourses. 3 

1 Bogdanovitch, Alexander I, p. 16. 

2 The story of this imperial idyl is charmingly told in Elizabeth's own letters. 
See Les Lettres de I'lmperatrice Elizabeth, published with an introduction by Grand 
Due Nicolas Mikhaiilowitch. 

3 Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. I, p. S3. 



INTRODUCTION b 

But in 1794, the year of Thermidor, the young teacher's Jaco- 
binism began to offend the Tsarina, and his dismissal was suddenly 
signified to him "without rank or cross" * or any of the distinc- 
tions usually accorded a royal tutor who had completed his task. 
Probably, through the intervention of his pupil, he obtained a 
postponement of his enforced departure. He used the oppor- 
tunity which this unexpected delay afforded him to complete his 
work, impressing upon the receptive mind of Alexander the les- 
sons of democracy and liberalism which had already fired the 
imagination of the future autocrat. The Grand Duke had now 
become a disciple rather than a pupil. Laharpe alone could in- 
fluence the curious blending of gentleness and stubborn determi- 
nation which, even at this early age, formed the basis of Alexan- 
der's character. 

The moment of separation arrived May 9, 1795. Alexander's 
grief and resentment at the departure of his friend and preceptor 
was manifested publicly and without reserve. Czartoryski in his 
Memoires records that "he was heard to declare himself with un- 
measured harshness respecting his grandmother's actions, using 
terms of almost inconceivable abuse." 2 The sincerity and con- 
stancy of this ideal friendship was only proved by time. Laharpe 
left behind him directions for the guidance of his pupil, which 
specified in detail remedies for the faults which his interrupted 
education might develop. In these instructions he advised Alex- 
ander to overcome his natural timidity and to mingle as often as 
possible with his future subjects. Only thus, he declared, could 
the Grand Duke hope to win their love and devotion. That his 
misgivings were not without cause is shown by the sequel. 

Catherine died suddenly in 1796, and was succeeded by the 
Tsarevitch, whose chief ambition was to make the heir of the 
Romanovs a soldier. In the company of the young garrison 
blades who now surrounded him, Alexander lost sight not only'of 
his earlier ideals, but also of all that could remind him of the 
teachings of Laharpe. His friend Czartoryski recounts the ef- 
forts he made at this time to surround the Grand Duke with more 
sympathetic and profitable influences. With this unselfish end in 

1 Rain, op. cit., p. 42, quoting the proceedings of the Societe Imperiale de VHistoire 
Russe, vol. V, remarks on Laharpe's unrepublican indignation at this slight. 
2 Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. I, p. 111. 



6 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

view, he asked leave to present to his patron two young men, 
Novosiltzov and Count Stroganov. In this fashion the nucleus 
of what became known as the "Young Liberal Circle" was intro- 
duced to the Tsarevitch during the Emperor Paul's coronation 
at Moscow. These new friendships deserve more than passing 
notice in considering the development of Alexander's character. 

Novosiltzov, somewhat pedantic and overconscious of the 
advantages of this new connection, soon "prepared in Russian the 
translation of a French work filled with good advice for a young 
Prince about to mount the throne." This was read by Alexan- 
der with characteristic "attention and satisfaction." Under 
these new influences, Czartoryski l notes with approval that "the 
philosophic and idealistic side of the Tsarevitch's character 
quickly recovered its ascendancy." These new friendships 
brought him into renewed contact with the political philosophy 
of the French Revolution. Stroganov, a pupil of the philosopher 
Rom and a disciple of Rousseau, had visited Paris during the 
Terror and listened to the dangerous eloquence of the Jacobin 
clubs. Novosiltzov, sent to Paris by the elder Count Stroganov 
to rescue the aristocratic young liberal from this dangerous at- 
mosphere, had himself become infected with the doctrine of 
"liberty and equality." He returned to Russia almost as great a 
revolutionary as his ward. Thus, in the company of these more 
traveled compatriots, Alexander heard reechoed the lessons of 
Laharpe — and the voice of the spirit of liberty. 

The influence of these friendships was to become the determin- 
ing factor of the "liberal phase" which marked Alexander's early 
career. The Young Liberal Circle, as they were called, planned 
a campaign of propaganda to educate public opinion. Suitable 
books were to be translated into Russian, but at first only those 
for which official approval could be obtained. It was hoped 
that the minds of Alexander's future subjects would thus, by slow 
degrees, be prepared for the measures of reform to which he 
already looked forward as the glory of his coming reign. "How 
happy I could be were you only by my side at this moment," he 
writes to his old master. And Laharpe, filled with honest pride 
at his own part in the education of so generous a prince, wrote in 

1 Czartoryski, op. cit., vol. l, pp. 156-157. 



INTRODUCTION 7 

reply long letters from his quiet retreat in Switzerland. But the 
classical maxims and sage advice of a confirmed doctrinaire of 
the republican era were unequal to the task of guiding his disciple 
through the fast approaching crisis of his father's reign. 

While the Tsarevitch and his companions were busying them- 
selves with their philosophical program of internal reform, im- 
pending events were to bring him face to face with the stern 
realities that beset a ruler. A palace revolution — a sudden, 
fierce reversion to the customs of the Byzantine court on which 
the early Tsars had modeled their own — was suddenly to clear 
the way to Alexander's throne and to place him face to face with 
problems whose theoretical solution had amused his leisure. 
The part which he played in the preparation of the plot which 
ended in his father's assassination has been the subject of long 
and bitter controversy. Of a guilty foreknowledge of this tragic 
event, history has, on the whole, absolved him. 1 

The impression which Paul's character and the circumstances 
of his death left upon Alexander during the brief period of their 
relationship as sovereign and subject must be noted in consider- 
ing the development of the character of the future author of the 
"Holy Alliance." 2 In spite of a striking physical dissimilarity, 
there was a curious resemblance between the two autocrats, father 
and son. 3 In both Tsars we find the same tendency to generous 
impulse marred by an almost morbid egotism; the same restless 
zeal for governmental reform accompanied by an equal disre- 
gard of the prejudices of those most likely to profit by their acts. 
Finally, a wholly false conception of the historical task of a 

1 Joyneville, in his Life and Times of Alexander I, analyzes Alexander's responsi- 
bility for his father's death in the light of the Memoirs of Mme. Svetchine, Bulau's 
Narrative, etc. According to the former, the appeal made to Alexander by the 
conspirators was merely for aid in "constituting the Emperor a state prisoner," 
(conversation between Count Pahlen and General Svetchine, quoted in Joyneville, 
op. cit., vol. i, p. 118). It must also be remembered that at that time Portugal and 
Denmark were both ruled by regents in the name of imbecile sovereigns. Joyneville 
(p. 142) also recounts that Pahlen revealed to Alexander that Paul had ordered 
his arrest, together with the Empress Marie and the Grand Duke Constantine. 
"The business," according to the British Attache, Ross, "took more than three- 
quarters of an hour." Joyneville believes this to be a direct proof that the murder 
of Paul was not decided upon in advance (pp. 147 and 152). See also Waliszewski, 
Le fils de la grande Catherine: Paul I er . 

2 Czartoryski, op. cit., p. 253. 

3 Joyneville, quoting Rostopchine, says that Paul, during his first campaign 
against the French, desired to form a permanent league for the "suppression of 
anarchy and democratic principles," a forerunner of the "Holy Alliance" in its 
later phase. 



8 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

"benevolent despot" and an unwavering belief in the high-minded- 
ness of their own motives led them both to perform the most 
astounding and contradictory acts and to adopt policies which 
were often carried through with ruthless conviction rather than 
statesmanlike foresight. 

Alexander was but twenty-three years old when he succeeded 
to the throne of the Romanovs. Prince Czartoryski was sum- 
moned to the capital to assume the role — but not the office — of 
Prime Minister, which the Tsar had promised him in their youth- 
ful conversations. The new ruler soon found himself surrounded 
with the friends upon whom he might most naturally depend for 
encouragement and support. The members of the "Young 
Liberal Circle," the intimates of his boyhood, returned to St. 
Petersburg from the four quarters of Europe, where the desire 
of the Emperor Paul to separate the Heir-Apparent from their 
liberal influences had dispersed them in semi-official exile. From 
England came Novosiltzov, filled with renewed admiration for 
the constitution and political life of the British commonwealth. 
Stroganov, the aristocratic admirer of the French Revolution, 
returned from the interrupted "grand tour" upon which his over- 
democratic ideas had embarked him. Perhaps most welcome of 
all these unofficial advisers was Alexander's old tutor, Laharpe, 
who hastened from Switzerland at the new Tsar's summons. 1 

International questions, however, rather than policies of inter- 
nal reform, so dear to the "Young Liberals," now forced them- 
selves on the attention of the new government. Just before the 
Tsar Paul's assassination, that monarch had formed an ill-con- 
sidered alliance with Napoleon, reversing Russia's former policy. 
This had resulted in a renewal of the "Armed Neutrality," and 
an embargo was placed upon all Russian, Swedish and Danish 
vessels in the harbors of Great Britain. 2 Orders were also 
given to the West India fleet to attack the Danish possessions in 

1 Laharpe was now somewhat disabused of many of his youthful enthusiasms for 
unrestricted "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." On his return to Switzerland he 
had taken a prominent part in inviting the French Revolutionary government to 
interfere in the civil quarrels of his native cantons. But the victories of the French 
troops over the armies of the Bernese oligarchy had been marked by such scenes 
of pillage and disorder as to trouble even the "pure" republicanism of Rousseau's 
pupil. Moreover, his fellow countrymen had, not unnaturally, held him responsi- 
ble for his share in bringing about their predicament. 

2 For a full account of this revival of Catherine's policy of the "Armed Neutrality," see 
Garden, Histoire generate des traites de paix, vol. v, pp. 347 and 361. 



INTRODUCTION y 

the Gulf of Mexico, while another squadron, under Nelson and 
Parker, set sail for the Baltic (February, 1801). On April 2, 
after a heroic defense by the Danish Admiral Fischer, the 
British fleet won a crushing victory at Copenhagen. After offer- 
ing terms tending to separate Denmark from Russia, which were 
loyally rejected, the victorious expeditions proceeded up the Bal- 
tic with the avowed intention of capturing Kronstad and St. 
Petersburg. 

Thus, during the first days of his reign, the Emperor Alexan- 
der found himself faced with an international crisis of the first 
magnitude. Little time remained to weigh in the balance ab- 
stract problems concerning "the rights of neutral nations," which 
the "Powers of the North" had sworn to defend. The first duty 
was to find some immediate remedy which might safeguard Rus- 
sia's national interests and his too accessible capital. 

In considering the somewhat inglorious settlement to which 
Alexander now gave his consent, several factors must be taken 
into account. His desire was to obtain a respite during which he 
might devote himself to the task of securing essential internal 
reforms. 1 He was constitutionally averse to war (though af- 
fected by what his courtiers called "paradomania") and was 
under the peaceful influence of Czartoryski's idealism. 2 

It was a cruel irony of fate which during the first weeks of his 
reign placed the Tsar in the dilemma of choosing between a forced 
abandonment of cherished principles of "international action" 
and an undignified flight from his royal residence ! Yet the prin- 
ciple embodied in the "League of Neutrals" was one of the few 
results of the Empress Catherine's foreign policy which his ideal- 
istic conceptions could approve. He, therefore, caught eagerly 
at the suggestion of the British Government for a "conference." 
This was a form of negotiation which Alexander seems gen- 

1 Nevertheless, Alexander's first impulse was to defend "the rights of neutrals" from 
respect "for the opinions of his august father." It was Vorontzov, his Ambassador in 
London, who urged upon him the necessity of an Anglo-Russian alliance to meet the 
situation. See an article by F. de Martens, in the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, vol. 
vin, 1894. 

2 In considering Czartoryski's influence at this time it must be remembered that he was 
above all else a patriotic Pole, and that all his hopes of renewing the early, generous 
enthusiasm that Alexander had shown for that much wronged nation lay in stressing the 
duties of an unselfish international viewpoint. This powerful personal influence was to 
be exerted during the whole period of the Tsar's "liberal phase," the period covered by the 
later "Instructions to Novosiltzov." See Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. I, p. 101. 



10 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

erally to have found irresistible. All the powers interested were 
invited to send representatives in order to arrange the differences 
concerning the "rights of neutrals," and in response to this over- 
ture Admiral Hyde Parker was notified by the Russian authori- 
ties of the new Emperor's disposition for peace. To his own con- 
ception, Alexander's "ideals" were actually to offer a convenient 
solution to his difficulties! The Prussian King was desired to 
evacuate Hanover for reasons which were "a distinct advance 
upon the international morality of the day," and, while costing 
the Tsar nothing, enabled him to meet the views of Great Britain. 
Alexander wrote that he was not only "desirous of pacifying the 
North," but also of establishing a "continuing world peace." He 
ended with the pious hope that in view of the high object to be 
accomplished, Frederick. William "would place no difficulties in 
the way." 1 

On June 17, 1801, a Congress of the "Powers of the North," 
viz., Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, assembled in St. 
Petersburg. The protocol agreed upon, with the exception of a 
clause forbidding paper blockades, was wholly favorable to the 
contentions of Great Britain. The parties agreed: (1) That a 
neutral flag should not cover enemy goods, and (2) that visit and 
search were permissible even when vessels were under the con- 
voy of a vessel of war. 

If the Scandinavian allies of Russia, one of whom had glori- 
ously suffered the loss of her fleet in defending the rights of neu- 
trals, could see in this arrangement little else than a base betrayal 
of the principles which the "Armed Neutrality" had sworn to 
defend, Czartoryski might at least console the Tsar with the 
thought that he had given an example of philosophic devotion 
to the cause of international peace and had saved his capital from 
invasion. 

Soon after this rather inglorious settlement of Russia's dif- 
ficulties, in 1803, Alexander appointed Czartoryski, whose in- 
fluence becomes more and more traceable in ensuing events, as his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. In spite of the clouds gathering 
on the horizon, notably an estrangement with France, the new 
Minister announced a program of peace and a foreign policy 
that eminently suited Alexander's ambitions. Said Czartoryski : 

'See Garden, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 376. 



INTRODUCTION 11 

I firmly believed that it might be possible for me to reconcile the tenden- 
cies of the Russian nation with the generous ideas of its ruler, and to make 
use of the Russian craving for glory and supremacy for the general benefit 
of mankind. The object was a great but a remote one, to be pursued con- 
sistently and with perseverance, and to be executed with patience and skill. 
I thought it was worthy of the national pride of the Russian people. I 
would have wished Alexander to become a sort of arbiter of peace for the 
civilized world, to be the protector of the weak and the oppressed, and that 
his reign should inaugurate a new era of justice and right in European poli- 
tics. 1 

Soon after Czartoryski's appointment, in 1804, the Duke of 
Enghien, grandson of the Great Conde, was treacherously seized 
by Napoleon's orders, within the territory of the Grand Duchy of 
Baden, and dragged across the French frontiers. After the 
mockery of a court martial, he was shot to death in the moat of 
the fortress of Vincennes. The disregard for international 
rights shown by this violation of neutral territory and its accom- 
panying judicial murder aroused all Europe to a fury of protest. 
Two months later, Bonaparte notified the Powers, still aghast 
at this unnecessary tragedy, of his formal assumption of the Im- 
perial title. The new Emperor of France could hardly have 
chosen a more unfavorable moment for entering the ranks of the 
sovereigns of Europe. Although in practical effect the aboli- 
tion of the Consular title was a mere matter of form, Russia 
refused to recognize Napoleon's usurpation. Only Austria and 
the subservient Hohenzollern dynasty, both of whom had felt 
the weight of his displeasure, acquiesced in the monarchical preten- 
sions of the ex-revolutionary general. The way was prepared 
for a fresh coalition of the Powers of Europe, in which the Tsar 
of Russia was to play the role of mediator which Czartoryski so 
ardently desired him to assume. Their ideals and dreams of 
international polity were, moreover, about to receive definite 
form through the medium of the "Instructions to Novosiltzov." 2 
The instructions follow the policy of a carefully written 
opinion dated April 5, 1804, in which Czartoryski sought to de- 
fine the Tsar's attitude towards a government which "tramples 
under foot the most generally accepted principles of international 
law." The duty of Russia and the Powers "to decry and avenge" 

Czartoryski, op. cit., vol. I, p. 370. 

2 These instructions are too well known through the studies of Sorel and Phillips to be 
quoted in extenso. 



12 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

such action was discussed at length. 1 In the opinion both of Czar- 
toryski and the Emperor a preliminary understanding between 
Great Britain and Russia promised the surest guarantee for the 
success of their international program and the proposed alliance 
against the hegemony of France. In September, 1804, Alexan- 
der was prepared to lay before the British Cabinet a scheme not 
only for immediate military action, but also for an eventual 
rational settlement of the entire diplomatic situation. The un- 
derstanding between these Powers was to form the basis of a 
wider coalition. Such, indeed, was the only means which might 
conceivably place a limit upon Napoleon's ambitions. 

"Novosiltzov's Instructions" outline the plan which Alexander 
now proposed to the British Cabinet. Long buried in the 
archives of the Russian Foreign Office, these were first made 
public in their complete form through the publication of Czar- 
toryski's Memoires. They had previously been known only 
through a partial quotation by Tatistcheff and notably through 
Pitt's reply couched, doubtless from reasons of policy, in a 
language similar to the Emperor's own. 2 

The opening paragraph of Novosiltzov's Instructions con- 
tains an eloquent recognition of the growing force of public 
opinion in international affairs: 

The most effectual weapon which France now wields — one with which 
the French continue to menace their neighbors — is their ability to persuade 
public opinion that their cause is that of the liberty and prosperity of all 
nations. 

As a condition preceding the "moral union" he sought with 
Great Britain, he next asks the latter's adhesion to a "New Or- 
der," which must be brought about. The "New Order" was a 
highly practical program of "self-determination," the outlines of 
a reconstruction of Europe on "national" lines. The King of 

1 Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. II, p. 2. 

2 The Instructions to Novosiltzov are given in full in Czartoryski, Memoires, vol. II, 
p. 27, and Appendix. In reading them, the truth of Czartoryski's contention, that history 
has neglected both their importance and significance becomes apparent. Modern writers 
have in a measure repaired this error, recognizing that they laid the foundations upon 
which, ten years later, rested the program of intervention and reconstruction contained in 
the Treaties of Kalisch and Chaumont. "Compare this language," says Sorel, speaking 
of Novosiltzov's Instructions, "with that which Koutousov addressed to the Germans in 
1813, and with that which Alexander addressed to the French liberals in 1814. It will be 
seen that all forms part of the same program. The same may even be said of the measures 
planned in 1804 and 1814 for the reconstruction of continental Europe." Sorel, U Europe 
et la Revolution Franqaise, part vi, p. 39. 



INTRODUCTION 13 

Sardinia, who had been unjustly deprived by Napoleon of his 
throne, was to be reestablished, but not until he had promised to 
give his people the benefits of "a wise and free constitution." The 
importance of maintaining Swiss neutrality was also recognized 
"as an essential factor in the peace of Europe." In restoring 
Holland to national existence the modern theory of self-determi- 
nation is recognized: "The character of the national desires 
must be considered before deciding upon the form of government 
to be established." 

A paragraph respecting the attitude to be adopted by the 
Anglo-Russian Alliance towards France herself is equally sig- 
nificant at the present day: 

I now come to the language which, in my opinion, it will be necessary to 
hold with respect to France herself. After having imposed our will upon 
her, and after, through just, benevolent and liberal principles, having mani- 
fested our intentions (giving her confidence that she can count upon the 
promises made by our Alliance), we should declare that it is not upon 
France that we make war, but only upon a government as tyrannical towards 
France as towards the rest of Europe. 1 

There is no suggestion in the Tsar's plan of a superstate (the 
favorite remedy of the eighteenth century philosophers for all 
international ills) nor any hint of the doctrine of intervention 
in the internal affairs of neighboring states (the policy which was 
later to render the pretensions of the Holy Alliance most hateful 
in the eyes of the "Constitutional Powers"). 2 

Perhaps the most important paragraph of Novosiltzov's In- 
structions is the one in which the Tsar, after a brief historical 
notice of former proposals to organize humanity, finds the 
guarantee of future peace in a pact binding the nations of Europe 
by means of a general treaty or confederacy — a League of 
Nations — whose guiding principles would be those of interna- I 
tional law and wherein mediation would be substituted for war : 

1 The Tsar's insistence that the Allies war only against Napoleon and not against the 
French people finds a parallel in President Wilson's declarations that "the real enemy is 
not the German people so much as the military masters who enchain them as well as the 
foreign territories they have conquered." 

2 "It seems evident that this great aim can only be considered as attained when we shall 
have succeeded in reconciling the nations with their governments, and in making the latter 
capable of action tending to the best interests of their people. We must also fix the rela- 
tions of the states among themselves by means of well-defined rules, which it will be in the 
interest of all to respect. Profound examination of these matters and the lessons of 
history will prove that these two results can only be obtained when the interior order of all 
states is based upon free institutions, protected against the passions and ambitions of the 
individuals who may be placed at their head." 



14 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

I can see no reason why, after peace has been declared, we should not 
undertake to negotiate a general treaty which might become the basis of 
the reciprocal relations between the States of Europe. This indeed will 
almost inevitably suggest itself at the moment of a general pacification, 
especially if no incomplete and partial peace be allowed to interfere, an end 
to which both powers are equally interested in devoting all their efforts 
and designs. 

When the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, a similar proposal was 
entertained. But the degree of political development and other circum- 
stances paramount at the time would not allow the consummation of this 
great work, in spite of the fact that for a long time this pact formed the 
basis of foreign relations. Modern diplomacy should be adequate to meet 
the situation which presents itself. Impossible though the attainment of 
a state of eternal peace would appear to be, nevertheless in many ways this 
end might be forwarded if the treaty, which should conclude the present 
general war, will embody clear and precise principles and prescriptions with 
respect to international law. Why should not a law of nations be evolved 
assuring the privileges of neutrality and consecrating as an obligation never 
to commence war without having exhausted all the means of mediation by 
a third party? — a mediator who, having through the proper means examined 
the respective wrongs of the litigants, will seek to compound them? It is 
by applying such principles that a true and lasting pacification of the world 
might be obtained. 

It is, moreover, interesting to note that membership in the pro- 
posed League of Peace was based upon a voluntary decision by 
its members. Alexander evidently believed that the advantages 
to be obtained through becoming a party to this general treaty 
would be patent to all the civilized states of Europe : 

After having experienced the drawbacks and inconveniences of a com- 
plete — though precarious and illusory — independent existence, the majority 
of all Powers would probably desire to belong to such a League. This 
would not only guarantee as far as possible their external tranquillity and 
safety, but also (especially in the case of states of a secondary order) would 
offer them internal guarantees of protection. 

Nor does the Tsar avoid consideration of the practical details 

of his problem. An interesting paragraph in the "Instructions" 

has reference to questions of political geography and of strategic 

and — even of economic — frontiers : 

In order to secure our ends, it would be necessary to fix the frontiers 
which properly belong to each separate state. It would thus appear 
especially desirable to follow the boundaries which nature herself has laid 
down, i. e., mountain chains, seas, etc. Finally, the proper means of ac- 
cess should be assured to each nation for the interchange of the products 
of their soil and industry. It might also be advisable if possible to obtain 
that each state should consist of homogeneous people in agreement among 
themselves and with the government that rules them. 



INTRODUCTION 15 

Finally, with respect to the old principle of "the balance of 
power" and the ever-present questions of the lesser nationalities, 
Alexander offers a striking solution — the grouping of the smaller 
states into federations which would place them more nearly on a 
par with their neighbors: 

The disturbances which have shaken Europe almost continually for so 
many centuries have only taken place because so little attention has been 
paid to any system of natural equilibrium. Just how far this principle 
could be made to govern the new arrangement which should follow the 
general pacification it would be difficult for the present to decide. It would 
depend largely upon what powers would be admitted to these councils and 
the logical outcome of events. Nevertheless, it is even now possible to 
recognize the necessity of strengthening as far as possible the secondary 
powers in order that these may be capable of self-protection, at least until 
the protecting powers and the other members of the League can come to 
their assistance. For the same reason it is evident that the existence of 
very small states would not be in accord with the ends desired. Since these 
are without the necessary powers of resistance, they can only serve as tempta- 
tions to the ambitions of larger states without contributing in any way to 
the general good. A means of remedying this inconvenience might be found 
by uniting them to larger states, or in grouping them in small federative 
unions. 

Although the defeat of the Allies at Austerlitz was to postpone 
for nearly ten years the possibility of any practical application of 
the principles contained in Novosiltzov's Instructions, Alexander 
had every reason to believe that they had formed the basis of the 
proposed general European settlement which was the avowed 
object of the Third Coalition. The British attitude was, in sub- 
stance, a cordial acceptance of Alexander's proposals. 

Pitt's reply to Novosiltzov (made public on May 15, 1805), 
read as follows: 

It would seem from the views advanced by H. I. M., views to which 
H. M. adheres, that three principal purposes are to be sought: (1) to free 
from the dominion of France the countries conquered by her since the out- 
break of the revolution, and to restrict her to her former frontiers; (2) to 
ensure to the countries released from the French yoke not only their con- 
tinued peace and happiness, but also to erect them into a barrier against 
further French aggression; (3) to establish (with the renewal of peace) 
a convention and guarantee for the protection and mutual safety of the 
Powers, and to establish in Europe a general system of public law. . . . 
His Majesty would consider this noble plan as incomplete if the restoration 
of peace were not at the same time accompanied by measures tending to 
secure the system thus brought into existence. It would appear desirable 
when the general pacification occurs that a treaty be concluded to which 
all the great powers of Europe might become parties. Through this means 



16 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

the possession of their respective territory, as now established, would be 
fixed and recognized. To secure this end the powers must engage them- 
selves reciprocally to maintain and support each other against all efforts to 
disturb and infringe upon their rights. Such a treaty would endow Europe 
with a common law and tend as much as possible to repress all enterprises 
troubling the general peace. 1 

The diplomatic history of the epic struggle between Alexan- 
der and Napoleon, which, except for the precarious duration of 
the Tilsit Alliance, was to continue for more than a decade after 
the date of Novosiltzov's Mission, has been studied in detail by 
Sorel 2 and Vandal. 3 Their scholarly interpretation of new mate- 
rial and the examination of archives not available to earlier stu- 
dents have revealed the story of these momentous years, probably 
in a form approaching finality. Yet everywhere in the pages of 
these historical masterpieces the glory of the vanquished out- 
shines that of the victor. In their revived enthusiasm for the 
Empire, the authors have done but scant justice to what may 
well appear at the present day the most significant feature of the 
campaigns that ended in the downfall of the French Emperor: 
the Tsar's determination, again and again apparent, to dedicate 
the victories of the Alliance to securing an organized peace and 
the establishment of a European System. In the negotiations to 
induce the Courts of Vienna, Stockholm and Berlin to join in a 
levee en masse of Europe against the pretensions of Napoleon 
there was no question of the sweeping plans of international re- 
construction which had preceded the signing of the "Treaty of 
Concert" between the Tsar and the King of England. Neverthe- 
less, "the young monarch firmly believed that he was fulfilling an 
international mission in becoming the military Champion of 
Humanity." 4 Even when the Third Coalition went down in de- 
feat (1805) at Austerlitz — and the Tsar instead of maintaining 
the rights he had championed in Novosiltzov's Instructions found 

1 See Garden, Histoire g'en'erale des traites de paix, vol. vm, p. 317. Until the publi- 
cation of Czartoryski's Memoires, Pitt's reply was the only public document with respect 
to this important negotiation except for a brief notice by Tatichev. Novosiltzov's nego- 
tiations in London during January, 1805, were continued throughout February by the 
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The result was the Alliance or "Treaty of Concert" 
of April 11. For a full account of the diplomatic negotiations preceding the Third Coali- 
tion against France, see Garden, op. cit., vol. vm, pp. 302 et seq. 

2 A. Sorel, L Europe et la Revolution Franraise. 

3 A. Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I er . 

* Tatistcheff, Alexandre I cr et Napoleon, p. 86. 



INTRODUCTION 17 

himself defending the frontiers of his own Empire against the 
victorious armies of the greatest political "realist" of all times — 
Alexander still clung to his ideals of European solidarity. The 
Russian disaster at Friedland (1807) was the result of his 
chivalrous devotion to Frederick William III of Prussia, an 
effort to save him from the consequences of his belated adhesion 
to the Third Coalition. 

When a way was opened for the conquerors to the heart of 
Russia, the peace which Napoleon imposed upon the Tsar at Tilsit 
' was offered in the form of an Alliance, and the methods used 
by the French Emperor to attach Alexander to his "Continental 
System" recall the irresistible appeal he had made to the morbid 
» vanity of his father the Tsar Paul. 1 Tilsit was the negation of 
every policy and principle that Alexander had heretofore pro- 
fessed. 2 The treaty laid down a program of opportunism : a 
"free hand" granted to Russia in Finland and a rectification of 
the Turkish-Russian frontiers were little more than an Imperial 
bribe. In the moment of the Tsar's greatest military peril he 
was thus offered an opportunity to resume the imperialistic poli- 
cies of Catherine the Great, 3 which the reactionary advisers of 
his court had accused him of abandoning. But Tilsit was from 
the beginning an alliance merely in name. Beneath the surface,' 
in spite of the assurances and compliments exchanged between the 
Emperors, French and Russian diplomacy continued a struggle 
without truce or common advantage. Neither sovereign could 
obtain the fulfilment of the essential features of a pact which only 
joined their real interests for a few brief months. The meeting 
at Erfurt, scarcely a year after the historic interview on the Nie- 
men, showed Alexander ready to plot the destruction of his Im- 
perial "ally" with the latter's most treacherous foes. 4 After 
more than three years of deceit and diplomatic evasion, it was 
almost joyously that the Tsar abandoned the plan of sharing the 
dominion of the universe with Napoleon. Resuming the dialectic 

1 Sorel, op. cit., vol. VI, p. 73. 

2 Paul at least was persuaded that his alliance with the "Corsican tempter" was 
to "ensure the Peace of Europe." Ibid. 

3 Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I*'. 

*Ibid. At Erfurt Alexander had a famous interview with Talleyrand, who more than 
hinted his willingness to betray Napoleon. See Dupuis, Le Ministere de Talleyrand en 
1814, vol. i, p. 27. 



18 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

of his earlier negotiation with Pitt — the language of Novosilt- 
zov's Instructions — we find him (1812) assuring his new ally, 
Bernadotte (the former Napoleonic General, elected Crown 
Prince of Sweden) that their common task is "to revive in Europe 
the regime of liberal ideas and to save her from the abyss of bar- 
barism to which she seems hurrying." * 

Into the details of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, the burn- 
ing of Moscow on the approach of winter, which made a with- 
drawal, if not a retreat, inevitable, and the loss of the Grande 
Arm'ee^ it is unnecessary to enter for the purposes of this intro- 
duction. Suffice it to say that Alexander's mind was busied with 
far-reaching schemes long since prepared, which were to make of 
the victories gained but the starting point for a second interna- 
tional crusade. He brushed aside governments, and appealed 
directly to the people, 2 and warned their rulers that if they re- 
mained abjectly persistent in their system of federation, it was 
the voice of the people which must be heard. It was with the 
peoples of Germany, rather than with their rulers, that the Treaty 
of Kalisch, uniting Russia and Prussia, was signed. 

Through a series of agreements anticipating both political and 
military action, the links of the Grand Alliance were one by one 
solidly forged. The Treaties of Reichenbach, the second link in 
the great system which was to control the destinies of Europe 
during the ensuing years, were signed on June 14 and 15, 1813. 
These constituted a formal treaty of alliance between Great 
Britain, Russia and Prussia, by the terms of which a new coalition 
came into being. At Reichenbach (June 15), England also 
renewed her continental policy, strengthening the bonds of the 
alliance with her generous subsidies. Pitt promised to pay the 
enormous costs of the armies of Russia and Prussia, but at the 
same time insisted upon a renewal of Alexander's earlier pro- 
posals, that none of the Powers were to permit themselves to 
enter into any separate negotiations with the enemy. In Articles 

1 Alexander to Bernadotte, quoted by Rain, vol. I, p. 208. 

2 " We now appeal to the people through this manifesto in the same terms that 
our envoy will use toward their rulers. If these latter remain abjectly persistent 
in their system of federation it is the voice of the people which must be heard. 
The rulers who have plunged their subjects in oppression and disaster must be 
forced to embrace the cause of vengeance and glory. Let Germany but recall her 
ancient valor and the tyrant will cease to exist." Garden, vol. xiv, p. 181. 



INTRODUCTION 



19 



I and II of the Treaty of Reichenbach the return of the "lands 
in Germany held by the French Princes was declared to be the 
object of the common efforts." Toeplitz (September 9, 1813), 
the third link in the chain of alliances, ranged Austria on the side 
of the Allies. The "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (October, 
1813) sealed the military fate of Napoleon. The era of diplo- 
macy was about to begin. 1 

After Leipzig, even Schwartzenberg, the Austrian military 
commander, believed the greatest obtainable military results to 
be achieved. "All . . . are of this opinion," he wrote, "but 
the Emperor Alexander ... !" Words failed the horrified 
Austrian tactician on his attempts to describe the determination 
with which the Tsar continued the pursuit of his enemy. With- 
out a complete military victory the international peace he aimed 
at was impossible. The advance towards Paris continued, "the 
army dragging forward, the diplomats murmuring and conspir- 
ing." 2 At Chatillon, where Napoleon was negotiating for peace, 
the conflict of selfish interests broke out afresh. 3 It was already 
becoming manifest that to find a common ground of agreement 
among the victors would be a task almost as difficult as Napo- 
leon's overthrow. The French success of Montmiriel and Cha- 
teau-Thierry caused these differences to be momentarily forgot- 
ten. But the battles of Arcis-sur-Aube and La Feree-Cham- 
peniose, while restoring the military equilibrium of the coalition, 
renewed the dissensions of their councils. 

The conference at Chatillon was in fact little else than a 
poorly staged diplomatic comedy which deceived neither antago- 
nist. Napoleon's ear , mess to negotiate rose and fell with 
the varying fortunes of his military campaign. The Allied 
proposals — purposely made more and more unacceptable to 
France — were not even presented until February 17. Badly 
beaten at the engagement of La Rothiere, Napoleon had author- 
ized his representative to make "the broadest concessions." It 

^he text of the Treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach and Toeplitz are to be found in 
Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites de Paix, vol. Ill, p. 234; vol. I, pp. 568, 571. 

2 Sorel, op. cit., part VIII, p. 257. 

3 These discussions turned upon Napoleon's successor, the question of the "natural 
limits," the plan of campaign, etc. The Tsar only consented to take part on "the basis 
of Frankfort," communicating his reservations in a memoir to Metternich. See Sorel, 
op. cit., part vm, pp. 250-255. 



20 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

required but a few slight successes, however, to encourage him 
again to resist the Allies' demands. 1 

One ominous fact must have convinced Napoleon's envoy, 
Caulaincourt, that his mission was more difficult than ever be- 
fore; the negotiations of Chatillon were carried out "under a 
general instruction" wherein the Allies "considered themselves 
as maintaining one and the same interest." 2 

This was the policy to be formally adopted by the important 
Treaty of Chaumont, an event of the deepest significance to the 
inauguration of a new political system for Europe, which occurred 
on March 10. The signatures of all the Allied Powers had been 
affixed to the same document after Leipzig. But no formal 
League of the Allies as yet existed, except such as arose from a 
complicated system of politico-military protocols and treaties, 
notably those of Reichenbach and Toeplitz. These mainly con- 
templated military action against the "Enemy of Europe," and 
only hinted at political arrangements. When the negotiation of 
a final peace became imminent, the necessity of consolidating the 
basis of some future common policy binding on all the Allies be- 
came apparent. 3 

It was to secure this important end that the Treaty of Chau- 
mont (bearing the date of March 1 ) had been proposed. In the 
preamble it was declared that the high contracting parties, 

having offered to the French government terms for the conclusion of a 
general peace (in case of the refusal by France of these conditions) desire 
to strengthen the bonds which unite them in the vigorous prosecution of a 
war undertaken with the intention of bringing a close to the misfortunes of 
Europe. 4 

Having thus clearly stated its main objects, the Treaty sets 
forth its intention "to insure the future tranquillity of Europe by 
reestablishing a just equilibrium of the powers." 

After fixing the subsidies to be advanced by Great Britain, 
Article V continues : 

'See Talleyrand, Memoires, vol. II, p. 151, and A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de 
I 'Europe, vol. I, pp. 6-7. Napoleon always believed himself on the eve of a Marengo or 
Austerlitz. After a theatrical tirade, he had pronounced for a peace at any price on 
January 4th. Caulaincourt was somewhat disconcerted at the extent of these powers and 
hampered by ignorance of the military situation. See Sorel, op. cit., part vii, pp. 259-262. 

2 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 72-79. 

3 Metternich was even believed to be negotiating separately with France. Sorel, op. 
cit., part vni, p. 289. 

4 This treaty is given in Martens, op. cit., vol. ir, p. 48. 



INTRODUCTION 21 

The contracting parties will agree after the conclusion of the peace with 
France ... to take defensive measures for the protection of their respec- 
tive territories in Europe against all attempts on the part of France to 
trouble the results of this pacification. 

This was nothing less than the "mutual guarantee" which the 
Tsar had long advocated. But in order not to raise premature 
differences between the Allies, the "order of things which shall 
be the happy outcome of their efforts " was purposely left vague. 

Certain broad lines of policy were, however, laid down. It was 
determined that Switzerland should be raised to the rank of an 
independent state, that Spain should be restored to the Bourbons, 
and that Germany should form a federal union. In order to carry 
out these provisions the means to be used were further set forth 
as "amicable intervention" (Article VI) and, this failing (Article 
VII), an international army might be raised, each party furnish- 
ing a contingent of 60,000 men. 

The Treaty of Chaumont thus became an elaboration of the 
policy determined upon at Toeplitz. While directed against 
France, it also furnished a treaty basis for future concerted 
action. Formally renewed at Paris in 1.815, and at Aix-la- 
Chapelle in 1818, it may be said to constitute the foundation of 
the "system" which formed the groundwork of European diplo- 
macy until the year 1848. 

A great change is observable, however, in the language of this 
document when it is compared with the generous sentiments 
embodied in Alexander's Kalisch pronunciamento, or with the 
liberal ideas contained in his tocsin appeal to the "peoples of 
Europe." The diplomats of Europe could find no place in a formal 
agreement for a league to maintain European peace "based on a 
new conception of public law," which Novosiltzov had discussed 
with Pitt. The Treaty of Chaumont was the resultant of con- 
tending forces and drew its future strength and usefulness from the 
purposely vague language of the articles dealing with matters 
which were a subject of controversy between the Powers. The 
future of Poland was ignored, as well as the question of Napoleon's 
successor; on the other hand a " balance of Europe " was definitely 
guaranteed (Article XVI) for a period — which might be ex- 
tended — of at least twenty years. Although France was the 
power ostensibly aimed at as a possible disturber of this highly 



22 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

desirable equilibrium, the terms were general enough to raise the 
issue to the rank of a great European principle. 

With this general affirmation of the solidarity of the great 
Powers, a principle which he was to affirm with increasing enthu- 
siasm during the ensuing period of diplomatic reconstruction, 
the Tsar was obliged to be content. Castlereagh, however, had 
been the controlling influence of the debates and the attitude 
which he adopted from the beginning had been guided by the terms 
of definite instructions, which clearly show the limitations England 
was about to place upon her Continental policy. "The Treaty of 
Alliance," he declared, "is not to terminate with the war, but is 
to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations to 
support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of 
stipulated succours. The casus foederis is to be an attack by France 
on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties." l 
It was the development of this policy of "reservations" which in 
the end was to wreck the whole framework of the Tsar's idealistic 
proposals for a European confederation. To offset Great Britain's 
determination to remain aloof from the internal quarrels of Con- 
tinental Europe, Alexander was soon to propose a plan of action 
having for its basis a definite recognition of the duty of inter- 
national solidarity. This policy, "consecrated" in the mystical 
pact of the Holy Alliance, was to serve ends wholly foreign to the 
Tsar's earlier ideals. 

Accompanied by the King of Prussia, Alexander entered Paris 
in triumph on March 30, 1814, and Napoleon's abdication was 
signed a few days later. 2 The first Treaty of Paris followed the 
signing of a convention, dated April 23, 1814. The article forming 
the basis of both the convention of April 23 and the ensuing 
Treaty 3 guaranteed to France "the frontiers as they actually 
existed on January 1, 1792." This deprived the restored mon- 
archy of all the conquests made by the Republic and the Empire, 
with the exception of certain territories belonging to the Con- 
federation of the Rhine. 

1 These instructions, quoted by Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, p. 66, from the 
Foreign Office Records, are contained in a Cabinet Memorandum, dated December 26, 
1813. 

2 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhallowitch, L' Empereur Alexandre I^r, vol. I, p. 134. 

3 The details of the negotiation of this treaty are given in full in Talleyrand, Memoires, 
vol. II, pp. 172 et seq. 



INTRODUCTION 23 

The keynote of Bourbon diplomacy was to ignore past events. 
When Alexander visited the Paris mint, a medal was struck in 
his honor which bore on one side the inscription: "To the restorer 
of peace in Europe"; on the reverse was emblazoned the arms of 
France, with the words: "In the month of April, 1814, France 
joined the Grand Confederation of the Powers of Europe." 1 
Many months, however, were to elapse before these words had 
any real significance. The real terms which defined the allied 
policy toward France were contained in secret articles annexed 
to the Treaty of Paris. 2 These stipulated: 

The disposal of the territories which his Very Christian Majesty has 
renounced by the terms of Article III of the Treaty (of Paris), an arrange- 
ment from which a real and durable European equilibrium must arise, 
will be decided at the Congress along lines which shall be determined 
among themselves by the Allied Powers. 

Although the intention of the Treaty of Paris was several times 
declared to be that of "effacing all traces of the recent unfortunate 
events," 3 it was in fact little else than the enumeration of the 
terms imposed by victorious conquerors upon a fallen enemy. 

In addition to the Allies of Toeplitz and Chaumont, Spain, 
Portugal, and Sweden were invited to accede to the Treaty, 
although — a derogation from the Tsar's favorite principle of "united 
action" — identical treaties were signed separately with France by 
each of these Powers. By the terms of these treaties eight of the 
principal Powers of Europe found themselves parties to a general 
agreement. Their alliance was still chiefly aimed at keeping a 
ninth great Power in a state of military inferiority, yet the Tsar 
might well feel that the foundations of his confederation of Europe 
had been well and truly laid. With the exchange of the ratifica- 
tions the sovereigns and their representatives dispersed. An era 
of good feeling, recalling the atmosphere of international solidarity 
which had reigned during the earlier conferences of the war, once 
more united the Allies. But as Sorel significantly remarks: "All 
important matters were but adjourned until the Congress." 4 

1 Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, Memoirs, p. 177. This incident is significant as show- 
ing the quick apprehension by the restored government of Alexander's favorite "inter- 
national" policy. 

2 Martens, Nouveaux SuppUmens, vol. i, p. 329. 

3 Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. II, p. 197. 

4 See Sorel's important appreciations, op. cit., part via, p. 346. 



24 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Vienna at the opening of the Congress presented an impressive 
spectacle. Besides two hundred and sixteen chiefs of diplo- 
matic missions, representing with few exceptions all the Christian 
Powers of Europe, 1 this great "international parliament" was 
attended in person by four kings and two emperors. While the 
civilized world awaited, with a natural anxiety, the result of the 
deliberations of the assembled statesmen, a series of balls, carnivals 
and tournaments varied the monotony of these debates and fur- 
nished entertainment for the host of courtiers and their ladies 
who surrounded the assembled monarchs. 2 

No one had awaited the formal opening of the great Congress 
with more eager anticipations than the idealistic Tsar of Russia. 
His brief stay in St. Petersburg had convinced him that he was 
once more autocrat, not only by right of law, but also in the hearts 
of his subjects. 3 It was fortified by the knowledge that his acts 
were approved by the people of his whole vast Empire that the 
Tsar had proceeded to Vienna. He was, moreover, confident 
that the debt which Europe owed him for Russia's powerful inter- 
vention in the late wars would make him the natural arbiter of 
the debates which were to organize a permanent peace. 4 

Alexander was accompanied on his journey by a complete diplo- 
matic staff. Gentz in his letters criticizes the Tsar's intention 
to negotiate in person rather than to depend upon the training 
and experience of his entourage. His determination to do away 
with intermediaries had resulted in a quarrel between the Tsar 
and his Grand Marshal, Count Tolstoy. "Persuaded that his 
kindness towards him could have no bounds, Tolstoy opposed 
Alexander's appearance at the Congress. His idea was that the 
Emperor could only play an undignified role. Worn out by these 
representations, his Majesty . . . decided to part with his 
Grand Marshal." 5 He had early reason to regret his neglect of 
their excellent advice. The necessity of making rapid decisions 
amidst the heated debates of the council chamber deprived him 
of the advantage always maintained by a deputy acting ad referen- 

1 Talleyrand, vol. II, pp. 275 et seq. 

2 For an account of these festivities, see La Garde, Fetes et Souvenirs du Congres de 
Vienne. 

3 His natural modesty prevented the Holy Synod from conferring upon him, according 
to the ancient Russian fashion, the title of "Blessed of God" in recognition of his victories. 
See Rain, op. cit., p. 245. 

4 Sorel, op. cit., part VIII, p. 384. 
6 La Garde, op. cit., vol. I, p. 197. 



INTRODUCTION 25 

dum. This egotistical pretension to override the accepted customs 
of diplomacy was to place the Tsar, on more than one occasion, 
in a position of inferiority. Equally disquieting was his depend- 
ence on individuals like Czartoryski, Capo DTstria and Laharpe, 
personally sympathetic advisers rather than sources of information 
and counsel to which the traditional policy of the Empire required 
him to give weight. 1 

The deliberations of the Congress of Vienna may be studied in 
detail in the memoirs of the French and Austrian representatives, 
Talleyrand and Metternich. For the purposes of our subject 
they need only be considered in so far as they concern the ensuing 
era of the international congress and the upbuilding of the "Sys- 
tem of 1815." The members of the Grand Alliance were loath 
to admit new influences to their debates. They preferred to 
consider the Congress as a council of the Allies. As late as Novem- 
ber 1, one month after the assembly of the delegates, Metternich 
still maintained that "the Congress is not a Congress; its com- 
missions are not commissions." Indeed the only advantage which 
he consented to accord to the Vienna gathering was that "it 
seems an opportunity to remove the physical distances that 
divide Europe." 2 

A few days later he declared that the "very word of Congress 
terrified the Prussians" and that it would be preferable to call the 
conference together only after some agreement had been reached 
with respect to the principal questions involved. 3 In other words 
he proposed that this great "European" gathering should only be 
allowed the power of ratification after a division of the spoils of 
Napoleon's Empire had been made by the victorious Allies. 

The Tsar's intentions were from the beginning distrusted by 
many. There was indeed in his policy a curious blending of inter- 
national idealism and practical advantage to Russia. Behind all his 
fine phrases a determination was evident to draw profit from the 
military situation. "The only reward which I ask," he repeated 
with somewhat affected enthusiasm, "is to be allowed to repair in a 
measure the great crime committed by Catherine II." By uniting 
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, endowed with a liberal constitution, 
to his own autocratic domain, he planned to restore the ancient 

x Cf. Lansing, The Big Four, p. 38. 
2 Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. II, p. 420. 
'Ibid., p. 431. 



26 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Kingdom of Poland. 1 England and Austria, however, were un- 
alterably determined not to permit any change of frontier which 
might allow a Russo-Prussian entente to become a preponderant 
force in Europe. Poland according to their plans was again to be 
called upon to play her historic part as a buffer state. 

Thus when the Tsar, strengthened by his own conceptions of the 
debt which Europe owed in return for his sacrifices in the cause 
of the Alliance, formulated his demands, he found himself faced 
by a firm coalition determined upon refusal. A series of stormy 
personal interviews ensued; horrified rumor affirmed that in his 
conversations with Metternich strong personalities were indulged 
in on the part of the Tsar 2 and that the Austrian envoy's rejoin- 
ders had been made in a tone of respectful but ill-disguised con- 
tempt. On October 1, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the Tsar, 
setting forth at length his opposition to the latter's views with 
respect to the Duchy. This resulted in a sharp interchange of 
"extra-official notes," wherein Czartoryski was called upon to 
defend "the right of Poland to nationality," a contention in con- 
venient accord with one of the principal "points" of Novosiltzov's 
Instructions. This extraordinary debate, carried on by private 
correspondence, finally exasperated the Emperor, who refused 
to continue further negotiations by this means. 3 Tolstoy's 
prophecies respecting the "personal negotiation" of his sovereign 
were being fulfilled. 

Above the clamor of contending ambitions and particularistic 
interests now sounded a new rallying cry, Talleyrand's famous 
formula of "legitimacy." This principle indeed appeared the 
only one generally applicable to a situation complicated by 
so many contending interests. One cause which had restrained 
Castlereagh from openly opposing the military power wielded by 
the Tsar was the fact that Great Britain was still embarrassed by 
the long-drawn-out war with the United States. With the sign- 
ing of the Peace of Ghent (December 24, 1814), full liberty of 
action was restored to England's forces. Castlereagh immediately 
declared himself ready to adhere to Talleyrand's plans, and the 
latter had the satisfaction of concluding the secret alliance which 

1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. i, p. 22. 

2 Talleyrand, op. cit., vol. II, p. 509. 

3 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhailowitch, op. cit., vol. I, p. 147. 



INTRODUCTION 27 

he had so long desired to form between France, Austria and Eng- 
land (January 3,181s). 1 

Thus a few weeks after France had been dragged to the bar to 
hear the sentence of Europe passed upon her misdeeds, she found 
herself, through the surprising diplomatic abilities of her chief 
representative, party to a secret treaty wherein two of her 
principal opponents formally engaged themselves to act with her 
in common against "the pretensions recently manifested" by the 
two remaining members of the great coalition. "In case certain 
circumstances shall arise," read this document, "from which 
may God preserve us, Great Britain, Austria and France agree to 
unite their strength in order to maintain the principles formulated 
in the Treaty of Paris." 2 

Only the return of Napoleon from the Island of Elba restored a 
semblance of harmony to the debates. The alliance and princi- 
ples of Chaumont were reaffirmed and all the Powers joined in a 
manifesto decrying the Emperor's treason to the cause of Europe. 3 
The end of Napoleon's great adventure of "The Hundred Days" 
left the Allies in an awkward and ill-defined relationship toward 
France. A tendency was manifested to hold the twice-restored 
Bourbons responsible for their failure to prove the blessings of 
"legitimacy." Moreover, the rivalries and differences which had 
arisen at Vienna seriously separated the Allies. The secret 
Treaty of Alliance between France, Great Britain and Austria — 
forgotten by Louis XVIII in his hasty flight — was known to 
Alexander. The Tsar, in spite of this proof of Bourbon duplicity, 
was still disposed to be lenient towards France. Motives of altru- 
ism, judged by his allies to be wholly exaggerated, and a kind of 
mystical piety (which, as we shall later see, resulted in the negotia- 
tions leading to the pact of the Holy Alliance), now guided his 
policy. But the Russian troops had taken only a minor part in 
the Waterloo campaign and the Tsar found his prestige sensibly 
diminished. 

The Prussians now demanded an indemnity of 1,200,000,000 
francs, but compromised on a permission to occupy Luxembourg. 
The situation was also improved by the dismissal of Talleyrand. 

1 See Talleyrand, op. cit., p. 550, and Debidour, op. cit., p. 36. Debidour recognizes the 
full importance of the influence exercised by the War of 1812 upon European affairs during 
this period. 

2 See Talleyrand, op. cit., appendix, p. 561. z Ibid., p. 134. 



28 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

The latter, informed by Royal decision that his services were no 
longer needed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, disappeared 
from the scene. A new minister, the Duke of Richelieu, acceptable 
both to Russia and the Allies, was installed in his place. It was on 
these terms that the second Treaty of Paris was signed on Novem- 
ber 20, 1815. 1 

On the same day, another treaty of the utmost significance in 
the development of the System of 1815 was signed between 
Austria, Russia and Great Britain. This was known as the Treaty 
of Alliance and contained the following important clause: 

Article VI. In order to consolidate the intimate ties which unite the 
four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting 
Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own 
auspices or by their representative ministers, meetings consecrated to 
great common objects and the examination of such measures as shall be 
judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of Europe. 2 

The above article (which was a substitute for one proposed by the 
Tsar calling upon the Allies to give proofs of the "permanency and 
intimacy of their union") had been modified by Castlereagh to 
suit the reluctance of the English Cabinet to ally themselves 
definitely to any system of "European action" indefinitely pro- 
longed or even to indorse permanently "the principles consecrated 
by the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna." 3 

No reference whatsoever was made in the highly practical 
I terms of the articles of either the "Treaty of Alliance" or the 
» Treaty of Paris to a treaty signed on September 26 by the sover- 
eigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia, a pact subsequently known as 
the "Holy Alliance." It now remains for us to consider the sig- 
nificance of this manifesto and its relation to the System of 1815. 
, Had Alexander rested upon his military laurels as the con- 
queror of Napoleon, his fame would have been safe for all time. 
His experiences during the debates of Vienna were in many ways 
a bitter disillusion to the Tsar-Idealist. As Rain remarks: 

The aureole of triumph that had long hovered about the head of the 
Emperor of Russia grew pale during the Congress. He had arrived in 
Vienna like a conqueror, expecting to play the role of arbiter of Europe 
in the old capital of the Holy Roman Empire — and to hold the position 
he had assumed since the beginning of the coalition. He had, however, 
only triumphed among the ladies and in the salons. In the conference 

1 Martens, op. cit., vol. u, p. 682. 

2 Ibid., p. 737. _ 

8 Phillips, op. cit., pp. 134 et seq. 



INTRODUCTION 29 

he had been tricked — bamboozled 1 — and his diplomacy mastered by 
that of Metternich. He found his life-long dreams opposed and mis- 
understood by his closest advisers, and even under the most favorable 
conditions impossible of realization. 2 

It appears certain that Alexander had planned to bring to the 
attention of the assembled sovereigns the generous schemes for 
international organization and "concerted" action which he had 
first proposed in his Instructions to Novosiltzov and embodied in \ 
the military treaties preceding the signing of the Treaty of 
Chaumont. But at Vienna the inopportune return of Napoleon, 
coinciding with his diplomatic struggles to revive Polish nation- 
ality, prevented any elaboration of these plans. Moreover, 
Alexander was absent with his armies at the time most appropriate 
for the consideration of such matters, during the closing days of 
the conference, and the "Final Act" of the Congress, drawn up 
by Gentz and edited by Metternich, was a triumph of their cold- 
blooded system of "real politics." 

Concerning the period of Vienna, Alexander later wrote to his 
friend Golytzine. From this letter we learn of his desire to secure 
from the representatives of the Powers assembled in the old capital 
of the Holy Roman Empire some definite recognition of the 
principles to which he believed himself committed. He felt — not 
without reason — that so favorable an opportunity might never 
again recur to lay the foundations for a general treaty of peace. 
This letter (dated February 15, 1822) is also highly interesting 
because it contains Alexander's own version of the origin of the 
Treaty of the "Holy Alliance: " 

. . . You tell me to return to my policy and ways of thinking such 
as these existed between the year 1812 until my departure for Vienna. 
You appear to suppose that in some way I have changed my manner of 
thinking since that time. What stay in Vienna have you in mind? 
(Do you refer to that which I made during the congress of 1814?) 
. . . You seem to forget that the plan of the "Holy Alliance" came 
into my mind at that time. I have frequently told you it was to crown 
all my work there. It was only the return of Napoleon from Elba 
which, by bringing our stay in Vienna to a close, forced me to postpone 
the execution of this plan until after a new period of struggle which was 
happily ended through the aid of Providence. At Paris, when Napoleon, 
through the grace of God, was overthrown for the second time, the Most 
High enabled me to realize the plan which I had cherished since the 
Congress, and permitted me to trace upon paper the Act of which you 

1 Rain, writing in 1910, here uses the word bafoue. 

2 Rain, op. cit., p. 259. 



30 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

have knowledge. As soon as I returned to Petersburg I composed my 
manifesto, by which the act of the "Holy Alliance" was made public, and 
which a little later, on January 1, 1816, I published to the world . . . l 

In the first days of September, 1815 — not without intention of 
restoring the prestige which the Russian armies had lost by their 
absence from the glorious field of Waterloo — Alexander decided 
to display their well-trained strength as a diplomatic reminder 
to his allies. 2 A great review of the entire Russian force was 
held upon the Plain of Vertus, near Chalons. This spectacle the 
Tsar also determined was to be the dramatic prelude to what he now 
considered the most important political act of his career, the mani- 
festo of a Holy Alliance of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace. 

On September 10 the magnificent troops of Alexander's guard 
and line (drilled even in war to a state of precision, for which the 
Emperor Paul's "paradomania" was largely responsible) passed 
before the Russian sovereign and his guests, the Emperor of 
Austria and the King of Prussia. Following the straight files 
of the grenadiers came the turbulent ranks of the Cossacks, the 
wild cavalry of the steppes, whose exploits during Napoleon's 
retreat had given them a wide reputation throughout Europe. 
The religious ceremony was perhaps the most remarkable part of 
the spectacle. On the broad plain seven altars had been erected, 
where the imposing ritual of the Greek service was celebrated in 
the presence of this reverent host. Their thundering responses 
to the chanting of the priests showed them ready to die with 
fanatical zeal at the word of their Autocrat. 

Still under the powerful influence of this significant military 
pageant, 3 the sovereigns present at the review were invited by 
Alexander to affix their signatures to the famous document sub- 
sequently known to history as the "Holy Alliance." 4 On Sep- 
tember 14/26 the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of 
Prussia formally declared that henceforth their united policy had 
but a single object: 

1 Given in full by the Grand Due Nicolas Mikhaiilowitch, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 221 et seq. 

2 This great review is considered by Pasquier to have been held with the generous object 
of "bringing the Allies to adopt a more moderate conduct towards France." Memoires, vol. 
iv, p. 22. See also Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, Memoirs, p. 202. 

3 See note, Rain, op. cit., p. 280. 

4 While detailed to the French Fourth Army, in 1917, the author came across a monu- 
ment — shattered by German shell fire — which was erected near Chalons to commemorate 
the Tsar Alexander's dream of perpetual peace. 



INTRODUCTION 31 

To manifest before the whole universe their unshakable determination 
to take as their sole guide, both in the administration of their respective 
states and in their political relations with other governments, the pre- 
cepts of religion, namely, the rules of Justice, Christian Charity and 
Peace. 

These precepts, far from being applicable only to private life, should, 
on the contrary, govern the decisions of Princes, and direct them in all 
their negotiations, forming, as they must, the only means of giving 
permanence to human institutions and remedying their imperfections. 

Following this unusual preamble came the terms of a diplomatic 
agreement, no less extraordinary in the eyes of contemporary 
statesmen: 

Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all 
men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting Monarchs 
will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity. 
Considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions 
and in all places lend each other aid and assistance; towards their sub- 
jects and armies, they will extend a fatherly care and protection, leading 
them (in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are themselves 
animated) to protect Religion, Peace and Justice. [Article I.] 

In consequence, the sole principle in force, whether as between the 
said Governments or as between their subjects, shall be that of doing 
each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by an unalterable good- 
will the mutual affection with which they should be animated. They 
will consider themselves as members of one and the same Christian 
nation; the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely dele- 
gated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family. The 
rulers of Austria, Prussia and Russia thus confess that the Christian 
world of which they and their people form a part has in reality no other 
sovereign than Him to Whom alone power rightfully belongs . . . Their 
Majesties consequently recommend to their people with the most tender 
solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a 
good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves 
every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties 
which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind. [Article II.] 

All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles 
which have dictated the present Act — and shall acknowledge how im- 
portant it is for the happiness of nations . . . that these truths 
should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence 
which belongs to them — will be received with equal ardor and affection 
into this Holy Alliance. [Article III.] 1 

The language of the pact thus suddenly presented by the Tsar 
to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia for their signa- 
tures had no parallel in the archives of diplomacy. In adhering 
to the Holy Alliance these sovereigns bound themselves to nothing 

1 This version is made from the French original in Martens, vol. II, pp. 656-658. 
Cf. also, British State Papers, vol. in, pp. 211-212. 



32 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

more than a promise to observe in their foreign and domestic 
policy "the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to man- 
kind"; yet, as Gentz reports, they were "amazed and terrified" 1 
by the possible consequences of their act. Reliance upon moral 
principles so general and widesweeping were indeed to lead to 
policies and events unforeseen at the time by their author. 

But in order to understand aright the meaning which the mysti- 
cal invocation of the Holy Alliance connoted in the mind of Alex- 
ander, it now becomes necessary briefly to consider some of the 
later inspirations of the Tsar's internationalism. Alexander's 
early training under Laharpe, a follower of that Rousseau who had 
summarized and put in his own persuasive language the princi- 
ples of the Abbe de St. Pierre's project for perpetual peace, 
accounts for the clear and lucid argumentation of the secret 
Instructions to Novosiltzov. His letter to Golytzine (1822), 
which recounts, in retrospect, the origins of the Holy League, 
is also significant. Golytzine's mystical and religious influence 
began during the days of the invasion of Russia by Napo- 
leon's Grand Army. It is beyond the purpose of this study to 
consider, at length, Alexander's later relations to the Baroness de 
Krudener and the French reactionary philosopher, Bergasse, in 
whom contemporary historians saw the direct inspiration of the 
Act of September 14/26, 1815. 2 These relations, of great interest 
in themselves, belong rather to an intimate and personal biography 
of Alexander. To the student of psychology — especially the psy- 
chology of the reformer — they have a value which it would be 
difficult to overestimate. But in a study of the real influences of 
the Holy Alliance upon the organization of Europe, they need 
only to be mentioned in passing. 

It was shortly after the return of Napoleon from Elba, while 
the Tsar was hastening through Germany to join his armies in 
France, that he first met this extraordinary woman who was to 
be so strangely associated with his preparation and promulgation 
of the Holy Alliance. It was by a combination of circumstances, 
probably not wholly fortuitous, that the "sibyl" found herself 
for the first time face to face with her sovereign and future pupil. 3 

1 Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. I, p. 216. 

2 See Metternich's statement in the following chapter; also Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 23. 

3 Madame de Krudener's life has been written in two volumes by Eynard. An 
entertaining biography largely drawn from the above, Life and Letters of Madame de 
Krudener, has appeared in English by C. Ford. She was also the subject of two of St. 



INTRODUCTION 33 

Following this first brief interview, during which the Tsar seems 
to have been much impressed by Madame de Kriidener's per- 
sonality, he invited her to join him in Paris when her prophecies 
concerning the overthrow of Napoleon should be fulfilled. On 
July 14, 1815, she appeared in that capital, her arrival almost 
coinciding with that of the victorious Tsar. She was lodged in 
quarters in convenient proximity to those occupied by Alexander 
himself. Her salons soon became the scene of an almost continual 
"prayer meeting." While Madame de Kriidener still assisted 
publicly at the elaborate services of the Greek rite, celebrated in 
the Tsar's chapel at the Elysee, the private reunions in her own 
home were modeled on the simple gathering of the early Chris- 
tians. 1 Whenever the Tsar honored her gatherings with his 
presence, Madame de Kriidener, falling on her knees, would com- 
mence a long prayer, generally reciting the triumphs of religion 
as exemplified in Alexander's victories, together with pressing 
demands for the general repentance and conversion of mankind. 
Her aims seem to have included a general reconciliation of all the 
churches of Europe. It was to aid her in this work that she 
appealed especially to the repentant Tsar, a task he may well 
have believed related to his own international aims. 

Mystified by the strange relationship between Madame de 
Kriidener and her Imperial "disciple," contemporary writers have 
undoubtedly exaggerated her influence. Extravagant stories 
were told concering the mystical ceremonies that attended their 
interviews. The language used by the "initiated" was in itself 
calculated to excite suspicion and ridicule. The vocabulary of 
Madame de Kriidener finds an echo in Alexander's letters and even 
in his official documents — a fact which probably gave rise to the 
rumor that she either wrote with her own hand or inspired many 
of his political acts. That she was responsible, however, for any 
of the Tsar's political theories is not only denied by contemporary 

Beuves' literary "portraits." Barbara Julie de Weitinghov was born in Riga in the year 
1764. When their first meeting took place, she was therefore considerably older than 
Alexander (born 1777) and certainly well past the bloom of her former beauty. (Ford, 
op. cit., p. 4.) Her father was a Senator of the Empire, sincerely pro-Russian in spite of 
his Baltic ancestry. Her early religious environment was that of the Greek Orthodox 
Church. She was married at an early age to Baron de Kriidener — and after a youth of 
pleasure and frivolity became a mystical religieuse and devoted to good works. 

1 These were attended, however, principally by members of the highest society. Among 
her congregation were the Duchess of Bourbon and Duras, Mme. Recamier (who was 
asked to make herself "as ugly as possible so as not to trouble souls"), Chateaubriand and 
Benjamin Constant. Eynard, Vie de Madame de Kriidener, vol. II, p. 30. 



34 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

writers, 1 but is also rendered highly improbable from all that is 
known of her teachings. It is difficult, moreover, to conceive that 
an experienced statesman like the Tsar should have been more 
than superficially influenced by such a source of political advice. 
Recent evidence tends to prove that another member of Madame 
de Kriidener's circle was infinitely more influential than the Baro- 
ness in this respect. 

The part played by the reactionary philosopher Bergasse in 
the preparation of the Holy Alliance is defined by another con- 
temporary writer, Leopold de Gaillard. 2 Bergasse was a political 
writer of some note under the first Bourbon restoration. However 
reactionary his theories may have been, they were at any rate the 
result of scientific inquiry, not of mystical inspiration. From 
Gaillard's account, it becomes evident that Bergasse furnished 
the "political" theories, while Madame de Kriidener furnished the 
language and inspiration of the Tsar's manifesto. Bergasse seems 
to have dreamed of a system of theocracy, vicariously asserting 
itself through the institution of legitimate monarchy. The reign 
of universal peace he believed might be secured through an 
active cooperation between the Kings of Christendom, the "Lord's 
anointed" on earth. The rights of man with difficulty found a 
place in this new order of ideas, although their rulers were bound 
by higher laws to respect them. However mystical and impracti- 
cable such a doctrine might appear to the statesmen of Europe, 
it was, nevertheless, to be the principle he besought Alexander to 
apply to the adjustment of international differences. 

The influence of Bergasse long outlasted that of the "Letton- 
ian sibyl." Even during the Congress of Verona he continued in 
correspondence with the Tsar, urging that he use the might of 
the "Holy League" to stamp out the power of the revolutionary 
"sects." There is also evidence of somewhat stilted and formal 

1 "I do not know upon what foundations the authors of the two histories of Alexander 
have been pleased to attribute to the exalted imagination of Madame de Kriidener the idea 
of the Holy Alliance and the League of universal peace, — a noble project, which could only 
have had birth in the mind of Alexander himself. Neither at that time nor afterwards, 
when on several occasions he conversed with me, did the Emperor pronounce the name of 
the author of Valerie, although he often spoke of the celebrated literary men of past times 
and of the present, and even of women distinguished for their wit and intelligence, such as 
Madame de Stael, whose great talents he admired." Mme. de Choiseul-Gouffier, p. 153. 

2 Quoted in Bergasse: A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution. This interest- 
ing collection of family papers has a valuable introduction by M. Etienne Lamy, mem- 
ber of the French Academy. 



INTRODUCTION 35 

requests on Alexander's part for further light upon the subject. 1 
It soon becomes evident, however, that the Tsar was tired of the 
torrent of advice poured out by this loquacious valetudinarian. 
The influence of Nicholas Bergasse — an influence which has per- 
haps not been sufficiently reckoned with in judging of the re- 
actionary phase of Alexander's policy — appears to have ended 
in much the same way as other momentarily preponderating in- 
fluences in the life of the great idealist. Like Czartoryski, 
Speranski, Madame de Kriidener and other lesser oracles, Bergasse 
"became a bore" and was somewhat brutally discarded in conse- 
quence. The Tsar possessed to a finished degree the faculty of 
taking advice when he needed it to support his own faltering 
judgment. But once his course was decided upon, he became 
suspicious and intolerant of anything that savored of direction. 
Like all convinced doctrinaires, he abhorred sermons unless he 
himself occupied the pulpit. 

*The "sects" in this correspondence seem to have played the role of the "reds" in our 
own time. Alexander's note of acknowledgment dated 4/16 August, 1822, admits that 
he has "only been able to consider these matters hastily." Bergasse, p. 383. 



CHAPTER I 
THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

"A Congress of Kings was to be held at Cambray. It was to consist of 
Maximilian the Emperor, Francis the First king of France, Henry the Eighth 
of England, and Charles, the sovereign of the low countries. They were to 
enter, in the most solemn manner, into mutual and indissoluble engage- 
ments to preserve Peace with each other, and consequently, Peace through- 
out Europe . . . But certain persons, who get nothing by Peace and a 
great deal by War, threw obstacles in the way, which prevented this truly 
kingly purpose from being carried into execution." Erasmus, The Complaint 
of Peace (1517). 

Through their adhesion to the "Act of September 14, 1815," 
on the Plain of Vertus, the chief Continental Powers had reluc- 
tantly signed the acknowledgment of an obligation to "com- 
mon action." 1 If the mystical language of the "Holy Alliance" 
contained any practical meaning this lay in its affirmation that the 
sovereigns of Europe should "on all occasions and in all places 
lend each other aid and assistance." Nor was this to be a "partial 
and exclusive alliance." All Powers who should choose solemnly 
to avow its "sacred principles" were to be received in its bonds 
"with equal ardor and affection." Before noting the effect of 
this invitation upon the non-signatory Powers, it would be well 
to consider certain evidence concerning the attitude of the signers 
themselves toward the vague program to which they found them- 
selves pledged. 

The spirit in which Alexander's cherished scheme for a Christian 
League of Peace was received by his allies is perhaps best shown 
in Metternich's own account of the events just preceding the signa- 
ture of the manifesto: 

During the course of the negotiations which brought about the signa- 
ture of the second Peace of Paris, the Emperor Alexander asked me for an 
interview. He then informed me that he was busy with a great enter- 
prise concerning which he especially desired to consult the Emperor 
Francis. "There are certain matters," said the Tsar, "which can only 
be considered in the light of intimate beliefs. Moreover, such beliefs 
are entirely subject to influences and considerations of a personal char- 
acter. If this matter were purely an affair of state, I would immediately 
have asked for your advice. The subject, however, is one of such a 

ir The name of Holy "Alliance" or "League" was a popular designation. With refer- 
ence to the much discussed adhesion of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, Gentz observes: 
"The Prince Regent, either carelessly or to be agreeable — or even to make fun of his 
August Ally (the latter is very possible in view of the fact that his signature had no value 
without a countersign) answered with an autograph letter adhering to the pact." Gentz, 
Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. I, p. 217. 

37 



38 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

nature that the council of official advisers can be of no use. It is one 
requiring the decisions of sovereigns themselves . . ." Several days 
afterwards, the Emperor Francis sent for me and informed me that he 
had just returned from a visit to the Tsar, who had asked him to come 
alone to discuss matters of high importance. "The subject of our con- 
versation," said the Emperor, "you will understand, after reading the 
document the Tsar has submitted to me with the request I give it my 
earnest attention . . . For my own part, I have no sympathies with 
the ideas it contains, which have given me food for great unrest." 

It did not require any very serious study to convince me the document 
had no other value or sense except considered as a philanthropic aspira- 
tion cloaked in religious phraseology. I was convinced it could in no 
way be considered the subject of a treaty between sovereigns, and that 
it might even give rise to grave misinterpretations of a religious character. 1 

Metternich found the King of Prussia, who had also been con- 
sulted by Alexander, averse to thwarting the desire of his powerful 
ally, but equally doubtful as to the propriety of signing the 
manifesto in its original form. It was only after Metternich had, 
not without difficulty, secured the Tsar's consent to a number of 
changes that the promised signatures of the Emperor of Austria 
and the King of Prussia were finally obtained. In the case of 
Emperor Francis this act was executed (as Metternich states) 
"in spite of a natural antipathy with which the whole project 
inspired him." In closing his account of the above transaction, 
Metternich adds the following significant, though somewhat dis- 
ingenuous, paragraph: 

The irrefutable proof of what I have detailed above is found in the 
fact that subsequently there never was any question among the Cabinets 
of Europe of a "Holy Alliance"; that no such questions indeed could 
arise. It was only those hostile to the monarchical party who sought to 
exploit this act and use it as a weapon of calumny against its authors. 
The Holy Alliance was never founded to restrain the liberties of the 
people, nor to advance the cause of absolutism. It was solely the expres- 
sion of the mystical beliefs of the Emperor Alexander; the application of 
the principles of Christianity to public policy. It is from this strange 
mixture of religious and political theories that the conception of the Holy 
Alliance arose. It was developed under the influence of Madame de 
Krudener and Monsieur Bergasse. No one knows better than myself 
the true meaning of this empty and sonorous document. 2 

Metternich (who at a later date was to turn to the purposes of 
Austrian diplomacy the bond of indiscriminate solidarity which 
Alexander believed to be the essence of the Holy Alliance) always 
insisted upon the essential difFerence between the League of Sover- 

'Metternich, Memoires, vol. i, pp. 209-210. 
2 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 39 

eigns and the "conventional" agreements of the System of 1815. 
Posterity, he believed, would ascribe to his "system" — rather 
than to the Tsar's manifesto — the credit for the long peace 
enjoyed by Europe from the downfall of Napoleon to the outbreak 
of the Crimean War. ^Perhaps the truest conception of this much- 
misunderstood document may be obtained from the writings of 
the two philosophers to whom Alexander was chiefly indebted for 
his political theories — Bergasse and Laharpe. 

Two fundamental ideas (wrote Bergasse) appear as the basis of the 
Treaty of the Holy Alliance: The Sovereignty of God, the Brotherhood 
of Mankind. 

The spectacle offered by the events of the Revolution has afforded a 
terrible lesson both to the nations and their rulers. The catastrophes 
which have shaken the foundations of Europe had one fundamental 
cause: the weakening of the bonds of religion and the resulting corruption 
of both peoples and princes. This corruption of public morals brought 
with it inevitable disorder and anarchy. The systematic repudiation of 
all Divine Law — and the pretensions advanced by those who believed 
only in the sovereign rights of man — were the fundamentals of revolu- 
tionary doctrine. According to these theories (had such a result been 
possible) organized disorder would have been permanently established, 
thus inaugurating a period of fresh disasters. 

In the presence of such a possibility it became a great and solemn 
necessity to proclaim as a guiding principle the sovereignty of the 
Divine Will — and the essential doctrine that nations as well as indi- 
viduals must obey His laws if they desire to continue in a state of peace 
and prosperity.*/" 

In the face of the general criticism which the mystical language 
of Alexander's manifesto aroused, even his old teacher Laharpe 
was moved to defend the good intentions — and good sense — of his 
Imperial pupil. There was little in common, however, between 
the theories of the Holy Alliance and his own philosophical pre- 
cepts. His half-hearted explanations are chiefly interesting 
because of his early relations to the Tsar. 

In answer to an article on "Alexander of Russia," by Impeytany, 
Laharpe wrote: 

Although intrepid in the midst of danger, Alexander had a horror of 
war. Thoroughly aware of the abuses that excite the discontent of 
nations, he hoped that during a lengthened peace, the want of which 
was generally felt, the governments of Europe, recognizing the impor- 
tance of undertaking such reforms as the necessities of the age called for, 
would seriously apply themselves to that work. To this end a state of 
profound tranquillity was indispensable; and as the confusion of the 

1 Bergasse: A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution, pp. 261-262. 



40 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

past thirty years appeared to have greatly weakened the old ideas of 
order and subordination, he thought to offer a remedy by making a 
solemn appeal to religion. So far at least as this monarch is concerned, 
no doubt such an appeal was an emanation proceeding from his own 
noble heart; but the genius of evil soon took possession of these philan- 
thropic conceptions, and turned them against himself. The assem- 
blage in the "Plaine de Vertus" (14 September, 1815) of a Russian 
army of 160,000 men ready for the field, struck with amazement the 
diplomatic corps of Europe, who were present at the imposing spectacle; 
but such an exhibition of the military strength of a vast empire alarmed 
them much less than the invisible power and perfect moral influence 
which the greatness of soul and well-known principles of the monarch 
who now reviewed his troops had created. At this period, indeed, from 
north to south, from east to west, the eyes of the oppressed were turned 
towards Alexander I; but from this moment also is to be dated the con- 
spiracy which secretly plotted to strip him of that formidable moral 
power, which gave him for auxiliaries every friend of enlightenment and 
humanity — the universal cooperation of honest men. Disposed by the 
native moderation of his character to consent to anything which might 
remove fears of his preponderating influence, and willing at any price 
to dissipate the alarm that was feigned or felt, he consented to the 
establishment of a court of Areopagus, where a majority of votes should 
decide the measures to be taken in common for the maintenance of the 
general tranquillity. The genius of evil quickly caught a glimpse of the 
advantage he might reap from so generous an abrogation of this pre- 
ponderating influence. Thanks to the troublesome and vexatious turn 
the members managed to give to the progress of ordinary affairs, the 
confidence of the nations was impaired, and the magnanimous monarch 
who had so well deserved it saw it lost, amid the impious acclamations 
of the enemies to his glory, who did not hesitate to impute to his obstinate 
and absolute will, measures the most unpopular which they dictated in 
their Areopagus. 1 

The suspicions and distrust with which his declaration of peace 
and good will was received by the Powers of Europe 2 caused 
Alexander to take decisive measures to correct the impression 
that his "Great Enterprise" was intended to hide a policy of 
self-interest. On March 18, 1816 (following an Imperial ukase 
ordering that a manifesto summarizing the treaty of the Holy 
Alliance be read in all the churches of the Empire), Alexander 
wrote a long letter to his Ambassador in London, Count 
Lieven, disclaiming any intention of hostile action "against 
non-Christian nations." He protested with pathetic vehemence 

1 Schnitzler, Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia, vol. i, pp. 70-72. 

2 Writing under date of October, 1815, de Maistre describes the effect produced in St. 
Petersburg by the signing of the Holy Alliance: "This document has not yet been printed, 
but has been read at Gastchina in the presence of the Empress . . . Its author is Alex- 
ander himself, who writes with great facility and elegance." Joseph de Maistre, Lettres, 
vol. i, p. 360. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 41 

against the calumny which persisted in considering this act of 
Christian love and fraternity as masking a plan for further con- 
quest. 1 

In this declaration, written by Alexander's own hand, we may 
recognize not only the spirit of mystical ardor which lay at the 
root of the "Holy Treaty," but also the very style and dialect of 
this extraordinary document. 

The letter to Lieven was, moreover, a renewed appeal to Great 
Britain to join the chief Powers of Europe in their Pact of Peace. 
At the time the Holy Alliance was promulgated the Prince Regent 
had refused to become a party to this supplemental treaty, "not 
because of the principles set forth," but because (as he declared 
in a letter of October 6, 1816) "the Act of September 26, 1815, was 
personally concluded by the signatory sovereigns while the British 
Constitution demanded that treaties should be signed by the 
responsible Ministers." 2 

Liberal opinion in Great Britain had shown itself immediately 
suspicious of this Brotherhood of Sovereigns, and indeed of the 
whole language and tone of the "Holy Pact." Partisan spirit and 
a desire to embarrass the government were undoubtedly at the 
bottom of many of the fiery speeches made by the Liberals in 

^he letter is given in full in Grand Due Nicolas Mikhailowitch, V Empereur Alex- 
andre I?', vol. I, pp. 171-172: 

St. Petersburg, March i8th. 
To my Ambassador, Count Lieven, Sir: 

Having considered it advisable to give wide currency to the Act of Fraternal and 
Christian Alliance concluded the 14th of September last (old style) with my Allies, H. M. 
the Emperor of Austria and H. M. the King of Prussia, I have decided to expose both its 
spirit and true meaning to the persons who, like yourself, are charged with interpreting my 
intentions, at the courts allied with Russia. The explanations which I will now give, will 
allow of no further misconceptions with respect to the act itself, nor of the manifesto 
announcing it to my people. 

The mass of rumors which have reached me respecting the false interpretations given to 
this guarantee of union and harmony show the high importance of some more precise 
explanation regarding the motives upon which it is based. The Genius of Evil, over- 
thrown by the hand of a Providence which disposes as it wills of both sovereigns and their 
people, now makes a final effort to besmirch the terms of this Declaration by suggesting 
political motives as incompatible with the intentions which have inspired it as they are 
contrary to the salutary end it is destined to fulfil. My allies and myself, moved by the 
same noble purposes which inspired the last great European struggle, have had no other end 
in view than the means of applying more efficaciously to both the civil polity and external 
relations of States the principles of Peace, Concord and Love, which are the fruit of the 
Christian Religion. 

It has been our pleasure to consider this act a means of associating ourselves with the 
very essence of these saving precepts — rules of conduct which have been too long confined 
to the sphere of private relationships. 

2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, p. 22. Except for this obvious and informal approval of 
the Christian principles affirmed in the Holy Alliance there is no other ground for the 
statement that Great Britain ever adhered to this pact. 



42 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Parliament and the denunciations that soon appeared in the 
newspapers of the day. During the two brief sessions of Parlia- 
ment which considered the question of the new treaty it is doubt- 
ful whether the opposition fully realized the importance of the 
subject upon which they poured forth their critical eloquence. 
This was particularly true in the case of Brougham. It was the 
old grievance of "secret diplomacy" and the "clique" directing 
the policy of the Foreign Office which excited his wrath. 

In the session of the House of Commons held February 8, 1816, 
Mr. Brougham stated that he 

would now move for the production of two papers which, though he 
had reason to believe they existed, were not to be found in the great mass 
laid before the House. The first he considered with great jealousy and 
alarm, coupled with the speech made from the Throne and the declara- 
tions of the Noble Lord. It was a treaty (dated September 25, 1815) * 
between Austria, Russia and Prussia, a treaty to which this country was 
not a party, nor yet France. It was ratified the 25th of December, a 
day ostentatiously mentioned as the Birthday of our Saviour. The 
treaty was of a very general nature and seemed to have no definite prac- 
tical or secular object but professed to relate to the interests of the Chris- 
tian nations. He suspected more was meant by this than met the eye. 2 

Formally answering the above statement, Lord Castlereagh 
merely stated : "I believe the treaty had no evil views whatsoever." 

Referring to a treaty alleged to have been signed between 
France and Austria and some other Power "to which Mr. Brougham 
had referred in an earlier part of his speech," Lord Castlereagh 
somewhat superciliously declared "he could not understand to 
what paper the former referred." He closed his formal acknowl- 
edgment of Brougham's interpellation by declaring that the 
treaties as he understood them were "concluded in the mildest 
spirit of Christian tolerance," although he admitted "that they 
were drawn up in a manner rather unusual." 

During the session of the House of Commons held on February 
9, 3 Brougham renewed his attack upon the treaty, which, it is 
to be noted, still remained unnamed. "The sovereigns," he began, 
"have merely bound themselves to observe their mutual engage- 
ments and to promote the Christian faith." "What engagements," 
he asked, "are these, and why is it necessary to protect the Chris- 
tian faith?" 

1 The "Noble Lord" was Castlereagh — the treaty, that of September 14/26, 1815. 
2 London Times, February 9, 1816, p. 2, col. 2. 
'Ibid., February 10, 1816, p. 2, cols. 3-4. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 43 

"Something in the very language adopted, though it professed 
no practical or secular object, bears in itself a character of sus- 
picion." Continuing in the same tone of biting sarcasm he re- 
ferred with telling effect to the fact that the very Powers which 
had become a party to the League were those which had joined in 
the great international infamy of the partition of Poland. "Even 
the language of diplomacy," he declared, "can not disguise the 
fact that a similar intention is probably maintained at the present 
moment." Here the speaker was interrupted by loud Liberal 
cheering. When this had died away, Brougham moved an address 
to the Prince Regent, asking both for the production of the treaties 
and of another treaty dated January 26, 1815, concerning "guar- 
antees against Russia." 

Castlereagh's reply was a model of moderation and debating 
skill. "If the sovereigns had not coalesced," he advanced, 
"Europe would never have been relieved." The success of the 
Confederation was due "entirely to the present conferences of the 
sovereigns. At Chaumont the sovereigns had expressly reserved 
the right to make separate engagements not contrary to the 
general objects of the war." Castlereagh felt he could even admit 
that the Emperor of Russia had shown him a rough draft of the 
agreement referred to, before it was submitted to the other sover- 
eigns, and at the same time had requested him to invite the Prince 
Regent to accede to the treaty. His answer to this request had 
been that it was not usual for the British Government to be a 
party to treaties concluded in such a form. At the same time he 
added his assurances that every good disposition was felt toward 
the object of the arrangement, which was not directed against "an 
un-Christian Power," as was very generally believed. 

Mr. Bennett, another prominent leader of the Liberal opposi- 
tion, now took up the line of attack where Brougham had left off. 
"Lord Castlereagh's arrogant tone," he declared, "seems to con- 
sider independent states at his disposal so that he decides their 
fate according to his will; one to be weakened, the third divided, 
etc." He then censured the Noble Lord for the tone of eulogy 
which he had used in connection with the Alliance which Mr. 
Brougham had brought to his attention. He characterized it as a 
compact "conspicuously against the freedom and rights of the 
subjects of the sovereigns concerned." 



44 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

This brief outburst of Liberal hostility to the first announce- 
ment of the Holy Alliance appears to have been without imme- 
diate result. For many weeks all further discussion of the 
matter was avoided in Parliament. By a party vote of 30 against 
104 (a division along party lines), Brougham's motion was 
defeated. The deep waters of the ministerial majority closed 
silently over the whole matter. A brief editorial appeared in the 
Times of February 9, generally unfavorable in its tone to the 
principles of the Holy Alliance. But even the Thunderer kept 
silence in the face of the governmental policy which counseled 
Great Britain to consolidate a necessary friendship between 
Great Britain and the Tsar of Russia. 



Just one hundred years ago the young philosopher Emerson 
wrote concerning the states of Europe in his Concord Diaries: 

Aloof from contagion during the long progress of their decline, America 
hath ample interval to lay deep and solid foundations for the great- 
ness of the New World. 1 

Let the young American withdraw his eyes from all but his own coun- 
try, and try, if he can, to find employment there ... In this age 
the despots of Europe are engaged in the common cause of tightening 
the bonds of monarchy about the thriving liberties and the laws of men; 
and the unprivileged orders, the bulk of human society, gasping for 
breath beneath their chains, and darting impatient glances towards the 
free institution of other countries. To America, therefore, monarchs 
look with apprehension, and the people with hope. 2 

During the great crisis of reconstruction following the Napo- 
leonic Wars, Emerson in voicing the liberal opinion of New 
England but repeated the warnings of Washington. Yet many 
reasons insistently urged a "moral participation" in European 
affairs. Moreover, the invitation extended to the United States 
to share in the councils of Europe, as we shall have cause to note 
in the present chapter, was no less insistent than at the present 
day. 

The decision which the statesmen of the Washington Cabinet 
were called upon to take with respect to American participation in 
the affairs of Europe during the period from 1815 to 1818 recalls 
the no less momentous problems of the present time. 

During the period of reconstruction preceding the Congress of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander was apparently convinced that in 

1 Emerson, Journals, vol. 1820-1824, p. 201. *Ibid., pp. 246-247. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 45 

order to obtain the "universality" which he desired for his system, 
the "Holy League" must include not only the Christian Powers 
of the continent, but also Great Britain and the United States. 
His efforts to persuade the two English-speaking nations to adhere 
to his pact of "Justice, Christian Charity and Peace" form an 
interesting chapter in the development of internationalism. It 
soon became evident that, in spite of the duties laid upon her by 
the Treaties of Chaumont, Paris and Vienna, England was de- 
termined to return as quickly as possible to her policy of inde- 
pendent action — and as Canning subsequently announced, to v-/ 
"resume her isolation." 

Conservative opinion in England may have leaned to the side of 
the Powers of the Holy Alliance when these concerted their meas- 
ures against revolution. 1 So far as revolution against the Bour- 
bons in France was concerned they were indeed bound to con- 
certed action by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance. 2 It was 
not until after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle that the British 
Cabinet were called upon to draw fine distinctions between what 
a constitutional government might or might not do to assist 
a group of reactionary allies in applying broad measures of 
repression in every corner of Europe. But from the beginning 
Alexander seems to have been suspicious of the spirit shown by the 
opposition in Parliament 3 towards his League, and to have sought 
to exploit the differences between Great Britain and the United 
States in a sense favorable to his own policy of an "unalterable" 
union among the Great Powers. 

In the United States the policy debated by the Monroe 
Cabinet and the conclusions arrived at were to fix the course of 
American foreign affairs until our own day. When the repeated 
appeals of the Tsar's envoys had failed to obtain results which 
their master so ardently desired, Alexander's sensitive pride caused 

1 But even Lord Castlereagh was early "obliged to pretend to disapprove of the conti- 
nental system of the Holy Alliance." Greville, Memoirs, vol. I, p. 105. See also 
Hansard's Debates, vol. n, p. 359. 

2 Article II of the Treaty of Alliance bound the signatory Powers to common action 
against the "same revolutionary principles that caused the recent usurpation in France." 
Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites dePaix, vol. n, pp. 735-736. 

3 The confusion of modern writers with respect to British policy towards the Quadruple 
Alliance which she signed and the Holy Alliance which she diplomatically opposed is 
scarcely understandable. Often, however, in writings of the time "the expressions 
Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance are used synonymously." Cf. Boyce, The Diplomatic 
Relations of England with the Quadruple Alliance, 1815-1830, University of Iowa Studies, 
vol. vii, no. 1. 



46 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 



him to bury in the limbo of his secret official dossiers all traces of 
these negotiations. But in the archives of the Russian Foreign 
Office proofs are not lacking of the long and patient efforts made 
between the years 1816 and 1819 to induce the great American 
Republic to abandon her policy of "isolation" and to play a part 
in an "international" system. 

At a time when the fear of Napoleon had united the powers of 
Europe in common measures of political and military action, 
the United States were already separated and estranged from the 
victorious Powers of the Grand Alliance by reasons arising from 
the great war itself. The neutrality of the principal American 
state, maintained with the greatest difficulty, had ended in a 
quarrel with both antagonists. The problems which arose from 
the enforcement of the British Orders in Council (May, 1806) 
and of Napoleon's retaliatory Berlin Decrees (November, 1806) 
had found a poor solution in Jefferson's Non-Intercourse Act 
(1809). Yet in 1810 Napoleon's ready diplomacy had success- 
fully committed the United States to a course favorable to the 
French view of this doubly declared "blockade." Although in 
practice the Emperor had relaxed none of the severity of the 
Rambouillet Decrees under which American shipmasters groaned, 
the wrongs of the "quasi-war" with France were forgotten in an 
open breach between the United States and Great Britain. Dur- 
ing the War of 1812 the ports of Havre and Brest became the 
home stations whence American privateers sailed forth to prey 
upon British commerce. 1 When two years later the treaties of 
Kalisch, Toeplitz and Chaumont had gathered the Powers of 
Europe in progressively strengthening bonds of international 
solidarity, the young American Republic found itself inter- 
nationally "suspect" — bound by an unsatisfactory and informal 
truce to the tottering Napoleonic colossus and at open war with 
one of the principal members of the coalition. 

It was, however, Great Britain's desire to sit with her allies at 
the council table of Vienna, backed by the full force of her land 
and sea power. This desire, indeed, was a chief factor in bringing 
to a close the indecisive quarrel of 1812. Lord Castlereagh, on 

^Cambridge Modern History, vol. vn, pp. 324-332. An interesting proof of the care 
with which the development of Anglo-American relations was followed by the Tsar is 
afforded by the long report drawn up by the diplomatic free lance Gentz for Nesselrode, in 
April, 1812, re the Orders in Council. Nesselrode, Letters and Papers, 1760-1850, vol. iv, " 
p. 223. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 47 

his way to attend the Great Council at Vienna, had stopped at 
Ghent (in August, 1814) to hasten the British negotiations toward 
the signing of a treaty. 1 In view of his own friendly efforts to 
bring about an earlier reconciliation 2 between his ally and the 
young republic, Alexander may readily have believed that it 
would be no difficult task to persuade the American Government 
to adhere to a wider system of world peace. 

The general invitation addressed to "all Powers who shall 
choose to avow its sacred principles" contained in the final 
articles of the Holy Treaty had now been accepted by an im- 
posing number of "minor Powers." The first among these was the 
liberal-minded King of Wiirttemberg (August 17, 1816). The King 
of Saxony adhered to the declarations (in May, 1817), as well as the 
Kings of Sardinia and the Netherlands. Soon the Free Hanseatic 
cities and the Republic of Switzerland — precedents of interest to 
the United States — followed their example. 3 Moreover, one of 
the chief objections made in England to the terms of the Holy 
Alliance lacked force in America. This was the reference to 
"Christian Powers" so often repeated in its phraseology — a refer- 
ence which was believed by the diplomatic circles of the Tsar's 
capital to contain some secret menace against the Ottoman 
Empire. Yet even this threat gave no apprehension to the 
Government at Washington, where Russian support of our policy 
in the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates was not for- 
gotten. The personal popularity of Alexander and the aureole of 
liberalism which, though growing fainter, still hovered about the 
head of the pupil of the Republican philosopher Laharpe, probably 
caused phrases and expressions of his manifesto, considered omi- 
nous by liberal opinion abroad, to pass unnoticed. 

The Holy Alliance was formally made public through the 
Imperial ukase of January 1, 1816. Although its obscure inten- 
tions caused a stir all over Europe, several months elapsed before 
the matter was noticed in the American newspapers of the day. 
On August 26, 1816, the New York Evening Post announced that 
"the King of the Netherlands has acceded to the Holy League, 
considering that it will have a beneficial effect on the state 

1 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p. 9. 

2 For the details of this negotiation, see Golder, "The Russian Offer of Mediation 
in the War of 1812," in Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxxi, No. 3. 

3 Martens, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 659. The Pope from reasons of religious policy still 
refused to join the "Pact." 



48 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

of society and the reciprocal relations between nations." On 
September 4 of the same year a meeting of the sovereigns of the 
Holy Alliance is reported by the same paper "as likely to take 
place at Carlsbad." To this notice was added the following 
comment — certainly far from hostile in tone: "No doubt matters 
of great importance will be discussed at this assembly, and ifdis- 
cussions run upon the means of consolidating the peace of the 
world . . . ajid^ removing the burden of taxes and unwieldy 
military establishments which press at this moment upon every 
country, the members of the Holy League will establish an im- 
perishable claim on the gratitude of mankind." 1 

In Niles Register, a gazette published in Baltimore, may be 
found (April 6, 1816) definite expression of the generous approval 
which public opinion in America seems always ready to accord to 
schemes promising an increment of international solidarity and 
good will. The Massachusetts Peace Society, writing to the 
' Emperor Alexander under date of April 9, "recalls to the attention 
/ of His Imperial Majesty that the Society was founded in the very 
week in which the Holy League of the three sovereigns was 
announced in Russia," and has as its object "to disseminate the 
very principles avowed in the wonderful Alliance." In the same 
issue appears an announcement that the American Minister at 
St. Petersburg "is treated with great distinction. It is thought 
important negotiations are in progress." 1 

The not unfavorable impression which the Tsar's project 
made in American diplomatic circles is shown in the correspond- 
ence of Levett Harris, the American charge d'affaires at the 
Court of St. Petersburg: 

The Treaty of triple alliance concluded at Paris will, before this comes 
to hand, be already known to you . . . This treaty, which originated 
with the Emperor Alexander, and which does equal honor to his head and 
heart, I fear will not answer the magnanimous purposes for which it 
was designed. If such were the case we should behold Europe ready 
to embrace the arts of peace, and see dissolving at once those monstrous 
combinations which have already lifted the world from its axis and now 
threaten to consummate the work of human woe. 2 

Levett Harris was one of the body of trained and experienced 

1 Files, New York Public Library. 

2 Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American 
Embassy, Petrograd. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 49 

diplomats who founded on a solid basis of good sense and good 
will the early foreign relations of the United States. He was too 
well aware of the deep rivalry separating the Allied Powers to 
believe in the cementing power of fine phrases — but he neverthe- 
less seems to share the hopes entertained by a large number of 
his countrymen that Alexander's League might result in some 
permanent guarantee of European tranquillity. Harris, however, 
did not fail to note in his dispatches the commonly credited rumors 
that the six hundred thousand Russian troops still under arms 
"proved that the Tsar was meditating offensives in the Danubian 
provinces, if not elsewhere." 1 

The task of maintaining the friendly relations which already 
existed between Russia and the United States and of obtaining 
their accession to the League was actively pursued by Alexander 
during the summer of 1816. On July 24/August 5, 1816, Mr. 
Levett Harris further reported to Secretary Monroe the following 
interesting conversation held the day before with one of the Tsar's 
principal advisers: 

The Count Capo D'Istria, who engaged me at this interview in a 
conversation of an hour and a half's length, closed it by acquainting me 
that he had been preparing a communication to me relative to the Tri- 
partite Treaty of the Sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia (the 
treaty called the "Holy Treaty") with a view to know the sentiments of 
the American Government on the subject. That if the United States 
chose to yield their assent to this treaty the Emperor Would receive it 
with deference. That notwithstanding many opinions had gone abroad, 
on the subject of this League, it was none the less a solemn compact 
formed to preserve the peace of Europe, and that whilst Russia con- 
tinued to hold her present power this peace would not be troubled. I 
observed that it was notorious that peace had been a leading feature of 
our policy, and that we had reason to hope that we should not again 
be soon forced to depart from this policy. As Mr. Pinkney, I trusted, 
would soon feel himself justified to repair here — I begged that any 
communication of the nature now suggested might be reserved for the 
period of his arrival. 2 

From his correspondence with Dashkov, the Russian envoy to 
the United States (1817), the Tsar appears to have had every 
reason to suppose that his overtures were meeting with a friendly 
reception in Washington. "It is assured," wrote Dashkov to 

x Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American 
Embassy, Petrograd. 

2 Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, July 24/August 5, 1816. MS. Dispatches, Amer- 
ican Embassy, Petrograd. 



50 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Lieven, the Russian Ambassador at London, in an important 
dispatch, "that the American Government intends asking to be 
associated with the Holy League." 1 

Dashkov, a diplomat of mediocre intelligence, was perhaps 
unduly impressed by the expressions of approval with which 
American idealists welcomed his master's policy. A pact which 
in its actual form merely obligated its signers to render each 
other vague "reciprocal service" and to cooperate "in accordance 
with the direction of the Holy Scriptures" for the attainment of 
the better practice of "religion, peace and justice," would naturally 
appeal to the generous sentimentality so often controlling public 
opinion in the United States with respect to foreign affairs. The 
absurdity of being treated as "brothers" by the three most re- 
actionary sovereigns of Europe would probably have deterred 
but few among the kindly majority of the Massachusetts 
Peace Society from expressing their sympathy for the Tsar's 
"League of Peace." The vague and impracticable language in 
which this manifesto was couched might appear ominous to 
diplomats, but uninformed public opinion could hardly foresee the 
true meaning and inner significance of a pact apparently so gen- 
erous, or that the future policy of the Holy Alliance, as applied 
during Alexander's later reactionary "phase," was destined to 
become an unqualified support of "legitimist principles" abhor- 
rent to American ideals. 

Dashkov neglected the fact that public opinion in the Repub- 
lic during the existing internal "Era of Good Feeling" had 
little time to worry about foreign affairs. With respect to such 
matters the Tsar's envoy complains to Lieven that "they do not 
worry any more about me than if I were the Emperor of Japan." 2 
He also complains that his opportunities for negotiations were 
nearly nil. 

In the same connection he noted in an earlier dispatch his own 
version of the attention with which the cautious diplomacy of 
Adams and Monroe was following the development of the Euro- 
pean situation. "It would seem that the government is not 
without anxiety concerning the effect that some of its actions will 

1 February 22/March 6, 1817. MS. United States, Russian Foreign Office. Many o 
the MS. documents quoted relating to the United States have been listed in Golder's Guid 
to Materials in American History in Russian Archives. 

1 Dashkov to Lieven, MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 51 

have upon Europe, and the way in which their aggressive projects 
will be considered. However, a certain cunning and great ability 
characterizes the present administration." 1 He also noted the 
significant fact that "an increase of the naval forces and a more 
direct interest in the commerce of the American continent forms 
the basis of the President's policy with respect to the other 
nations." 1 

In spite of the apathy and lack of interest in European affairs 
which Dashkov had reported, the Tsar now decided to recall the 
young Republic to a sense of international obligations. In the 
instruction addressed to Baron De Tuyll, the Russian Minister, 
whom he intended to send to the United States, in May, 1817, 2 
to succeed the unpopular Dashkov, the following minute directions 
were given to guide him in his policy with respect to this matter: 

The relations existing between the United States and Russia are 
commercial rather than political. The only exception occurs through 
the proposed mediation which the Emperor has been asked to undertake 
as between Great Britain and the United States. 3 America is geo- 
graphically out of the European system. Her only political bonds are 
with England, the Spanish Colonies and France. 4 

Referring to the latter historical bond, Tuyll was directed to 
proceed to his post by way of Paris. If the occasion permitted 
he was to see Richelieu, "and to obtain some notion from him of 
his ideas respecting the desirability and utility of renewing rela- 
tions between the Cabinet of the Tuileries and the United 
States." 5 With respect to Spanish relations, Tuyll was also to 
use the utmost circumspection. The Emperor's interest con- 
cerning this matter is to be expressed, but "the Envoy of H. M. 
must not allow himself any direct intervention unless especially 
authorized." 6 With respect to Anglo-American policy the in- 
structions are equally specific, if obviously less sincere. Baron 
De Tuyll is to confine himself to expressing His Majesty's "pleas- 
ure" should any improvement occur in the relations existing 
between Great Britain and the United States. 

1 Dashkov, MS. United States, 1816, Russian Foreign Office. 

2 Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia, p. 110. 

3 As regards certain clauses of the Treaty of Ghent. 

4 MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 

5 See later Richelieu's invitation to the United States to send a representative to 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 

6 MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 



52 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

The instructions quoted now enter at length into an interesting 
discussion of the policy which the Tsar's Minister should follow 
in order to reconcile the Russian and American views concerning 
the "Holy Alliance": 

In respect to the policy set forth in this agreement, which was entered 
upon in a spirit of Christian and fraternal alliance between the states who 
were signatory to the Acts of Vienna and Paris, a difference is apparent 
between the latter and other states, who by their isolated positions or on 
account of the desire of their government, have abstained from this act. 
It is scarcely necessary to observe that the United States belongs to this 
second category. Nevertheless, as the United States is to be considered 
a Christian Power, they should necessarily accede to the Act of 14th/26th 
September. On the other hand, however, such adherence should be 
characterized by a purely spontaneous desire, and should arise from a 
wish inspired by a sincere conviction that the spirit of this agreement is 
not only salutary for the powers of the world but also in no ways 
coercive. As the Emperor has not had any opportunity of judging of 
the true disposition of the American Government, and is also ignorant 
of the obstacles which the Constitution of that country might oppose to 
an agreement of this character, His Majesty has not extended any formal 
invitation to the United States. Nevertheless, the Envoys of His 
Majesty are now authorized to make a careful inquiry concerning the 
opinions of the American Government. In treating of this matter, he 
should bear in mind that a similar invitation might be extended along 
the line of the overtures made to the Swiss Diet. Before taking any 
final steps he will, of course, enter into negotiations with the Secretary of 
State. In these negotiations he will advance the fact of the desire 
manifested by several of the Cantons to be admitted to take part in the 
Act of 14th/26th September and of the enthusiasm with which they have 
signed — fully convinced of its utility. Following the above routine, 
(in case the proposal should appear acceptable to the American Secre- 
tary), the Minister will develop more at length the purposes of the 
Treaty of Brotherly and Christian Alliance, pointing out the motives 
which lay at the bottom of this Pact and especially indicating that its 
main purpose is to preserve peace. In this exposition he may make use 
of His Majesty's circular dated March 22, 1816, and the considerations 
contained in the document dated May 4, 1817. He will accompany his 
explanation by the assurance that the Emperor would receive with 
great pleasure the adherence of the United States to the act mentioned. 

He must, however, take no steps without first assuring himself that 
the adherence of the United States will not be opposed by public opinion 
in that country ... In a word, it is important that he should be con- 
vinced of the success of his mission before entering into any long dis- 
cussions concerning the matter, a discussion which would be unworthy 
of the united spirit and purity of intentions which have dictated the Act 
of 14th/26th September, 1815. * 

While Baron De Tuyll's mission to the United States was inter- 
rupted by the unfortunate diplomatic situation arising from the 

'MS. Instructions, United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 



THE RECEPTION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 53 

imprisonment of the Russian Consul Koslov in Philadelphia by a 
local judge, his instructions show the interest felt by his Imperial 
master in securing the adherence of the United States to the 
Holy Alliance. Dashkov's efforts to win the approval of the young 
Republic not proving satisfactory, he was replaced by the Cheva- 
lier Poletica (June, 1819), l whose instructions, as we shall later 
observe, were even more urgent in their appeal to the Washington 
Government to join the European "League 6f Peace." 

Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 3, 1819. MS. Instructions, Russia. 



CHAPTER II 

THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE: 
THE AMERICAN MONARCHY 

In ancient times among the more civilized peoples it was held to be the 
greatest of all crimes to make war upon those who were willing to submit 
to arbitration the settlement of their difficulties; but against those who de- 
clined so fair an offer all others turned, and with their combined resources 
overwhelmed them, not as enemies of any one nation, but as enemies of 
them all alike. So for this very object we see that treaties are made and 
arbiters appointed. Grotius, Mare Liberum, 1608. 

Although no formal declaration of policy accompanied the sign- 
ing of the Holy Alliance, this very reticence had aroused general 
distrust in the liberal circles of Europe and the United States. 
The growing suspicion that the "Act of September 14, 1815," 
was but the credo of a revived dogma of legitimacy was proved 
by subsequent events to be well founded in fact. Metternich, 
even while turning to his own devious and complicated diplomatic 
purposes the bond of indiscriminate solidarity which bound 
the signers of this Pact of Kings, feigned to distrust the Tsar's 
"Jacobinism," yet he alone among the statesmen of Europe 
appears to have held this belief. He was, moreover, confident of 
his ability to control the Autocrat's liberal vagaries. 1 

Alexander's early liberalism had in fact given place to a new 
concept: the "Divine Right" of rulers "placed in the same relation 
to their people as a father to his family." 2 Moreover, in a clause 
of the Quadruple Treaty of Alliance, the Tsar saw a means 
to make effective this paternal spirit through "reunions devoted 
to the great common interests." 3 He now urged that the sover- 
eigns of Europe and their representatives should continue the 
practice developed by the politico-military conclaves which had 
followed the wars of the coalition. In following out this inter- 
national policy, Alexander was the first to show an exam- 
ple to his fellow monarchs by his constant willingness to make 

1 During a long journey from Frankfort to Paris (July 1/12, 1815) upon which the Tsar 
and the Austrian statesmen were traveling companions, Alexander, "talking about the 
matter for hours at a stretch," had developed his new theories with all the enthusiasm of a 
convert. He now believed "that a sacred bond should join the sovereigns of Europe to the 
exclusion of all other influences." Conversation with Metternich quoted by Baron 
Josika in his "Memoires" in Revue de Hongrie, vol. n, Aug.-Dec, 1908, p. 542. 

2 Regarding the Tsar's "liberalism," Levett Harris reported at that time from St. 
Petersburg: "There appear no responsible Ministers. He now acts by the exclusive 
influence of his own judgment and opinions." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, 
December 13, 1816, MS. Dispatches, Russia. 

3 The Treaty of Alliance, Art. VI, Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traites, vol. II, p. 737. 

55 



56 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

the journey from his distant capital whenever the needs of 
Europe seemed to require the assembling of a Congress. And 
Europe, following the great meeting at Vienna, seemed likely to 
profit by these ministrations. 

With the disappearance of the Napoleonic danger the motive 
of mutual defense had disappeared. But another international 
peril soon presented itself. Like the so-called "wave of Bol- 
shevism" which followed the recent World War, Europe after 
the Napoleonic struggle believed itself menaced by the workings 
of an occult and world-wide conspiracy fomented by the "Sects" 
and other revolutionary societies. The monarchs of Europe 
were again to be united in the face of revolution. 

Metternich's criticisms — that Alexander's policy during this 
period was contradictory if not opportunistic — were to a great 
degree justified. In Spain the Tsar tolerated the political follies 
of Ferdinand VII, even when that reactionary monarch restored 
the prerogatives of absolutism and reestablished the Inquisition. 
Again, in France, where Louis XVIII was attempting, honestly 
enough, to restore the prestige of "legitimacy" and to govern 
under the limitations of the "Charter," his growing fear of 
revolution caused him to interfere with Richelieu's electoral 
reforms in an "aristocratic sense." In Poland, where the mandate 
of the Congress of Vienna had given him full right to indulge his 
earlier ideals for reform, he adopted a contrary policy. In the 
latter country, moreover, Metternich felt that the Tsar's liberal 
"expansions" were directly opposed to the interests of the neigh- 
boring Austrian Empire. 

He did not fail to point out that Alexander's example in Poland 
furnished renewed support to the fast-reviving liberal spirit in 
Germany. Without great difficulty the Austrian statesman had 
succeeded in bringing the wavering policy of Frederick William III 
entirely within his own control. The Prussian monarch had 
solemnly promised a constitution to his people (on May 22, 1815, 
just before Waterloo), but under Metternich's influence he indefi- 
nitely postponed the fulfilment of his pledge. 1 The Liberal group 
which surrounded him during the heroic days of the Napoleonic 
struggle — Stein, Hardenberg and Humboldt — saw their influence 
rapidly give place to that of more reactionary Ministers. The 

1 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de I' Europe, vol. r, p. 114. 



THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 57 

first Federal Diet, which was held on November 5, 1816, was, 
in fact, a mere diplomatic gathering of the Princes of Germany. 
In all the minor German states a profound irritation was felt 
throughout all classes of society with respect to the Austro- 
Prussian policy of repression. 

The Sultan Mahmoud of Turkey (who, judged even by Euro- 
pean standards, might well have considered himself a "reformer") l 
could not contemplate without natural anxiety the Emperor 
Alexander's appeal through a Holy Alliance to the "Christian" 
nations of Europe. This was considered by the Sublime Porte, 
and also by the nations interested in the integrity of the Turkish 
dominions, as hiding a secret menace toward the Caliph of the 
Mussulmans. 2 

Aside from the traditional Oriental policy pursued by the Tsars 
of Russia, there was additional cause for anxiety to the supporters 
of the status quo in the East from the natural sympathy openly 
expressed by the Russian Orthodox Church in the fate of their 
coreligionists of Serbia, now openly struggling for liberty against 
the Turkish Government. Capo dTstria, Alexander's favorite 
adviser with respect to Eastern affairs, was already forming the 
Pan Grecian Association of the Hetairie in St. Petersburg, 
whose agents and propaganda were active in all the countries 
bordering the Aegean. The Sultan's growing anxiety regarding 
a possible Orthodox crusade was shared by Metternich and Castle- 
reagh, who were determined that questions of sentiment must be 
rigidly excluded from their policy towards the Ottoman dominion. 

The traditional policy of the English Cabinet since the days of 
Pitt had considered the integrity of the Turkish Empire as the 
cornerstone of England's colonial hegemony in the East. Even 
the action of the Congress of Vienna respecting the pirates of the 
Barbary Coast — who acknowledged the Sultan as their suzerain — 
was opposed by Great Britain on the ground that such a step 
would menace her self-appointed guardianship of the Mediter- 
ranean. 3 In the pretensions now advanced by Alexander (Decem- 
ber, 1816) that the "Great Family of Christian nations" should 

1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. I, p. 101. 

2 The armies which the Russian Emperor maintained upon a war footing, long after the 
other nations of Europe had demobilized their forces, with the exception of the armies of 
occupation in France, amounted in all to nearly 600,000 men. Mr. Harris to the Secre- 
tary of State, January 4/16, 1816. MS. Dispatches, American Embassy, Petrograd. 

3 See Schuyler, American Diplomacy, p. 226. 



58 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

take their part in repressing these piratical outrages upon the 
world's commerce, England saw another attack upon her 
jealously guarded supremacy. 1 

As the first united action to be taken by the Powers of the Holy 
Alliance and the European Directorate, Alexander formally pro- 
posed that unless the Sultan was prepared to give immediate 
guarantees for the good behavior of his vassals, the Beys of Tunis 
and Algiers, the European Powers should proceed, without further 
formalities, to destroy their fleets and "remove all means whereby 
they might reconstruct the same." 

The opposition of Great Britain and Austria caused the Tsar 
to withdraw this proposal, but during the month of March, 1817, 
rumors spread among the Courts of Europe that a secret treaty 
had bound the King of Spain to cede Port Mahon to Russia, and 
possibly other naval bases in the Mediterranean. It was, indeed, 
only by some such tangible advantage to Russian policy that the 
growing intimacy between the Courts of St. Petersburg and 
Madrid could be explained. 2 Tatistcheff, the Russian Ambassa- 
dor to the Court of Ferdinand VII, had been instructed (in spite of 
Alexander's scarcely concealed personal antipathy to this narrow- 
minded and reactionary Monarch) to cultivate Ferdinand's good 
graces even to the extent of approving his stupid and brutal 
administration in interior affairs. Another reason for this intimacy 
soon became apparent. 

During the early revolt of the juntas of South America in 1810 
"to preserve the rights of King Ferdinand" against the power of 
King Jerome, Great Britain had profited by the state of practical 
autonomy existing in the Spanish colonies to break down in favor 
of her own commerce the profitable trade monopoly which the 
Spanish Crown had always rigorously maintained. 3 In this 
matter the Tsar saw a fresh cause of future difference between 
Great Britain and the United States. It was especially as an ally 
against the preponderating influence of Great Britain in the 
councils of the nations that he desired the Government at Wash- 
ington to join his new League of Peace. Besides appealing to the 

1 See the report of an interview between Levett Harris and Capo d'Istria contained in 
the former's dispatch No. 19 of July 24, 1816, American Embassy, Petrograd, the 
Russian Minister expressing his indignation that "Lord Exmouth had neglected noth- 
ing at Algiers to have the American treaties changed." 

2 Debidour, op. cit., vol. I, p. 100. 

3 Shepherd, Latin America, pp. 72-74. 



THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 59 

hostile feelings that persisted after the Peace of Ghent, and to the 
ready jealousy between the mother country and her former colo- 
nies (a sentiment whose depth and nature has always been 
misunderstood by outside Powers), Alexander probably believed 
that he could count on this new cause of difference to secure the 
acquiescence of the Washington Cabinet in an antirevolutionary 
program in the Spanish colonies. 

Following the Congress of Vienna the particularistic views and 
"traditional interests" of the Great Powers had further postponed 
the consideration of the Turkish question and the affairs of 
the German Confederation. Intervention in America doubtless 
appeared to Alexander a less dangerous source of possible inter- 
national friction. Indeed, as we shall later see, American affairs 
became not only a convenient issue but also the first matter with 
which the newly constituted "Confederation" was to concern 
itself during the three years preceding the Congress of Aix-la- 
Chapelle and throughout the succeeding Era of International 
Conferences. The policy favored by the Tsar led to the formal 
mediation which the European monarchs now undertook with 
respect to South American affairs. 

Spain, Russia and Great Britain were all at this time great 
American Powers. The King of Spain was nominally (actually, 
in the eyes of legitimist Europe) the ruler of a territory geo- 
graphically the most important in the New World. His title of 
Emperor of the Indies represented a claim which, although 
disputed by a vigorous minority, was still respected by a large 
part of the population of South America. In the beginning of 
this struggle, hardly a fraction of the population was interested 
in throwing off the Spanish allegiance. The dominant classes, 
including an all-powerful clergy, were generally hostile or indif- 
ferent to a revolution which, in its natural course,would eventually 
attack their own privileges. The Indians and half-castes forming 
the bulk of the population were neutral or inclined to favor the 
home government. 1 

On the northern continent of America the Tsar of Russia was 
the ruler of vast possessions whose vague frontiers stretched 
from Alaska far down the coast to California. In 1812, Baronov, 
the Russian governor whose aggressive policy had earned for him 
the name of the "Little Tsar," succeeded in establishing a colony 

1 Shepherd, op. cit., p. 70. 



60 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

not far from Bodega Bay, but 30 miles to the north of San Fran- 
cisco. 1 The Russian-American company (instituted by the ukase 
of July 8, 1799) had been granted exclusive jurisdiction of the 
American coast north of the 55th degree of north latitude. These 
claims had been the basis for Russian diplomatic protests in 1808 
and 1810 against the encroachment of traders from the United 
States, 2 which had received respectful attention in Washington. 

While the Government at Washington was prepared to treat 
with consideration the claims of Powers long established on the 
American Continent, this toleration had no application to Powers 
like Austria, Germany and France, who now began to consider 
Ferdinand's plight with sympathy. The influence of all Europe — 
except a negligible minority — was to be exercised to counteract 
the growing triumph of the republican spirit. 

The unavowed principle underlying the attitude of the Powers 
of the Holy Alliance towards the revolutionaries of Venezuela 
and La Plata was their interest in maintaining the monarchical 
principle. 3 

In this connection it should be borne in mind that long after 
the tyranny of Ferdinand VII had rendered his further rule 
odious and impossible, a strong sentiment persisted throughout 
South America for a monarchical form of government. Even 
Bolivar, the Liberator, was far from being a convinced republican: 

Would to God (he exclaimed in a letter which foreshadows an American 
"League of Peace") that some day we might enjoy the happiness of 
having there an august congress of representatives of the republics, 
kingdoms and empires of America to deal with the high interests of 
peace and of war, not only between the American nations but between 
them and the rest of the globe. 4 

In a work entitled La Monarquia en America, Sefior C. A. 
de Villanueva has considered at length the early history of this 
movement. The first separatist movement "to preserve the throne 
of the Indies for Ferdinand VII" found itself without a leader 

1 Cleland, "The Early Sentiment for the Annexation of California." Reprint from 
The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, xvm, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (1914-1915), p. 7. 

2 Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia, p. 47. 

3 Writing at a somewhat later period, Chateaubriand, the French Ambassador in 
London (May, 1821), voiced their policy as follows: "If Europe is obliged to recognize the 
de facto governments of America, its whole policy should be aimed toward the encouraging 
of the establishment of monarchies instead of republics, whose principal exports would be 
their principles." Chateaubriand, Memoiresd' outre tombe, vol. vn, pp. 400-401. 

4 Moore, "Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism," Columbia University Quarterly, Sep- 
tember, 1915, p. 347. 



THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 61 

after the abdication of Bayonne and the assumption of the royal 
authority by Joseph Bonaparte. A strong desire was, however, 
manifested all over South America to replace the dethroned 
Bourbons by monarchs of the same dynasty. 1 The monarchical 
movement was, however, defeated by the partisans of the Junta 
of Cadiz in Buenos Aires; while in Caracas (December, 1811), 
acting under the advice of the American Consul Lowry, the revolu- 
tionists adopted a republican form of constitution. 2 According 
to the same author, the Congress of Tucuman (1816) "was openly 
monarchical," 3 although it eventually decided for a republican 
form of government. 

At a later date Hyde de Neuville, Louis XVIII's Minister at 
Washington, filled his dispatches to Richelieu with plans for 
founding one or more monarchies in South America — thrones 
which should be occupied by princes of the House of Bourbon. He 
even entertained hopes of securing the acquiescence of the United 
States in this plan in exchange for the good offices of France with 
respect to the cession of Florida. 4 

Until the real situation was revealed after the opening of the 
debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, the policy followed by Russia with 
respect to South America (rather than that pursued by their 
commercial rival Great Britain) was believed in the United States 
to be most favorable to the cause of "Liberty." This was largely 
due to a persistent belief in the Tsar's liberalism. Instructions 
from the Department of State to John Quincy Adams in London 
(December 10, 1815) report with apprehension the rumor that 
"Spain had ceded Florida to Great Britain," and that a British 
expedition was on its way to that quarter. 5 

Referring to the revolution already "making rapid progress in 
South America," Mr. Adams is directed to inquire: "What are the 
views and intentions of Great Britain regarding this important 
subject? Is it not to the interest of Great Britain that the 

1 A strong royalist faction in Buenos Aires entered into negotiations with the court of 
Portugal (which had found refuge in Rio de Janeiro,) seeking to come to an understanding 
with the Prince Regent which would enable his Consort, Carlotta (sister of the dethroned 
Spanish monarch), to assume the government "pending the return of Ferdinand." In 
Venezuela the patriots sought "to erect the old Captain-Generalcy into an independent 
province with a king of its own — choosing preferably a prince of the old Spanish dynasty." 
Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin {La Monarquia en America, vol. i), p. 10. 

2 Ibid., p. 18. 

3 Ibid., p. 45. 

4 Hyde de Neuville, Memoires, vol. i, pp. 267-279. 
6 MS. Instructions, Department of State. 



62 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 



Spanish provinces become independent? . . . In case of a rupture 
between the United States and Spain at any future time what 
part will Great Britain take in the contest, it being understood 
that we shall ask in regard to the Spanish provinces no privileges 
in trade which shall not be common to all nations?" l The Secre- 
tary of State soon after informed the American charge that "a 
strong suspicion is entertained here by many that the Spanish 
Government relies on the support of the British." 2 

Instructions of the same date direct Levett Harris in St. Peters- 
burg to confirm the views that he had previously expressed of the 
Tsar's disposition regarding the independence of the Spanish 
provinces, viz., that he was "believed to favor it." At the close 
of the year 1816 Harris reported from St. Petersburg that the Tsar 
was more interested in preserving the tranquillity of Europe than 
in inviting the hostility of the Government of the United States 
by representations concerning the conduct of private individuals 
and the depredations of the so-called revolutionary privateers. 3 

Thus in 1817 the Tsar's dilemma lay between his desire to 
secure the support of the United States against Great Britain 
and his fear that both with respect to Florida and in their conduct 
towards the South American insurgents the American Government 
might act in a fashion to contravene the monarchical"mediation." 4 
Dashkov, the Russian representative at Washington, reported 
to his government through Count Lieven (February 22/March 6, 
1817) that "Monroe is proclaimed President and is resolving to 
seize Florida by fair means or foul. The fleet will be employed in 
the Mediterranean before Spain can expect it." 

1 MS. Instructions, Department of State. 

2 Secretary of State to Mr. Adams in London, February 2, 1816. MS. Instructions. 

3 "The only object of high interest that has recently attracted attention here is the dif- 
ference which at present exists between Spain and Portugal. The Emperor showed great 
solicitude on this occasion, and at the last circle spoke to the Envoys of those Courts, 
especially the Portuguese, in a tone to lead to the impression that any attempt made to 
disturb the tranquillity (sic) of Europe would not be overlooked by His Majesty. Each of 
these ministers have made official communication to the Russian Ministry of the views and 
pretensions of their respective courts." Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, December 
14/26, 1816. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 

4 Re the Tsar's foreign policy. In a rare anonymous pamphlet entitled A Sketch of 
the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817, published in New York by Kirk 
and Mercein (1817), a copy of which is preserved in the files of the Library at West Point 
Military Academy, occurs an interesting contemporary appreciation of the role played by 
Alexander during this period: "Alexander now wields the huge sceptre of Russia, and dis- 
plays an ability equal to the task. His philosophical views have indeed been enfeebled 
by pernicious advisers, but those who have known him in other days still cling to the hope 
that he will not substitute an unfeeling policy, of which the pillars are tyranny, ignorance 
and fanaticism. 



THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 63 

In September, 1817, the newly-appointed Minister Pinkney 

wrote from St. Petersburg as follows: 

Very friendly relations (displayed occasionally with some parade) 
exist between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and although it might 
naturally be expected that out of Europe the Emperor would leave him 
to manage his own affairs as he could, this case of resistance by subjects 
to the King's rule, and of an effort to multiply republics may be thought 
to call for a general combination in Europe to discourage and repress 
it. . • . If it is true that a New Congress or rather interview of 
sovereigns is to take place next summer at Aix-la-Chapelle (as I con- 
fidently said and as I believe) the affairs of South America will, I presume, 
be talked of on that occasion. 1 

Both countries were anxiously alert to each other's moves. 
In May, 1817, Dashkov had again written to Lieven: 

Certainly the moral effect which America can exercise upon the whole 
world merits more attention than Europe appears disposed to give 
. . . Pernambuco has declared its independency as a republic. This is 
certainly no sudden commotion, but a well prepared revolution which 
should give cause for apprehension to the Portuguese Government and 
all of Brazil. 

And again on September 24/26, 1817, he notes: 

The Americans continue to send help to the Spanish insurgents, lend- 
ing them privateers and helping them in various ways. 2 

The anxiety of the State Department with respect to the Tsar's 
rumored intentions to intervene in America's affairs now became 
more marked. Mr. Pinkney, instructed to study the policy of 
Russia, reported the following ominous event: "There is no doubt 
a Russian fleet will very soon proceed to Cadiz." 3 This refers to 
a none too creditable transaction through which Tatistcheff had 
sold (not without profit to his own purse) five unseaworthy ships 
of the line to Ferdinand to be used to transport troops to South 
America. 4 His subsequent dispatch was more reassuring: 

The sale of the fleet mentioned in my last . . . can scarcely be 
termed a perfectly neutral proceeding with respect to the Colonies, but, 
if it be a sale, it seems to show that the Emperor does not mean to 
embark as a party in the contest. 5 

x Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 13/25, 1817. MS. Dispatches, 
Russia. 

2 Dashkov to Lieven, MS. United States, 1817, Russian Foreign Office. 

3 Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 25/October, 7 1817. MS. Dis- 
patches, Russia. 

4 Cambridge Modern History, vol. x, p. 210. 

6 Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State, September 29/October 11, 1817. MS. Dis- 
patches, Russia. 



64 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

In the beginning of the year 1818 the situation had become fur- 
ther complicated by General Jackson's invasion of the Spanish 
territory of Florida and his capture of St. Mark and Pensacola. 
Growing popular sentiment in the United States, under the leader- 
ship of Henry Clay, soon demanded recognition by the United 
States Government of the independence of the South American 
colonies. 1 It appeared that the United States was prepared to 
challenge not only the power of Spain but also the monarchical 
combinations of Europe. 

Meanwhile the "mediation" by the great Powers with respect 
to Ferdinand's differences with his revolted subjects in South 
America — whose possible consequences were not unnaturally 
feared in Washington — was actually taking place. The mediators 
were the Council of the Ministers of the Allied Powers in Paris — 
now virtually forming a European Directorate. These represented 
the Cabinets of the Powers who had signed the "Treaty of Alliance." 
Ferdinand VII, at the instigation of Tatistcheff, had formally 
asked for their aid in bringing about a forced reconciliation between 
his throne and the revolted colonies. 2 In proposing this course 
the King of Spain also demanded that military measures against 
Portugal should be taken by the European Powers. 3 In these 
pretensions Alexander and his protege found themselves checked 
by the policy of Great Britain. The English Cabinet from the 
beginning were unalterably opposed to any form of "eventual 
action" tending to armed intervention. The Tsar chose to con- 
sider this policy as deliberately opposing his schemes for inter- 
national action in the interest of world peace. 4 

During the early part of the Spanish mediation the British 
envoy was none other than the redoubtable Duke of Wellington, 

1 Hildt, p. 119. 

2 Debidour, vol. i, pp. 108-109. 

3 The revolt of the South American colonies was complicated by the Portuguese sup- 
port of the revolutionaries in the Banda Oriental. 

4 Under the date of June 30/July 12, 1818, Pozzo di Borgo, protesting against Great 
Britain's attitude, writes to Count Nesselrode: "Jealous of the interest that our August 
Master has shown in the cause of justice and of the Spanish interest, England has en- 
deavored for two years to prove to the Cabinet of Madrid that further deference to the 
Councils of Russia would react against their own interest. The plan of the English 
Minister has been, first, to tire out the Spanish negotiators, using for that purpose the 
talents of the Portuguese plenipotentiary; then to oblige both parties to have recourse to 
the arbitration of Great Britain (alone), thus enabling her to control the measures taken 
to reconcile the two powers of the Peninsula, and for the pacification of America." Pozzo 
di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, in Polovstov, Correspondence diplomatique des ambassadeurs 
et ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830, vol. 1818, No. 387, 



THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 65 

who, in spite of the presence of the British Ambassador, personally 
conducted the negotiations. Pozzo di Borgo somewhat queru- 
lously complains of his "colleagues of Austria and Prussia, whose 
conduct leads me to suppose that their instructions are but 
directions to adhere to the opinions advanced by Great Britain." l 

The unfortunate Russian envoy during this first essay of the 
great principles of "International Administration," found his 
path beset with difficulties. Alexander now believed — and acted 
as though — these principles legally obtained through the signature 
of the Treaty of Alliance, "consecrated" by the "Holy League." 
Pozzo di Borgo was manfully striving in the face of formidable 
opposition to direct the debates in a sense that would not only 
satisfy the ends of Russian policy but also his own ideas of the 
preponderating deference due to the "internationalist" theories 
of his August Master. In comparing the Russian contentions 
with those of Great Britain, he declares : "Those emanating from 
our Cabinet appear simple, easy and intelligible, and offer a means 
to attain their end, frank, mutual and friendly. I hope I shall 
not be accused of prejudice in admitting that those of our allies 
appear to me to be equivocal, filled with the marks of jealousy and 
tending to desire ends impossible to reconcile." 2 

He also complains that "the whole policy pursued by the Allied 
Powers seems to tend towards maintaining the principle of a 
quadruple alliance, excluding France and Spain, an arrangement 
whereby Russia would be reduced to a minority of one against 
three." With frank satisfaction he now noted that in the face 
of Great Britain's support of the Portuguese demands, M. Pizarro, 
the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, had communicated to the 
mediators that he had found it necessary to consider an arrange- 
ment with the United States with regard to Florida, "allowing it 
to be understood that this not impossible transaction could not 
but react contrary to the interests of Great Britain's systematic 
policy in the New World." 3 

At this juncture, "with the prospect of a close to this tedious 
negotiation," the Duke of Wellington, in a fit of impatience, 
hastened off to London, leaving Sir Charles Stuart in his place. 
Freed from his Jove-like presence, a lively squabble immediately 

l Ibid. 

2 Pozzo di Borgo to Count Capo d'Istria, in Ibid., No. 663. 

3 Capo d'Istria to Nesselrode, in Ibid. (June 30/July 12), No. 752. 



66 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

arose between the envoys of Spain and Portugal, wherein, by 
the use of subtle dialect and the transparent arts of intrigue 
proper to a diplomacy already passing out of date, each sought to 
gain some slight advantage over his adversary. "Despairing of 
any issue from this labyrinth of duplicity, ineptitude and extrava- 
gance," writes Pozzo, "the mediators (at least those whose 
dynamic was the spirit of Justice and Right) wishing to carry 
out the mandates of their respective courts *'ancf rather with the 
end of complying with their instructions than with any hope of 
satisfying the parties interested) . . . applied themselves to the 
elaboration of a treaty and convention the terms of which 
appeared to them the most likely to conciliate the rights with the 
interests of the two Peninsular Sovereigns in the New World." 1 
Shortly after, Pozzo di Borgo writes to Nesselrode concerning 
the progress of the mediators: 

The mediation to put an end to the differences existing between 
Spain and Portugal has until the present brought forth only voluminous 
notes and sophistical and dilatory arguments. The plenipotentiaries 
of Spain and Portugal had at last agreed to exchange confidential 
notes to be reciprocally signed, by the terms of which Brazil bound 
herself not to recognize the insurgents of Buenos Aires, and to cooperate 
by every means short of war to determine them to submit to the mother 
country. The representative of Spain at the same time gave assurances 
that in view of the services offered by his Very Faithful Majesty to 
His Catholic Majesty, the latter was willing to make certain territorial 
concessions which would rectify the frontiers of the two countries in 
America. 1 

The dispatch closes with a long account of a personal quarrel 
which had unfortunately arisen between TatistchefF and the 
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the following eloquent 
lament concering the spectacle offered to the mediators by the two 
Peninsular Kingdoms, once the greatest colonizing empires of the 
world, now reduced to undignified impotency. "The Cabinet of 
Madrid assisting like a mere spectator at the demolition of its 
own greatness, wastes its time combating phantoms in the midst 
of the deluge which is sweeping it away, while the Court of Brazil 
busily sets up for itself a terrible neighborhood of 'demagogy and 
disorder.' " 1 

In September, Pozzo communicated to St. Petersburg the import- 
ant news that "after three weeks of delay the British Government 

1 Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, in Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818 (July 25/August 6), 
No. 698. 



THE EARLY POLICY OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 67 

has finally pronounced an absolute negative with respect to the 
Spanish proposition." This refers to Ferdinand's desire to be 
present at a Congress where the Tsar wished to submit the 
Spanish case to a solemn conclave of the Powers assembled. 
The Spanish envoy, with a curious misunderstanding of the 
situation, had even "made his demand for the participation 
of his Master at Aix-la-Chapelle conditional upon another, viz., 
'that Great Britain should promise to declare itself openly against 
the insurgents in case these latter should refuse to accept the 
means of conciliation offered them.' " * Pozzo closes his dis- 
patch with a prophetic warning regarding the influence of the 
United States on European affairs : 

The result of these misunderstandings is, on the one hand, the progress 
of the insurrection, on the other, the advantages which accrue therefrom 
to the United States. For a long time I have had the honor to announce 
to the Imperial Ministry that the dismemberment of the Spanish- 
American Continent would result to the advantage of the Federal 
Government. There is no longer doubt that the Floridas will be ceded 
to them, and that the Union will extend its possessions along the Gulf 
of Mexico, until it has developed and dominated through the possession 
of the neighboring positions the whole extent of that vast body of water 
which is destined to become its absolute property. 1 

The European debates regarding the mediation between Ferdi- 
nand and the Portuguese Government (together with their differ- 
ences in the Banda Oriental) and the "pacification" asked for by 
Ferdinand with respect to the revolted Spanish colonies were to 
be continued at Aix-la-Chapelle. The Tsar, with increasing 
obstinacy, persisted in his view that the Spanish King's troubles 
in South America offered an opportunity for the Powers of Europe 
to apply and assert the principles of "concerted action" a view 
which he had been the first to advance in his Instructions to 
Novosiltzov and now believed to be binding upon the signa- 
tories of the Holy Alliance. The whole question of a European 
Directorate and the "mutual guarantee" it might afford to the 
status quo was about to be formally raised. Alexander was deter- 
mined that his "Great Idea" — which through the force of events 
he had seen thrust aside at Vienna — should receive the considera- 
tion it deserved. To "organize Europe" was, in his conception, 
the first step towards securing the reign of "Justice, Christian 
Charity and Peace." 

1 Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, in Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818 (August 27/ 
September 8), No. 713, p. 812. 



CHAPTER III 

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 

If it were allowable for the Allies freely to separate themselves from the 
Alliance there could be no permanent Society of Nations. But no ally, in this 
case, may hope to separate himself . . . and not be considered the common 
enemy of all the Allies. Abbe de St. Pierre, Projet pour Rendre la Paix 
Perpetuelle en Europe, 1713. 

In April, 1818, a circular was prepared by the Russian Foreign 
Office, under the Tsar's direction, setting forth at length the 
beneficent ends already attained through the recognition of the 
principle of international solidarity. The Powers were exhorted 
not only to continue an unalterable devotion to the system set up 
by existing treaties, but also to unite in closer bonds. In the form 
of a "Confidential Memoir," l this document was communicated 
to the Cabinets of Europe. As proof of the reactionary spirit 
already prevailing in the councils of the Russian Emperor, and 
as a credo of his intimate beliefs, the following extract is of the 
highest interest, especially when compared with the declarations 
that subsequently completed the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle: 

During this memorable epoch, a united Europe has been able to 
smother the spirit of revolution and to create a riew order of things 
safeguarding the general interest, under the aegis of Universal Justice. 
The means by which this end has been accomplished are: (a) The alliance 
of the Powers, unalterable in its principles, yet conformable to the prog- 
ress of events, so that it may develop into a great confederation of all 
the states, (b) The restoration of the legitimate government in France 
fortified by institutions 2 which unite indissolubly the rights of the Bour- 
bon dynasty with those of the people, (c) The declarations following 
the Congress of Vienna, (d) The subsequent declarations made at 
Paris during the year 1815. 3 

Two of Alexander's favorite ideas, grouped in the following 

sentence, find a prominent place in the "Memoir": 

The wrongs under which all humanity groaned during the revolutionary 
struggle were the inevitable consequence of the errors of the past, viz., 
individualism and partial or exclusive political combinations* 

The conservative nature of the bond which formed the basis of 
the European system is shown in the concluding paragraph. 

1 This "Confidential Memoir" is given in full by Polovstov, Correspondence Diplomatique 
des Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830, 
vol. 1818, p. 832. 

2 The Charter imposed upon Louis XVIII. 

3 Polovstov, op. cit., p. 833. 

69 



70 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

This was intended only for the perusal of the diplomatic chancel- 
leries of the Allied Powers: 

This association of states has assured the inestimable advantages of 
civil order and the inviolability of persons and institutions. It has 
consecrated and guaranteed everywhere legitimacy, 1 ab antiquo, and 
recognized by the treaties now in force, the territorial possessions of 
every state. In order to maintain this end, the principle of a General 
Coalition must be established and developed by further eventual action. 2 

Alexander's conversion from republican liberalism to a philoso- 
phy of monarchical paternalism was now complete. Yet a private 
letter from Count Capo dTstria to General Pozzo di Borgo, the 
Russian Minister in Paris, written just before the Congress now 
proposed, proves the Tsar's high-minded intentions towards his 
allies. In connection with the Memoir it shows Alexander's real 
aspirations regarding a concert of Europe at this critical time. 
Quoting the Tsar's own words, Capo d'Istria wrote: 

I desire the prosperity of the French Monarchy and the progressive 
strengthening of its influence, not for myself, nor for Russia, but in the 
interest of the entire universe. It is Europe that has suffered from the 
loss and misfortunes of France, and Europe is therefore greatly interested 
in the future happiness of France and the maintenance of the order there 
established. All the Powers, consequently, should cooperate to this 
end, at the same time respecting the plighted faith of treaties. This is 
the chief aim to which the efforts of each one of the Foreign Ministries 
should be directed, and aside from it, there is no hope either for France 
or for Europe. 

While General Pozzo endeavors to follow these principles, so often 
impressed upon him, he feels otherwise. Read his dispatches. They 
are written in the language of a devoted and zealous servant of the Crown 
who seeks by his foresight to profit by every possible combination the 
future may hold. He knows that Austria, England and Prussia have 
always disputed our right to share in affairs of general interest. In 
anticipation of the condition of affairs which may arise after France is 
wholly restored, he prepared to oppose them by winning to our side the 
support of French diplomacy, and if necessary that of Spain as well. 
With these auxiliaries, he looks confidently upon the future. 

This fashion of judging of men and affairs can not but impede the 
progress of the general system, and is not consistent with the purity of 
its guiding sentiments. Once known to the other Ministries, such con- 
duct will infallibly engender jealousy and suspicion. In adopting such 
a line, we should be drawn in spite of ourselves into a by-road. Instead 
of working towards eminently disinterested ends, and by legal and 
avowed means maintaining concord and union between the Great Powers, 
our efforts would become devoted to a line of conduct entirely selfish, 
veiled in mystery and moving by devious ways. We should inevitably 

1 For an interesting discussion of the principle of Legitimate Monarchy, see Goebel, 

The Recognition Policy of the United States. 
2 Polovstov, op. cit., p. 834. 



THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 71 

be driven to aim at Power, in order to make the other chancelleries dance 
to our tune. We should begin by thinking that all this was to preserve 
Europe in the way of Peace. But where would such a path lead us? l 

It must be borne in mind, in judging these utterances, that they 
were not part of a public manifesto. They are, indeed, but the 
report of a private conversation between the Tsar and the 
writer. They were addressed to one who, from the nature of the 
rebuke they implied, would probably be the last person to publish 
them abroad. As such, they offer valuable evidence of Alexander's 
good faith and sincerity of purpose at a time when his motives 
were — and still are — most frequently called into question. They 
explain why, even in the face of a policy they could not but deplore 
and oppose, the Tsar maintained the respect and admiration of 
such men as Monroe and Adams. They lead us to understand 
the verdict of Chateaubriand, whose faculties of criticism, at 
least, no one can deny, that Alexander of Russia, after Napoleon, 
was the greatest man of his time. 

The difficulties of continuing a common direction to the foreign 
policy of a group of states differing widely in political development 
and civilization became every day more apparent. From the very 
beginning, the Tsar's conception of a fraternal pact general in 
its terms — such as that uniting the monarchs of the Holy Alli- 
ance — was opposed by the decision of the British Cabinet to base 
its whole course of action on the actual text of the agreements 
signed at Chaumont, Vienna and Paris. Castlereagh, at first far 
from hostile to the Holy Alliance, was soon convinced that in 
following such a course lay the only means of remedying the 
defects of a system largely based on "eventual" decisions. Great 
Britain from the first found it hard to reconcile parliamentary 
principles and a traditional foreign policy with the Tsar's ideals 
of "European action." 2 

It was the Tsar's contention that the Treaty of Alliance of 
November 20, 1815, had provided (Article VI) the machinery for 
a real European government. In a series of congresses — wherein 
the representatives of the Powers might deliberate in common 
upon all matters concerning the general welfare — he saw the 
inception of a European legislature. In spite of the example 
afforded by the Congress of Vienna, he would apparently set no 

1 Letter from Count Capo d'Istria to Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, July 10/22, 1818, quoted by 
Polovstov, op. cit., vol. 1818, p. 774. 

2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, pp. 254-255. 



72 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

limits to the usefulness of international debate. But in the appli- 
cation of this policy he found himself opposed not only by Great 
Britain but even by Austria and Prussia. 1 Both of these Powers 
believed that a Congress such as the Tsar proposed — one including 
Spain and the lesser Powers — might readily lead to embarrassing 
complications with respect to the participation of France. Per- 
sistent rumors emanating from St. Petersburg even affirmed 
that the Tsar, dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies, was 
meditating an alliance with the restored dynasty of the Bour- 
bons. 2 The outcome of this situation was a compromise: Alexan- 
der obtained the Congress he so ardently desired, set for Septem- 
ber 30, at Aix-la-Chapelle. But in spite of Spanish protests and 
Ferdinand's complaints that Russia had abandoned him, it was 
decided to restrict this gathering to the representatives of the 
four great Powers. Before this tribunal Richelieu, the French 
Prime Minister, was invited to appear to give an account of the 
state of affairs existing under the restored monarchy. 

Although the conduct of the Bonapartists and other "revolu- 
tionaries" still gave cause for serious anxiety to all the signatories 
of the Treaty of Paris, 2 Richelieu by this time had gained the 
entire confidence of the Tsar. This was the end aimed at when 
the former Russian official was chosen by the politic Louis XVIII 
to replace Talleyrand. 3 For nearly a year Richelieu had flattered 
Alexander's favorite theories by pointing out that on all occasions 
the federal system of Europe which must grow out of the present 
state of things could always force France to be just in case she 
sought to be unjust. He insisted, however, that to secure this 
end, France must form part of this system. 4 

/I The growing intimacy between the courts of France and Russia 
was viewed by the Powers with some apprehension. But after 
an interview with the Tsar at Aix, Castlereagh reported with 
some relief the fact that Alexander had declared to Wellington as 
well as to Metternich and himself: "My army, as well as myself, 
is at the disposal of Europe." 5 

1 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de V Europe, vol. I, p. 118. 

2 Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. I, 
pp. 398^00. 

3 Richelieu had for some time been Governor of Odessa, while an emigre in Russia. 

* For the details of this negotiation, see Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 254—255. 

6 Dispatch, Castlereagh to Bathrust, October 3, No. 2, quoted in Phillips, The Con- 
federation of Europe, p. 168. 






THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 73 

Since the signing of the treaty of November 20, France had 
shown every disposition exactly to fulfil the terms of the financial 
arrangement imposed upon her by the Allies. Not only had the 
scheduled payment of the indemnities — considered enormous at 
the time — been rigorously fulfilled, but internationally her finan- 
cial position was even sounder than before. By the end of 
April, 1818, her debt to the Allies (500,000,000 francs) was com- 
pletely liquidated. 1 Through the reorganization of the army, 
the government of Louis XVIII was firmly established upon the 
throne. No real excuse could now be invoked for maintaining 
the great Army of Occupation within the borders of France. 
Moreover, signs were becoming apparent of a dangerous Liberal 
disaffection among the foreign troops long quartered in France — 
in not unfriendly contact with the people who had led the revolu- 
tionary movement throughout Europe. 2 

But before finally relinquishing their hold upon the French 
Government, the Allied Powers desired to exact from Richelieu 
some guarantee of future good conduct. The first sessions of the 
Congress were, therefore, almost entirely devoted to securing 
this end. 

The discussions with respect to the evacuation of French terri- 
tory by the Allied armies were brief and to the point. Nearly 
all the requirements determining this action had been carried out. 
A protocol, dated October 2, informed Louis XVIII that the 
foreign garrisons would leave not later than November 30. This 
news was received with joy throughout the whole country. 3 

The question now arose upon what terms the representatives of 
Louis XVIII might be admitted to take actual part in the council. 
To make France a party to the treaty of Chaumont would asso- 
ciate her as an ally in an agreement aimed chiefly against her own 
interests — and her own possible military rehabilitation. On 
October 3, Castlereagh made a formal proposal "that France 
be admitted under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty of 
Alliance," which had established "a deliberating system for the 
purpose of consulting at fixed periods and upon common inter- 
ests." 4 

1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. I, p. 117. 

2 Cretenau-Joly, Histoire des Traites de 1815, preface. 

3 Debidour, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 120. 

4 Martens, Nouveau Recueildes Traites de Paix, vol. n, p. 737. 



74 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

On October 8 a Russian memorandum, drafted by Pozzo di 
Borgo, was presented to the Allies, and on November 1 a protocol 
openly concluded with Richelieu declared that France was 
"admitted under the terms of Article VI of the treaty of Novem- 
ber, 1815." 

In the eyes of Europe, Louis XVIII was thus allowed, through 
his representatives, to take a full share in the ensuing debates. 
After Richelieu had formally accepted the Allied terms (Novem- 
ber 12), a further protocol, dated November 15, establishing the 
mutual relations of the Five Great Powers, was considered secret. 1 

Pasquier, referring to Richelieu's answer of November 1 2 and 

of the protocol of November 15, says: 

These two remarkable documents should be studied by all who desire 
to form an exact opinion of the affairs of this period. They are filled 
with the principles of the Holy Alliance. 2 

The terms of this protocol, wholly in accord with the Tsar's 
theories of concerted action, were, however, accompanied by cer- 
tain significant reservations on the part of the British representa- 
tive. Castlereagh presented a Memorandum to the Congress 
setting forth the views of his Cabinet. After recalling the terms 
of the previous agreements that bound the Allies, he declared that 
Great Britain could only consider as a casus foederis the return of 
Bonaparte or an attempt to restore his dynasty. In every other 
situation that might arise she would be guided by circumstances. 3 
The Island Empire was already tending towards the policy which 
V Canning afterwards characterized as "resuming Jierisolation.'' 
In Castlereagh's opinion it was time to call a halt on Concerted 
Action. The Tsar was already planning an Allied General Staff. 
In this idea he was warmly supported by the Prussians, and was 
only dissuaded by Wellington. 4 In the eyes of all the Allies of 
Chaumont, however, except the Tsar, the return of France to the 
European system was contingent on her good behavior. As Gentz 

1 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, p. 501. This document, described by Gentz, as a "protocol 
reserve" {Depeches inedites, vol. I, p. 410), is quoted in full in Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, 
pp. 501-502 : "The five Powers have decided not to depart, either in their relations with each 
other or with other states from the principles of intimate union which until now have 
presided over the common interests, a union become more Scfong and indissoluble from the 
bonds of Christian Brotherhood which join them." Article 2 states, " that this union is only 
more real and durable because it has in view no particularistic interests or temporary 
combination." 

2 Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 262. 

3 Gentz, Depeches inedites, vol. I, p. 409. 

4 Gentz, Ibid., vol. I, p. 413. 

4 



THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 75 

remarks in his account of the proceeding, "it was not a Quintuple 
Alliance. Indeed the idea came to no one's mind." l 

It soon became evident that Great Britain also desired a definite 
understanding with respect to the limits of her future policy con- 
cerning the mediation the Powers had undertaken in South Amer- 
ica. American affairs were indeed inevitably to become the chief 
concern of this formal gathering of European Powers. On 
October 27, "Lord Castlereagh first brought to the attention of 
the Congress the question of the mediation desired by Ferdinand 
between Spain and its revolted colonies." 2 

In the report of the proceedings of the Congress addressed to 
Alexander we read of the difficulties encountered in the course 
of this mediation, the progress of which was closely followed by 
the Tsar: 

The long statement of the British Plenipotentiary made all present 
feel that the British Government would consult only its own interests in 
the matter. His point of view was echoed by the Plenipotentiaries of 
Austria and Prussia . . . Richelieu remained silent, but the Russian 
Plenipotentiaries now made the following statement: 'At a moment when 
the eyes of all Europe and the interest of two hemispheres are fixed upon 
Aix-la-Chapelle, Spain again asks the Courts of Austria, France, Great 
Britain, Prussia and Russia to consider her case. She has proposed a 
general basis of settlement and asks to participate in their councils. 
Russia has not taken any attitude in this matter, but is nevertheless 
desirous of supporting the King of Spain. Great Britain has sought to 
develop the same ends through negotiations with the Duke of San 
Carlos. If a plan can be agreed upon, Spain appears willing to forward 
its execution through friendly negotiations with her colonies. It is 
only in case that these offers of mediation should be refused that Spain 

1 Gentz, Depeches in'edit'es, vol. I, p. 408. 

2 See MS. Russian Foreign Office, Archives d'Etat, 1818. The following unpublished docu- 
ments referring to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle are contained in a Folio marked Precis 
du Travail de la Conference d' Aix-la-Chapelle . The report to the Emperor, quoted above, 
is contained in Cartons 2 and 3 of this Folio. The Tsar's misgivings with respect to 
English support of his plan for a "Confederation of States" is shown by the terms of 
an interesting document presented by the Russian plenipotentiary to the Ministers of 
Austria, France, Great Britain and Prussia (dated November 11/23, 1818). In this 
document Alexander reiterated with doctrinaire persistency the ideals of solidarity and 
"brotherhood" of nations and sovereigns contained in the manifesto of the Holy Alliance. 
He once more expressed his belief that "reciprocal guarantees" alone could insure the 
status quo of Europe. At the same time he suggested as the surest basis for future peace 
a "Territorial Guarantee" of the respective possessions of the Allied Powers and the fol- 
lowing significant clause with respect to British participation was added: "They agree to 
notify the Government of Great Britain of the above clause, inviting H. B. M.'s Gov- 
ernment to use its good offices to obtain the results desired if necessary without requiring 
its active cooperation or full adhesion." This treaty draft, which does not appear to have 
been seriously debated by the Congress, is highly interesting not only as showing the 
Tsar's persistent devotion to the principles set forth in Novosiltzov's Instructions but also 
as a serious attempt to make a territorial guarantee the basis of a general treaty. (Com- 
pare Article X of the Treaty of Versailles.) See Appendix. 



/ 



76 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

will desire the intervening powers to furnish more effectual and impera- 
tive cooperation. 1 

Spain, as a party to the proceedings, continued to insist on 
being admitted to the Congress. To such a step — and to the 
"intervention" hinted at in the Russian statement — the British 
representative strongly objected. "Castlereagh explained that 
\y Great Britain would onlyjintg rvene' wid TTgood^orKces, and refused 

to consent to the Spanish envoy being admitted to the de- 
bates." * The Russian representatives were to continue, to the 
end of the Congress, their attempts to draw the English Foreign 
Minister into the Tsar's plan of a European Directorate. But 
besides their objections to vague "eventual action," the British 
Cabinet felt, not without reason, that the solidarity between the 
Russian Court and the Courts of France and Spain would but 
set up a condition of "equilibrium" wholly to the Tsar's advan- 
tage. Alexander's efforts to force Ferdinand on the Congress 
defeated his own ends. 2 

At the second conference, held on October 24, consideration of 
these important questions was continued. "No one cared to 
open the discussion" — or to oppose the Tsar's desires. France 
and Russia were alone in favor of making an "international 
question" of Ferdinand's domestic troubles. It was Castlereagh 
who finally proposed a solution. "Let us," he said, "decide 
collectively that the role of Mediator be accepted by the Five 
Courts, at the same time announcing to Spain that only good- 
offices are possible; let us propose that she begin by granting to the 
colonies still under her sceptre the advantages she is disposed to 
offer, and make similar offers to those which are in a state of 
insurrection." 3 Greatly to Alexander's chagrin, Austria and 
Prussia seconded Castlereagh in the above proposal. 

Richelieu, inspired by the Tsar's interest in Spain, now 
made a last attempt to include Ferdinand in the debates. He 

1 "Report to the Emperor," Carton 2, loc. cit. 

2 Pasquier is careful to point out that this meeting in which sovereigns and their 
plenipotentiaries took part remained in reality a reunion. It had been "positively 
announced that it was not the intention of the sovereigns to hold a Congress." "In 
London it was feared that Russian influence in a Congress would be preponderant." 
Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, pp. 254-255. The Tsar's doctrinaire efforts (renewed at Lay- 
bach) to give a formal, legislative tone to the debates but aroused opposition on the part 
of Great Britain and Austria. This was perhaps the chief cause that made Aix-la-Chapelle 
the closing chapter of the "coalition" rather than the opening of a new era. 

3 "Report to the Emperor," Carton 2, loc. cit. 



THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 77 

opposed the British plan for the following reason: "In using such 
language to Spain she will be forced to refuse the mediation." 
His closing reason — in view of subsequent events — is also signifi- 
cant: He objected to Castlereagh's attitude because "this will 
be serving the purposes of the growing democracy of the other 
hemisphere." 1 

The discussions "now became general and vague." The 
Russian envoy (Capo dTstria) fell back on a classic strategem of 
diplomacy. After speaking at length in support of Richelieu's 
motion, he desired "an adjournment pending further instructions 
from the Emperor." * The latter evidently still pinned his faith 
to the form which the "mediation" should assume. Indeed, from 
the very beginning the real interest of the sovereigns grouped 
in the "Holy Alliance" was evident. Their anxiety for Ferdinand 
was dependent on preserving the institution of European mon- 
archy in the New World. 

Capo d'Istria now proposed as a substitute for the English 
scheme a collective note asking Madrid to "suggest remedies in 
detail," adding, in a burst of frankness: "It is realized that no 
one knows the real situation in America or the circumstances of 
the insurrection well enough to judge whether the remedies pro- 
posed would be effectual." 1 

The indispensable Gentz — who was considered an authority on 
American affairs — was charged with drawing up a full "report" 
for the Congress. This High Priest of Legitimacy 2 was, there- 
fore, to frame the solution by which Europe might crush the 
growing Constitutional movement — based on the example of the 
United States — which was threatening all South America! 

The French proposal regarding the form which the mediation 
should assume (contained in the instructions given to Richelieu) 
but continued the monarchical thesis. It laid down the following 
propositions: 

1 "Report to the Emperor," loc cit. 

2 Gentz in his youth had written a remarkable thesis on "The Effect of the Discovery 
of America on Europe." See de Clery, Un diplomate d'il y a cent ans: Frederick de 
Gentr, p. 27. See also a pamphlet in the Congressional Library in Washington concern- 
ing The Origin and Principles of the American Revolution compared with the Origin and Prin- 
ciples of the French Revolution, written by Gentz and translated by J. Q. Adams. Gentz' 
later anti-Americanism is shown in his reports to the Russian Foreign Office. See 
Nesselrode, Letters and Papers, 1760-1850, vol. v, p. 39. 



78 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

(1) The recognition of the independence of Buenos Aires, on condition 
that a constitutional monarchy be established with a Spanish Prince 
occupying the throne, and of certain concessions being granted, favorable 
to Spanish trade. 

(2) Political and commercial concessions to be granted to Caracas, 
Venezuela and the provinces of Grenada which have achieved inde- 
pendence from Spain. 

(3) The immediate adoption towards Peru and Mexico of a more 
liberal system of commerce, and especially the apppointment of native 
Americans to public office. 

Commenting on the above "points," King Louis made the fol- 
lowing admissions: 

His Majesty believes that these are the three means of preventing 
the general conflagration by which America is menaced, a disaster 
whose reactions on Europe would be terrible. Thus the progressive 
emancipation of this great continent, because it is in line with the 
inevitable order of things, will be restrained and rendered less dangerous 
to the European system by conserving the forms of monarchical govern- 
ment. 1 The important matter is to have (the above) adopted as the basis 
of Aix-la-Chapelle. The details of the plan can only be elaborated in 
accord with Spanish views, and at a reunion where, in order to secure the 
widest discussion, not only the envoys of Brazil, but also those of the 
United States, should be invited to attend. The King is persuaded that 
by admitting the latter Powers to a conference when this important 
question will be treated, measures best calculated to insure its success 
will have been taken. 

The concluding paragraph of the instructions was wholly in 
accord with the desire of Alexander to open these debates directed 
by the spirit of the "Holy Alliance" to the Christian and civilized 
nations of the world. Richelieu, as Castlereagh had foreseen, 
was working "in combination" with the Russian delegation. The 
French instructions show that Alexander still hoped to obtain not 
only the adherence of the United States to the "Holy Alliance" 
but also their participation in the "World Congress," where they 
might act as a counterpoise to British policy. 

As will be seen from the above instructions, Franco-Russian policy 
was not opposed to including the principal American Powers — 
notably the United States — in the European debates concerning 
the Spanish insurgents. Sound as this policy appears upon the 
surface, there were reasons which caused it to be viewed with 

1 "Instructions de Louis XVIII au Due de Richelieu, Plenipotentiare Francais au Con- 
gres l'Aix-la-Chapelle," Polovstov, Correspondence Diplomatique des Ambassadeurs et 
I Ministres de France en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830, vol. 1818, No. 
y 1367, p. 820. 



THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 79 

suspicion by the Washington Cabinet. We may now consider 
some hitherto unpublished evidence of the dangers which con- 
fronted the young Republic in formulating a policy with respect 
to European affairs. The secret dossiers of the Russian Foreign 
Office offer proofs that the trained diplomacy of Adams and 
Monroe, in clinging to the policy of isolation set forth by Wash- 
ington and refusing their adhesion to this earlier League of Peace, 
adopted a course in accord with the best interests of the whole 
American Continent. 

The Russian plan of mediation (complementary to the above) 
is a highly interesting document. It brings to the attention of the 
European Powers the importance of a new factor in international 
affairs: the growing power of the young American Republic. The 
original is marked "Confidential," and "Submitted by the Pleni- 
potentiaries of France and Russia to their colleagues as wholly 
confidential and reserved for their own information." It was also 
further stated that this document is "in no case to be inserted in 
the Protocols of the Conference." 1 

A cautious preamble set forth the Tsar's views of the attitude 
to be adopted by the Powers of Europe towards America. The 
general line of policy thus laid down was probably no secret to 
the Washington Cabinet. It was a policy which, as the Russian 
Memorandum admits, was more suitable for "verbal communica- 
tion" than for written notes: 

Spain's confidence must be gained, not forced. This is indispensable 
because she alone has the power to act directly . . . An event which 
would cause irremediable differences in the development of the situation 
would be the recognition by any power of the government set up by the 
insurgents. Unfortunately, this is not an improbable event. The 
popular party in the United States, much strengthened of late, is pre- 
paring to make a strong effort to secure the recognition of the indepen- 
dence of Buenos Aires during the next session of Congress. Considera- 
tion of their actions reveal their ambitions to make of the American 
Continent one Grand Confederated Republic at the head of which will 
be found the United States. In the actual state of affairs, the United 
States centralizes all its efforts in developing its resources and population. 
It is directed by a moderate policy and does not offer a menace to 
Europe. This would not continue to be the case should a large portion 
of South America adopt its institutions. A whole republican world, 
young, ardent and enriched by the production of every climate, will then 
set itself up in opposition to an old monarchical Europe, overpopulated 
and shaken by thirty years of revolution. This is a perspective worthy 

1 MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. 



80 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

of the earnest consideration of all European statesmen. The conse- 
quences of all this might be incalculable. ' 

The Russian Memorandum then proceeds to prove with what 
care Europe should seek to prevent, or at least retard, the growing 
relations between North America and the new states formed in 
the south: 

The essential point is to gain time; a united representation by the 
Powers of Europe would undoubtedly have a great effect on the American 
Government . . . It is believed that the Plenipotentiaries of the Five 
Powers at Washington should take the steps necessary to persuade public 
opinion in the United States, as well as the Executive, to adopt their 
point of view. This delicate negotiation should be conducted with 
much care. Verbal communication would be preferable to written 
notes — in order to avoid giving ammunition to the opposition, who 
would seize upon the idea of foreign influence as contrary to American 
institutions ... 

The closing paragraph of this extraordinary diplomatic docu- 
ment is not without a certain enduring significance: 

It would be advisable that these overtures be made only with the 
intention of examining more carefully — before taking action — the 
results which might follow an intervention in America. These results 
would probably be obtained most easily should the United States finally 
be invited' to send a Plenipotentiary to confer with the other Powers. 
They could be told they were themselves a European people, Christians, 
and, therefore, like Europe, interested in questions of a general nature. l 

As will later appear, the terms of the Russian secret "Memoran- 
dum" present a startling contrast to the tone subsequently 
adopted by Poletica in his renewed negotiations to induce the 
Government at Washington to accede to the "Holy Alliance." 
Had the invitation to form part of the European system (already 
conveyed through Capo dTstria at St. Petersburg 2 and Dashkov 
at Washington) been accepted, the envoys of the United States 
would have found themselves at Aix-la-Chapelle either in a 
minority with Great Britain, opposing the mediation asked for by 
Ferdinand, or else (as Alexander hoped) throwing the weight 
of their influence in support of the Russian proposals. To accede 
to the latter would have ended in limiting the action of the United 
States in America, while the Powers of the Holy Alliance imposed 
their own policy through "concerted action." 

^S. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. 
2 See supra. 



THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 81 

Early in the sessions of the Congress (October 24) Castlereagh 
had cleverly annexed to the Spanish colonial questions (by a 
reference to Ferdinand's promise to end the traffic in negroes 
in the year 1820) the whole matter of the slave trade. This 
was placing the negotiations on a new footing, wherein sentiment 
rather than expediency determined the issue. Realizing the dan- 
ger of this line of conduct, the Russian envoys attempted to have 
the slave trade made the object of a "Special Association," in 
which all the states would have a part. In this connection they 
suggested a central international rendezvous for an Allied fleet 
on the African coast. This proposal for forming an International 
Maritime Police naturally brought up the matter of the general 
safety of the seas, and notably the vexed question of the Barbary 
pirates. In view of the English policy in the Mediterranean, there 
was a return to debatable ground. The European Powers found 
it convenient to overlook their own particularistic interests and 
to join once more with cheerful unanimity in renewed admonitions 
to the United States. 

In the meeting of November 11 the conference took cogni- 
zance of a Memoir drawn up by Count Palmella, the Portuguese 
envoy, concerning "the piratry's exercise by a band of scoundrels 
navigating under unrecognized flags." * By this term was in- 
tended not only the insurgents of South America but also alleged 
privateers fitted out in North American ports to aid the revolu- 
tionists. Palmella proposed "that the Ministers of the Five 
Powers in Washington should be instructed to act in accord with 
the Ministers of His Most Faithful Majesty (the King of Portugal) 
in order to obtain the renewal of the Act of August 3, 1793, by 
which the arming of corsairs in the United States was forbidden, 
and that such clauses necessary to secure the execution of this 
act should be added." He also proposed "that all colonial powers 
of America should take steps to forbid the equipment of corsairs 
in their ports, the sale of prizes illegally detained," etc. On 
November 13 the Duke of Richelieu, to whom Palmella's memoir 
had been referred, reported that the "United States shou'd be 
included in the proposed League of International Maritime 

a MS. Aix-la-Chapellf, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. 



82 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Police." "But such an invitation," he continued, "could not be 
well extended until Spanish America was pacified." 1 

On November 14 the League to Suppress Piracy was considered 
a proper subject "for a general treaty of alliance, which should 
determine the ports to which each contingent should be assigned." 
The latter, it was proposed, should each have a separate cruising 
ground, which was to be changed at frequent intervals. As a 
measure of precaution "the whole strength of the squadron should 
never be united unless necessary for action against the Barbary 
States." l 

Great Britain's reluctance to lend the support of her sea power 
to these "international" naval measures ended in their abandon- 
ment. Upon her jealously guarded "hegemony" turned, moreover, 
the whole success or failure of an armed intervention in South 
American affairs. The "League to Suppress Piracy" was indeed 
but the Armada of Legitimacy and monarchical solidarity. Had 
Britain not curtailed the theoretical "freedom of the seas," 
there can be little doubt that the fleets of the Holy Alliance 
would have sailed unhampered upon a crusade chiefly aimed at 
upholding the "European principle" and extending its benefits 
to the Latin-American Continent. 2 

1 MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office, Petrograd. As part of the same 
debates, Metternich now proposed to restore their island fortresses to the Order of the 
Knights of Malta as a nucleus of the international fleet operating against the Barbary 
States. "Such an institution of permanent police," he maintained, "is preferable to a 
political and military combination." The Emperor of Austria offered the port of Lissa 
as a base of operations for the Order. Under Metternich's scheme, the old order of 
Knighthood was to be accessible, not alone to members of the nobility, but also to 
"youths of good family." It would thus become a school for young sailors and a place 
where veteran seamen could be usefully employed. "Placed under the protection of a 
permanent neutrality, the flag of the Order would be respected by all of the other fleets." 

2 See supra, p. 91, Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 21/May 3, 1819. 
Disappointed in his efforts to challenge and control Great Britain upon an element she 
had made her own, the Tsar nevertheless pursued his intention to open the debates of the 
Congress to all matters of international concern. The meeting of November 21 was entirely 
devoted to another question of abiding interest at the present day. This was a communica- 
tion of a report by Mr. Way "On the wrongs and political disabilities of the Jews in the 
different nations of Europe." Here again particularistic interests interfered and no prac- 
tical steps to ameliorate the postion of this unfortunate people appear to have been 
proposed. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICAL 
RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE, 1815-1820 

"Some days before he left Paris he said to us: 'I am about to quit France, 
but I wish, before I go, to render by a public act the homage which we 
owe to God . . . and to invite the nations to devote themselves to the 
obedience of the Gospel. I have brought with me the outline of this act, 
and I wish you would examine it attentively . . . You will join with me a 
prayer to God that my Allies may be disposed to sign it.' " Tsar Alexander 
to Empaytaz, 1815. 

The Tsar's gratification with respect to the accomplishments 
of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was complete and openly 
expressed. A document preserved in the files of the Russian 
Foreign Office contains the following summary of the results 
obtained: 

The conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle have beyond the power of any 
denial added to the progress of the European system. This system is 
now based upon existing common transactions, and the Cabinets of 
Europe have been able to recognize and appreciate its governing 
principles. In the future no questions of a general nature can be too difficult 
or complicated for its application. Precedents for the treatment of such 
questions will be found in the Acts and Transactions of the Congress of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 

The Grand Alliance, therefore, has gained in two ways: First, a fresh 
proof has been given of its solidarity, and, secondly, new rules of conduct 
applicable to the future have been deduced, ensuring the maintenance 
of peace and union between the Allied Powers. 1 

It is doubtful, however, whether even at this time Alexander's 
optimism was wholly justifiable. Once the question of readmit- 
ting France to the councils of Europe had been decided, the 
arguments of the Tsar's representatives had aimed to secure 
from their reluctant colleagues of Prussia, Austria and Great 
Britain some formal recognition of the principle of international 
duty and solidarity. This policy was viewed with suspicion by 
the other signatories of the treaties forming the System of 1815. 
Castlereagh's "reservations" held England obstinately apart 
from any Alliance Solidaire. Metternich's grudging recognition 
of the advantages of such a pact were of little practical value. 
Aplatonic "mediation," not an "intervention," had been the only 
form of "concerted action" approved by the Powers in the ques- 

1 Contained in the "Report to the Emperor," MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, Russian 
Foreign Office, Petrograd. 

83 



84 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

tion of the Spanish Colonies. 1 A brief review of the diplomatic 
policy of the United States preceding Aix-la-Chapelle throws 
much light upon the European situation. 

Although Castlereagh had intimated that an American rep- 
resentative would not be unwelcome at the Congress and the 
same proposal had been made in Richelieu's instructions, the 
United States had held resolutely aloof from all participation in 
the "Acts and Transactions" of Europe. The foreign policy of 
the Washington Cabinet was one of extreme complication. While 
public opinion was pressing for some open expression of sympathy 
with the South American insurgents, the American Minister in 
Madrid was doing all in his power to secure from Ferdinand some 
practical settlement of the Florida question. 

An interesting contemporary judgment on the conduct of the 
United States at this time is to be found in the Abbe de Pradt's 2 
UEurope apres le Congres a" Aix-la-Chapelle . To oppose the 
European system the author welcomes an American system 
based on a liberal conception of diplomacy and government. 
He seems to have been the first European writer to realize the 
benefits that might accrue to the Old World by the desire of the 
United States to remain apart from combinations principally 
concerned with particularistic interests in which it had no share. 
He summed up this policy as follows: 

To remain apart from European affairs; to oppose any intervention of 
Europe in the affairs of America; and to build up a universal American 
system. 

Pradt's works on foreign policy were widely read and doubtless 
led liberal opinion abroad to a better understanding of the policy 
of the Washington Cabinet. But in the opinion of the chief 
protagonist of "concerted action" the absence of an American 
representative from the Congress of 181 8 was a regrettable neglect 
of international duty. The Tsar was determined to renew the 

Nevertheless the American Minister in St. Petersburg was informed by his British 
colleague "that an adjustment of the quarrels between Spain and her colonies would 
doubtless be attempted under the auspices of the Allied Powers." Mr. Campbell to the 
Secretary of State, September 25, 1819. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 

2 L'Abbe de Pradt (Archbishop of Malines) wrote (with truly astonishing prolixity) 
concerning the relations of Europe and America. His best known works are L' Europe 
apres le Congres d Aix-la-Chapelle (published in 1819), UEurope et I'Amerique en 1821 
(published in 1821, with a second enlarged edition in 1822). These studies were quickly 
followed by another concerning Le Vrai Systeme de l' Europe relativement d'Amerique et la 
Grece (published in 1825). 



THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 85 

negotiations unsuccessfully carried on by Dashkov to secure the 
adherence of the United States to the Holy Alliance. Early in 
the year 1818 he chose the Chevalier de Poletica for the difficult 
task of again urging the Washington Government to form some 
more intimate connection with the European system. Poletica 
was impressed with the importance of his task. His correspond- 
ence, preserved in the Archives of the Russian Foreign Office, 
shows that before leaving Europe he made a careful study of the 
American situation in all its bearings; for unlike Dashkov — a 
careless petty official — Poletica had been trained in the most 
subtle traditions of European diplomacy. 

He wisely considered that the key to the mediation regarding 
the Spanish colonies lay in the hands of the Cabinet in Washing- 
ton rather than in Europe. Any formal recognition of the insur- 
gents would be fatal to the cause of Ferdinand — and indirectly 
to the system of "concerted action" regarding South American 
affairs desired by the Tsar. To. persuade the Government at 
Washington that their duty as members of the great family of 
nations required them to respect the decisions reached by the 
common deliberations of the Powers became his chief end. 

Before leaving for his post Poletica was directed to attend the 
meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle. The fate of the mediation at this 
conference was disappointing. But the Tsar was still hopeful of 
the results that might be obtained by opposing the United States 
to British policy, not only in the New World but in the councils 
of Europe. The above aim is developed at length in Poletica's 
instructions: 

At your own desire you have been able to assist at the Congress just 
ended at Aix-la-Chapelle so that you can judge of the results of these dis- 
cussions. You will thus be able to use this knowledge in your relations 
with the Government of the United States. . . . You understand the 
general system of Europe, both in its details and its general policy. 
It is a policy of preserving peaceful relations adapted to all civilized 
states, no matter what their political institutions may be, or the place 
which they may occupy among the nations. The United States are 
called upon by their own interest to adhere to this sytem. The Imperial 
Chancellor, counting on your zeal, does not hide its appreciation of the 
difficulties arising from popular prejudices which confront you. The 
Chancellor knows of the opinion generally held in the United States 
that it is better not to associate that country with the political systems of 
Europe. Indeed, it has even been said that the misfortunes of Europe 
are the cause of American commercial prosperity. 



86 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

The last war between England and America must be considered as 
resulting from this system of isolation. That this has ended more 
happily for the United States than could be expected is, however, due 
rather to the presumption and mistakes of their adversaries than to any 
other cause. It seems clear to us that even if the United States should 
persist in her present system of isolation from the European system, 
they will inevitably, sooner or later, be drawn within its influence. 
Thus the state of things which led to the War of 1812 will undoubtedly 
recur. Upon what does the United States then hope to base her future 
policy, and what Power will intervene in her behalf? 1 

The above instructions were in line with the course already 
recommended by Poletica himself. Proof of the care with which 
this diplomat had prepared the work of his mission is offered by 
his earlier personal correspondence with Capo dTstria, which 
contains an interesting appreciation of the entire situation: 

During my passage through Paris, Mr. Gallatin touched upon this 
delicate question. 2 I have every reason to believe that on my arrival in 
Washington it will be the first subject concerning which I shall have to 
negotiate with the United States Government. ... I am aware 
that the Emperor's political system — as simple in conception as equitable 
in its motives — desires nothing except the general interest of Europe and 
hopes to gain this end by a strict observance of the Pacts which form the 
basis of the European system. The American Government, however, 
finds itself outside of this center of political action. Like all new states 
of a democratic character which have succeeded in proving their youth- 
ful strength, the United States seems to have arrived at a period of 
development wherein they find themselves impatient of all peaceful 
restraint. 

The Powers most directly interested feel that both a spirit of justice 
and their own public interest require that a strict neutrality be observed 
in the struggle between Spain and her colonies. But public opinion, all 
powerful in a republic, is always ambitious. The people of the United 
States demand of their government that it should extend its already 
immense territory and should, therefore, support the insurgents. It is 
without doubt a veritable catastrophe that the imprudent conduct of 
the reactionary Court of Madrid, in the Colon affair and in its general 
colonial system, should have been the cause of so much exasperation. 
This furnishes fuel for England's mercantile cupidity and the dema- 
gogues of the American Congress. 

In the actual state of affairs, it is sufficient to point out that the un- 
conditional return of these colonies to Spanish tyranny has become 
impossible and that their partition emanating even in absolute inde- 
pendence has become nearly certain. All hypothesis with respect to 
the future of Spanish America must lead to this end. 

1 The above document forms part of a series transmitted through the Imperial Russian 
Ambassador, Mr. George Bakhmietiev, published in American Historical Review, vol. xviii, 
p- 315. The above project is endorsed: "Signed 9th/21st November, 1818. " s MS. Aix-la- 
Chapelle, Russian Foreign Office. 

2 The question of the Spanish colonies. 



THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 87 

Will Your Excellency give me instructions how, without departing 
from His Majesty's intentions, I can adjust my own language to these 
probabilities? It is only the more essential to give a precise and direct 
statement of our policy, in view of my knowledge of the Spanish envoy 
in Washington. This leads me to believe that he will make every effort 
upon my arrival to have it publicly known that a complete conformity 
of views exists between the Court of Madrid and the Court of His 
Majesty the Emperor, at least so far as the policy to be followed in the 
struggle between Spain and her Colonies. The Chevalier d'Onis will 
presume upon the intimacy of the two Courts (which has been the 
motive of so many diplomatic explanations). I will not hide from 
Your Excellency that if the Spanish envoy succeeds in establishing 
this opinion, our popularity in the United States, where the honored name 
of the Emperor is so generally respected and venerated, would suffer, in 
a sense it would be wise to avoid. 1 

In a personal letter annexed to the above, Poletica states even 
more explicitly his opinion with respect to European and American 
affairs. After expressing his conviction that England's policy 
turns upon (1) the fear of a new general war, and (2) the fear of 
Russia (shown by her intrigues with Austria, Prussia and even 
France), he concludes: 

England will always be found opposed to Russia and in league with 
Austria, seeking to isolate us so that we may be without allies. With 
respect to the conduct of America, they have no expression strong 
enough to condemn it. The occupation of Florida has a parallel only 
in the partition of Poland! They die of rage here over it, but these 
feelings they will control until the day of reckoning. The relations 
between England and the United States should make our future 
relations with North America more and more interesting. 2 

This letter is an interesting confirmation of the view that it 
was principally with the intention of securing a diplomatic ally 
opposed in policy to Great Britain that the Tsar continued his 
efforts to bring the North American Republic into closer relations 
with the European Powers. Aside from the probability that such 
a participation might forestall the recognition of the insurgents — 
an event possibly fatal to the success of the European "mediation" 
desired by Ferdinand — Alexander at first based great hopes on the 
mutual opposition of American and British policy in the New 
World. 

1 MS. United States, Carton 8 (1818), No. 13. Diplomatic Archives, dated Moscow, 
February 27, 1818. 

2 Poletica to Capo d'Istria, London, August 1/13, 1818. MS. United States, Russian 
Foreign Office. 



88 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

While no actual invitation had been extended to the United 
States to join in the debates at Aix-la-Chapelle, 1 it is probable 
that Alexander would have eagerly welcomed an expression of 
such a desire by the Washington Government. As shown by 
Richelieu's action at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Tsar seems to have 
considered, logically enough, that to legislate with respect to 
American affairs without the presence pro forma of the principal 
American Power was to invalidate the measures thus determined. 2 

The situation as viewed in Washington may be gathered from 
the instructions issued by the State Department to the new 
Minister, Mr. George W. Campbell, who was sent in April, 1818, 
to St. Petersburg to replace Mr. Pinkney. In spite of the 
good feeling in the United States towards Russia, there were 
reasons to suspect that Alexander's American policy was not 
wholly disinterested. In May, 1818, Correa, the Portuguese 
Minister, had hinted to Adams not only that the European Alli- 
ance was preparing to take a hand in settling the disordered affairs 
in South America, but also that Russia was seeking to establish 
her own power more firmly on the American Continent. Correa's 
"indiscretion" may have been intended to enlist the support of 
the United States in favor of the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental. 

1 Castlereagh in February, 1819, told Minister Rush "that, during the discussions at 
Aix-la-Chapelle, he had found France and Prussia laboring under a belief that the United 
States desired to be associated in the mediation" . . . until undeceived by Rush's com- 
munications. Rush, A Residence at the Court of London, vol. I, p. 5. 

2 It is interesting that a direct appeal to be represented at the Congress had been 
received by the Tsar from the South American insurgents themselves. While the United 
States had consistently refused — from reasons of traditional policy — to associate them- 
selves with Alexander's plan of a World Confederation consecrated by a Holy Alliance, 
Rivadavia, the representative in Europe of the Junta of Buenos Aires, addressed himself 
to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in terms that could only be gratifying to the 
Tsar's notions of the role reserved for the "August Sovereigns of Europe": 

"When the Congress of the United Provinces of South America learned of the principles 
solemnly recognized in the act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, and perceived 
with joy that its own procedure was in conformity with the doctrines advanced by the 
August Sovereigns of Europe, they could not but congratulate themselves on the prosperity 
they were bound to enjoy through the application of these beneficent maxims. The news 
of the forthcoming Congress [Aix-la-Chapelle] gives reasons to hope that no object would 
be considered so worthy of the attention of the August Sovereigns as that of uniting 
America and Europe by bonds other than those of a colonial system. The Powers will 
not judge a quarrel upon which depends the happiness of twenty million inhabitants 
without first learning the circumstances." 

Rivadavia then desires Nesselrode to make known to his august master: "I am authorized 
by the Government of the United Provinces of South America to manifest its sincere 
desires to establish relations between the Old and New Worlds which will guarantee a 
sound basis for future peace." 

Rivadavia to Nesselrode, Paris, October 14, 1818. MS. Aix-la-Chapelle, Russian Foreign 
Office. In view of the subsequent development of the policy of the United States under 
the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, the above direct appeal by the South American repre- 
sentatives to the assembled Powers of Europe is not without present significance. 



THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 89 

It is remarkable (Adams wrote to Campbell) that the European 
Allies have hitherto withheld from the United States all their proceedings 
on this intended mediation between Spain and her colonies. 1 

Campbell was therefore instructed not only carefully to watch 
the development of Russian policy towards America, but also 
to assure the Tsar's Government that the policy of the United 
States had been neutral between Spain and her colonies and that 
the United States wished to pursue a course for the future in 
harmony with that of the Allies. The following significant 
warning, foreshadowing Monroe's Message, formed part of these 
instructions : 

We can not participate in, and can not approve of, any interposition 
of other Powers unless it be to promote the total independence, political 
and commercial, of the colonies. 1 

After the Congress of the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle the all- 
important question in Washington became: How far the Tsar 
might be prepared to go in the support of his favorite theories, 
and whether an active intervention by Europe in American affairs 
might not result from his determination to impose respect for the 
conclusions arrived at during this conclave? In December, 1818, 
Mr. Campbell reported at length with respect to Alexander's prob- 
able attitude. It was his reassuring conviction that "he would not 
separately unite with Spain in war against the United States." 2 

In considering the probable effect of the influence of the system 
of congresses inaugurated at Aix-la-Chapelle upon the interna- 
tional situation — and more particularly upon American affairs and 
the spread of republican principles in the New World — Mr. Camp- 
bell also reported at length under date of December 10/22, 1818: 

The new quintuple alliance in which the late conference at Aix-la- 
Chapelle resulted may, and, it is believed, will for some time greatly 
influence if not entirely control the conduct of all the Powers of Europe, 
whether parties thereto or not. . . . 3 

1 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 28, 1818. MS. Instructions, Russia. 

2 Campbell added: "It is therefore most probable he will use his great personal influence 
(for his manner is said to be very prepossessing) as well as that derived from the immense 
physical force he could command to accomplish his ends by overawing the councils of 
Europe without hazarding his present high standing. That the views of this great and 
certainly powerful coalition of crowned heads in relation to the pending contest between 
Spain and her colonies will soon develop themselves there can be little doubt, and the 
importance of their being known to our Government previous to its becoming a party to 
the contest would seem entitled to serious consideration." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary 
of State, December 10/22, 1818. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 

3 What follows is in cipher. 



90 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

The diffusion of principles having a tendency to endanger or in any 
degree weaken the cause of legitimacy — in which the source of that 
alliance is to be sought for — will be viewed by the parties thereto with 
jealousy. 1 

The same communication refers to Alexander as "the great 
arbiter of the politics of Europe," and with respect to his inten- 
tions continues: 

It is my present opinion that the Emperor of Russia will use his 
influence to reconcile the Spanish Colonies to the parent state, and that 
he would view in an unfavorable light an acknowledgment of the inde- 
pendence of these colonies by our Government and would in such an 
event be inclined to induce the Allied Powers to interpose if there was a 
prospect of success to prevent the establishment of such extensive 
independent states and consequent spread of republican principles. 1 

It is, moreover, in a tone of considerable relief that this perspica- 
cious observer reported the substance of a long and cordial 
interview with which the Tsar favored him on his return to St. 
Petersburg. Alexander spoke in English, in which language, Mr. 
Campbell reports, "he expresses himself quite intelligibly." 

With respect to the recent Congress, Alexander declared that — 

he was happy to say that things went on smoothly . . . that every- 
thing depended on the Powers acting up to their engagements. This 
he expected they would do, with the possible exception of France. With 
respect to Spain, the Powers had contented themselves with advice. 
They had proposed the appointment of Wellington as mediator . . . 
but no answer to that proposal had yet been received. 

Campbell concludes: 

From what he said there can be no doubt that the dispute between 
Spain and her colonies was made the subject of formal deliberation . . . 
that Spain is not inclined to offer such terms for adjusting the dispute 
as will be likely to induce the Powers to embark in the contest for the 
purpose of enforcing their acceptance on the part of the colonies. ^It 
is, however, still my opinion that this Government would view in [an 
unfavorable light the acknowledgment of the independence of the colo- 
nies, at this time, by the United States, and although it would not, in 
such an event, engage alone on the side of Spain, its influence would be 
exerted conjointly with that of the other Powers to maintain the cause 
of legitimacy and prevent the establishment of such powerful independ- 
ent states. 2 

In a final dispatch resuming the above matter (written in 
April, 1819), the Secretary of State was informed of the lengths to 

1 Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, December 10/22, 1818. MS. Dispatches, 
Russia. 

2 Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, February 6/18, 1819. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 



THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 91 

which the Tsar had been prepared to go in his enthusiasm for a 
universal peace based upon international action: 

There is reason to believe (wrote Campbell from St. Petersburg), 
that about the close of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle instructions were 
given on the part of this Government to put into a state of preparation 
for active service at the opening of spring, twelve ships of the line, 
besides other vessels. This step was taken with the view of being 
prepared to cooperate with Spain, should it become necessary in impos- 
ing measures relating to her revolted colonies as might be adopted in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Allied Sovereigns, and 
under an impression that she would acquiesce in the course proposed by 
them of mediation, as stated in my last. Not long after the return of the 
Emperor, however, to this capital, the foregoing instructions were, it is 
said, countermanded and the usual number of vessels directed to be 
prepared, in consequence, it is believed, of information received by this 
Court that Spain was not disposed to pursue the course suggested to 
her by the crowned heads at Aix-la-Chapelle. 1 



There had been every indication that ample grounds existed for 
the misgivings of the American Cabinet concerning the inten- 
tions of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle to "legislate" with respect 
to American affairs in a sense favorable to a European "system" 
— rather than in the interests of the colonies. The opposition of 
Great Britain had been the principal obstacle to such a course. 2 

The outcome of the Congress had inevitably ranged the United 
States in line with British policy as opposed to the Tsar's designs 
of "concerted action." 

As Poletica had foreseen, it was only by sowing distrust 
between Great Britain and the United States that plans for an 
all-controlling World System could be pursued after the failure 
of the "mediation" proposed at Aix-la-Chapelle. The new 
Minister reached the United States in April, 1819 — and imme- 
diately laid his program before Adams 3 (May 24, 1819). 

1 Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, April 21/May 3, 1819. MS. Dispatches, 
Russia. 

2 But Castlereagh's attiude was dictated by other motives than solicitude for "con- 
stitutional" liberty. The commercial advantages arising from the existing situation largely 
influenced British policy. A Tory Cabinet was not unwilling to see the power of a legiti- 
mate monarch restored, if these advantages could be maintained. On the other hand, as 
early as June, 1818, Campbell had been instructed clearly to express the desire of the 
United States to "promote the total independence, political and commercial, of the colo- 
nies," while maintaining "that the policy of the United States, like that of the European 
Powers, had been neutral." 

3 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell, June 3/19, 1819. MS. Instructions, Russia, 
Dashkov did not wait for Poletica's arrival, and presented his letters of recall March 6. 
1819. 



92 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

The diplomacy of Monroe had meanwhile profited by the em- 
barrassments of the King of Spain to secure what appeared to be a 
settlement of the long-standing difficulty with respect to the pur- 
chase of the Floridas. 1 Poletica, on his arrival in Washington, 
found a treaty between Spain and the United States already 
signed, and Spanish affairs, as Adams expressed it, standing under 
a very different aspect from that which it wore when his instruc- 
tions were drawn. Said Adams: 

The differences between the United States and Spain were assuming a 
character which threatened the peace of the world. They had reached 
a crisis which it was scarcely possible could terminate but by a peace or 
rupture. When Mr. Poletica received his instructions they were at the 
most dangerous and menacing period. When he arrived here, they were 
all amicably adjusted. 2 

Almost daily interviews now took place between Adams and 
Poletica, chiefly concerning Spanish affairs. Poletica — while 
assuming a tone of utmost frankness — at first adopted a course 
curiously at variance (as we may now see) with his instructions. 
He declared that he had been instructed to prevent the United 
States from associating themselves with the European Alliance — 
and at the same time to suggest that they must necessarily follow 
a course in accord with the general policy of Europe. 3 

Poletica's somewhat coercive tone was accepted in good part 
by the Secretary of State. Adams declared that it was the earnest 
desire of his Government not to be associated with the European 
Alliance, but to follow a policy wholly in unison with it, and that 
they were deeply impressed with the importance of preserving the 
general tranquillity of the world. He seems fully to have 
recognized the fact that so long as Spain, Russia and Great 
Britain remained American Powers, any real isolation was im- 
possible. Moreover, during the recent Napoleonic struggle, 
America had become the great "carrying nation," and, in spite of a 
scrupulous respect for neutrality, had become involved in a war 
with Great Britain, and in the "quasi-war" with the latter's great 
opponent. Yet even faced with the active displeasure of the 

1 The Treaty of Washington was signed February 22, 1819, but its ratification was 
delayed by Spain till February, 1821. Before ceding Eastern Florida to the United States, 
Ferdinand desired a guarantee that the independence of the revolted colonies would not 
be recognized. Cf. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, vol. iv, pp. 
474 et seq. 

2 Secretary of State to Mr. Campbell. MS. Instructions, Russia, 1819. 

3 Adams, Memoirs, vol. iv, pp. 379-381. 



THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 93 

Continental Powers, Adams persisted in remaining aloof from 
their combinations. In answer to Poletica's intimations with 
respect to possible European action, the Secretary of State 
ventured, as a private opinion, that if the King of Spain should 
still decline to ratify the Treaty of Washington, the next Congress 
would probably authorize the forcible occupation of the Floridas 
and a recognition of the Government of Buenos Aires. The only 
way for the Powers to avoid such a course was in forbearing to use 
force in a sense contrary to the liberties of the insurgents. 1 

The weakness of Poletica's contentions was becoming more and 
more apparent. He suggested that Great Britain's breaches of 
maritime law (notably Castlereagh's proposal of a mutual right 
of search for the suppression of the slave trade) must range the 
United States upon the side of the Tsar. 2 It was intimated that 
if any questions should arise between the United States and the 
governments of Europe, the Emperor Alexander, desirous of using 
his influence in their favor, would have a substantial motive and 
justification for interposing if he could regard them as allies, which, 
as parties to the Holy Alliance, he would. 

A natural community of interest, however, and the converging 
policy of Great Britain and the United States with respect to 
South America were inevitably closing the breach caused by the 
War of 1812. Poletica found that to base his diplomatic policy 
upon this "ancient grudge" was a matter of increasing difficulty. 
Not only had the differences arising from the summary execution 
of two British subjects (Ambrister and Arbuthnot) by the United 
States forces in Florida been amicably settled, but the British 
Minister in Madrid had even offered to use his good offices to 
secure the ratification of the Treaty of Washington. 

Poletica felt his negotiation losing ground. With respect to any 
combined action of Russia and Spain against the colonies, Poletica 
said that by selling ships to Spain, Russia had not intended to take 
sides with her against the colonies. Falling back on Alexander's 
well-known desire for international action, he also declared that 
the Tsar was utterly averse to all "exclusive or partial alliances." 3 

1 Ibid., p. 381. 

2 Secretary of State to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820. MS. Instructions, American 
Embassy, Petrograd. Quoted in full in Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, 
p. 376. 

3 Adams, Memoirs, vol. IV, pp. 380-381. 



94 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

His previous attitude with respect to the United States and the 
"European" Alliance was suddenly changed. A proposal was now 
renewed that the United States should join the "Holy League." 

On June 17, 1819, he mentioned "inofficially and confiden- 
tially" the Emperor's desire that the United States should 
accede to the Pact of September 26, 1815; Adams stated that 
the same reasons which had caused Great Britain to withhold her 
signature to this pact governed the policy of the United States; 
that the agreement was a personal one between sovereigns and 
therefore not appropriate for the consideration of a constitutional 
state. 1 

Finally when Poletica urged that "the treaty was nothing in 
specific engagement," and that the Holy Alliance was a "league of 
peace" and had hitherto preserved a universal peace in Europe," 
Adams — a sound constitutionalist — replied that before taking 
any further steps in the matter it would be "advisable to ascertain 
what were the dispositions of the members of the Senate." 2 

1 Adams, Memoirs, vol. IV, p. 394. 

2 Ibid., pp. 394-395. 



CHAPTER V 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 

"To a world gone mad must be opposed a new order, a new system inspired 
by wisdom, reason, justice and correction." (Unpublished letter from 
Metternich to Alexander, written at Troppau, December IS, 1820. From 
the Archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) 

In July, 1820, Adams, in instructions to Middleton, resumed 
the policy of the United States in their relation with the Powers 
of Europe; and their attitude towards the Tsar's League of Peace: 

The political system of the United States is . . . essentially extra- 
European. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entangle- 
ments in the European system has been a cardinal point of their policy 
from the peace of 1783 to this day . . . 

Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States as one of the 
members of the general society of civilized nations increases in the eyes 
of the others, the difficulties of maintaining this system and the temp- 
tations to depart from it increase and multiply . . . 

Should renewed overtures on this subject l be made, Russia would be 
answered that the organization of our government is such as not to 
admit of our acceding formally to that compact. But it may be added 
that the President, while approving of its final principles and thoroughly 
convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the con- 
ception and presided at the formation of this system, by the Emperor 
Alexander, believes that the United States will more efFectually contrib- 
ute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded by 
abstaining from formal participation in it. As a general declaration 
of principles, the United States not only give their hearty assent to the 
articles of the Holy Alliance, but they will be among the most earnest 
and conscientious in observing them. 2 

Even this qualified approval of Alexander's pact — a diplomatic 
evasion of Poletica's renewed proposals — would hardly have 
been made a few months later. The Powers of the Holy Alliance 
were already entering upon a policy of reactionary repression 
which was to estrange them from all more liberal states. Taking 
as his excuse the necessity for prompt and decisive action against 
the forces of revolution, Metternich had undertaken a campaign 
of propaganda among all the principal courts of Europe, arguing 
the necessity of taking common measures to crush out the fast- 
reviving spirit of "Jacobinism" and the pernicious doctrines of the 
"Sects." His artful diplomacy was ably seconded by the pen of 
Frederick Gentz. This living arsenal of gossip, epigram and 
satirical observations, was a political philosopher of no mean 

1 Poletica's overtures to induce the United States to join the Holy Alliance set forth in 
the preceding chapter. 

2 Secretary of State to Mr. Middleton, July 5, 1820. MS. Instructions, Russia. 

95 



96 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

attainments. He possessed an extraordinary talent for the tech- 
nique of diplomacy, and, had he been able to win the respect of 
his fellow statesmen, might have filled a much more important 
place than history has accorded him. It is as Metternich's 
alter ego and familiar that he is best known. 1 

Metternich's first idea had been to allow the newly formed 
Federal Diet created at Vienna to take action against the "perils'' 
which, he believed, confronted the German Federation. Gentz, 
however, realized the danger of allowing the voice of Liberalism 
an opportunity to be heard in public places. His own plan in- 
volved a diplomatic solution in line with the Tsar's international 
programs. Two private reunions of the interested Powers were to 
be held. In the first of these, the Conference of Carlsbad, only 
Austria and Prussia were to take part, together with the repre- 
sentatives of four or five minor German states, without influence 
or voice in the chapter. A second conference, he suggested, might 
then safely be held in Vienna, formed of chosen delegates from all 
the member states of the Confederation. This would in turn 
modify the fundamental laws sufficiently to enable the recom- 
mendations of the Carlsbad Conference to be carried out. 

Gentz's program was carried out almost to the letter. Metter- 
nich's first step was to warn Frederick William that unless he 
adopted without reserve the plans of the Emperor Francis, the 
latter would retire from the German Confederation. 

Events in Germany again helped to forward this policy. At 
Toeplitz, the King of Prussia heard that enthusiastic meetings 
were being held all over Prussia in favor of Liberal reforms, 
and as a protest against the rumored measures taken by the Prus- 
sian Government. In three days Metternich imposed upon the 
now terrified and repentant Hohenzollern not only the program 
he had drawn up, but even exacted a promise that he would perma- 
nently renounce all plans of granting constitutional representa- 
tion to his people. The vacillating monarch promised his help 
to extend these principles of reaction to the whole of Germany. 
The celebrated "Decrees of Carlsbad" were the fruits of these 
interviews. 2 

While the Tsar (together with the Cabinets of Great Britain 

1 De Clery, Un Diplomate d'il y a Cent Arts: Frederic de Gentz, pp. 219 et seq. 

2 In France, Metternich's reactionary program was forwarded by the political assassi- 
nation of Kotzebue in Germany and that of the Duke of Berry, heir to the French throne 
(February 13, 1820). 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 97 

and France) viewed with growing alarm the preponderating power 
exercised by Austria and Prussia over the newly "united" states 
of Germany, their concerted action was nevertheless inevitably 
forced to follow the reactionary lines laid down by Metternich 
and Gentz. 1 

Alexander still clung firmly to the illusion that he was the 
champion of international "rights." When his brother-in-law, the 
King of Wurttemberg, maintained his determination to grant a 
constitution in the face of the protests of Austria and Prussia, 
the Tsar found that his policy needed a new formula. Insurrec- 
tion and revolution on the part of subjects against their Kings 
were inadmissible. On the other hand, the voluntary concession 
of liberal institutions by Kings to their subjects, he held, must be 
regarded as a sacred privilege. In this connection, it must be 
noted that the King of Wurttemberg had addressed his appeal to 
Alexander "in the name of Liberty and the free exercise of the 
monarchical principles guaranteed by the 'Holy Alliance.' ' This 
was the last occasion when the principles of this mystical pact 
were to be invoked in the cause of liberal reform. 2 

Reactionary fears were justified by the series of revolutions 
which followed the popular uprising of January 1, 1820, led by 
Riego in Spain. This constitutional 3 movement soon spread over 
the whole southern part of Europe, and its repression through 
"intervention" became the chief concern of the Powers con- 
federated by the "System of 1815." 4 

The King of Spain, after his unsuccessful attempt to obtain 
the intervention of the Powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, 
had found himself almost powerless to stem the tide of victorious 
Liberalism in his American colonies. All the resources of his 
Kingdom had been expended in preparing a great military 
expedition, which during the year 1819 vainly awaited the 
necessary transports on the Island of Leon, near Cadiz. The 

1 Alexander now asked the Court of London "what steps were to be taken regarding 
Germany" and that Cabinet replied there was no motive to interfere. Gentz, Depeches 
inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. II, p. 17. 

2 The Tsar declared "that it was unfortunate when a monarch did not know the proper 
time to give a constitution to his people." Mr. Campbell to the Secretary of State, 
April 10, 1820. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 

3 The Constitution forced on Ferdinand was the same which Alexander had applauded in 
1812! Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, p. 498. 

4 Metternich declared he "was able to inform the Princes of Germany" that no dif- 
ferences separated the sovereigns of Europe, whose inviolable intention was to keep the 
peace. Gentz, Depeches inedites, vol. II, p. 127. 



98 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

revolution had its origin among these troops. 1 The harsh con- 
ditions of military service was the fault alleged. But the mis- 
government of Ferdinand throughout the peninsula and the 
liberal ideas left in the wake of Napoleon's armies caused dis- 
turbances to break out with startling rapidity all over Spain. 
Troops stationed at Coruna in the far north and Barcelona in 
the south joined the mutineers. Within two short months the 
revolutionaries obtained their ends. The army proclaimed the 
readoption of the Constitution of 1812, and the ignoble Ferdinand 
hastened to accept the situation — pretending to accede as gra- 
ciously as possible to the popular wishes. 

As Metternich had prophesied at Aix-la-Chapelle, Constitu- 
tional government now became the question of the day. A few 
months later, a revolution similar in its aims to that in Spain 
broke out in Sicily, 2 where on the 6th of July the Spanish Con- 
stitution was accepted by the King. A third Constitutional 
revolution took place in Portugal, where the same document was 
again proclaimed (on August 23). 

Any interference of the Powers in Portugal, however, was a 
direct challenge to England's traditional policy to act as sole 
protector with respect to that state. 3 

The Tsar now sought an opportunity to propose an intervention 
between the King of the two Sicilies and his subjects, thus making 
the Neapolitan revolution a matter of European rather than of 
exclusively Austrian concern. Metternich, from reasons of policy, 
at last agreed to Alexander's favorite plan — a European Con- 
gress. 4 This solution once decided upon, the opening of the 
debates was set for October 20, 1820, at Troppau. 5 

But from the beginning the differences separating the Powers 
represented were even less likely to result in unity of action 
than at Aix-la-Chapelle. 6 Castlereagh refused to join the Congress, 
as desired by the Tsar, and sent Lord Stewart instead. Troppau 
thus became little more than a reunion of the three monarchs 

1 "The army, which was ill clothed, ill fed and worse paid, mutinied to prevent being 
embarked for Spanish America, on board a fleet composed of vessels that were esteemed 
not seaworthy for so long a voyage." Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, 
vol. i, p. 33. 

2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. iv, pp. 515-516. 

3 Ibid., p. 514. 4 Ibid., pp. 526 et seq. 5 Gentz, Depeches inedites, vol. II, p. 81. 
6 The invitation to Troppau came at an awkward moment for Castlereagh. "We know 

to what point the Tsar wishes to push the principle of Alliance," he said. "The five powers 
would soon be a sort of European Government. It would be universal monarchy, the 
dream of the Abbe St. Pierre!" Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 539. 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 99 

allied under the terms of the "Holy Alliance." The British (and 
the French) representatives were frankly present, not to take 
part in the "European" deliberations but merely to furnish their 
respective courts with an accurate account of the debates. 1 

Alexander saw in the reunion of Troppau a new opportunity 
to proclaim to the world some of his favorite theories: the fraternal 
solidarity of the great Powers, and their devotion to the principles 
of concerted action. The right to exercise powers of supernational 
police among the countries of Europe was, he believed, to be 
vindicated at last. From the beginning of the conference, how- 
ever, he favored a policy which was directly opposed to the wishes 
of Metternich. He renewed his contention that while a constitu- 
tion which was the result of a revolutionary movement could not 
properly be recognized by the Allied Powers, it could nevertheless 
be granted by a sovereign to his people. The right of Ferdinand — 
if he so desired — to maintain the constitution already granted 
was therefore upheld. In view of Alexander's own recently 
avowed intentions with respect to granting a constitution to 
Russia, and always haunted by the determination to be "con- 
sistent," no other course appeared open to him. 

A declaration signed on November 13 by the plenipotentiaries 
of Austria, Russia and Prussia — the signatories of the "Holy 
Alliance" — formally announced to Europe a decision which seemed 
to respect the prejudices of Alexander while in fact affirming the 
most reactionary features of Metternich's policies. 

This declaration created a tremendous sensation throughout 

Continental liberal circles. It read as follows: 

Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change 
its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which 
might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to 
form a part of the Alliance, and will remain excluded from its councils 
until its situation gives every guarantee of order and stability. 2 

1 Castlereagh declared to Decaze "he was sick of military revolution." But a strong 
liberal reaction had resulted in England from the accession of the unpopular George IV. 
This made it advisable to disassociate English policy from any direct attack on consti- 
tutionalism, whether in Naples, Spain or Portugal. Pasquier, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 526. 

2 The second article read: "The Allied Powers not only formally declare the above to be 
their unalterable policy, but, faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed con- 
cerning the authority of legitimate governments, they further agree to refuse to recognize 
any changes brought about by other than legal means. In the case of states where such 
changes have already taken place and such action has thereby given cause for apprehension 
to neighboring states (if it lies within the ability of the powers to take such useful and 
beneficent action) they will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within 
the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and 
if this fails, coercion will be employed, should this be necessary." Quoted in Debidour, 
Histoire Diplomatique de I' Europe, vol. I, p. 152. 



100 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Although the Powers of the "Holy Alliance" alone signed this 
document, the wording of the manifesto seemed to dedicate the 
whole power of the European Confederation to the suppression 
of liberal reform. 1 Not only Castlereagh found himself obliged 
to disassociate his government from the conclusions reached by the 
Congress (in two notes, dated December 19 and January 16), but 
even the Government of Louis XVIII followed suit. Fear of 
popular and parliamentary disapproval had united Great Britain 
and France in opposition to the Troppau Declaration. 2 

The Liverpool Cabinet, however, was far from unsympathetic 
with any movement that tended to stamp out the "Red" menace of 
revolution. In France, Richelieu's Ministry, once more in power, 
was wholly subservient to Russian views. Alexander now sought, 
in a measure, to placate liberal opinion. In explanation of the 
manifesto, he again attempted to reaffirm the benevolent principles 
underlying his conception of a Confederated Europe. The means 
chosen was a memoir, 3 addressed to the Russian representatives 
in the principal courts of Europe. This document was especially 
intended to counteract the impression already prevalent "that 
the Triple Alliance is opposed by another formed of the Con- 
stitutional States," the latter group including "besides England 
and France, the two Americas." After complimenting Austria 
and Prussia for their firmness "in the great task of reconcilia- 
tion," the Tsar gave free rein to his resentment against England 
as the obstacle in the path of concerted action. 4 



In its main results, Troppau definitely ranged the Tsar on the 
side of obscurantism and reaction. Whatever may have been 
his personal antipathy to Metternich and his plans, Alexander, by 
signing the manifesto, entered the group dominated by the genius 
of the Viennese statesman. While still proclaiming his Liberalism, 
he now adopted Metternich's formula, to the effect that "to a 

1 The Tsar "wished an act of guarantee of the internal peace of states in the sense that 
the transactions of 1814, 1815 and 1818 had assured the political peace of Europe." 
Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, vol. II, p. 97. 

2 The preliminary Troppau protocol was signed November 19. "It was the first step 
along the road followed by this Triple Alliance, which was soon to be substituted for the 
quintuple." Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, pp. 33-34. 

3 MS. Troppau, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. 

4 In the following phrases: "The British Empire, now at the zenith of riches and civili- 
zation, appears for the moment to be engulfed by its own prosperity." 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 101 

world gone mad must be opposed a new order, a new system 
inspired by wisdom, reason, justice and correction." * 

The Tsar's attitude at Troppau was but confirmed during the 
adjourned sessions of the Congress held at Laybach (a spot chosen 
as convenient for the attendance of the King of the two Sicilies). 
To give the proceedings a tone of formality becoming to an 
occasion which the Tsar chose to believe an important continua- 
tion of the "System of Congress," the Russian plenipotentiaries 
presented at the first meeting (held January 11, 1821) their 
"opinion concerning the forms and precedence to be followed 
during the deliberations of Laybach." 2 "Far from having in 
view new political combinations," the Memoir concludes, "this 
reunion is especially called to reaffirm the system which has given 
to Europe the blessing of peace by restoring independence to the 
nations." Instead of the "journal" of the proceedings kept at 
Troppau, the Tsar now desired to substitute formal "protocols" 
of the daily proceedings — signed by all the plenipotentiaries 
present. 

It was only when the representatives of the other Powers 
pointed out that under the terms of such an arrangement the 
British plenipotentiary (Gordon) would be excluded from the 
debates by the terms of his instructions that the Russian repre- 
sentatives consented to continue the system of informal con- 
ferences which had been followed at Troppau. In the Conferences 
of Laybach "veritable discussions were replaced in the minutes 
by convenient debates arranged by Mr. Gentz, who even com- 
posed the opposing arguments." 3 

At the second Conference, held on January 12, the comedy 
wherein the King of Naples was to play the part of mediator be- 
tween the Powers and his revolted subjects was carefully staged. 

1 M etternich to Alexander, Troppau, December 15, 1820. MS. Troppau, Russian Foreign 
Office. Whole paragraphs in the above, which include long tirades against anarchy, etc., 
are heavily underlined in pencil and annotated by Alexander himself. 

2 This was endorsed by the Emperor himself. In this document, the Russian envoy 
proposes a set of rules to govern the deliberations of the Powers: While the con- 
ferences of Troppau, he maintained, were only preliminary and preparatory (and, the 
Powers, therefore, necessarily prevented from deliberating "in due form"), the meeting 
at Laybach formed a European legislature. At Troppau the plenipotentiaries of the 
intervening Powers had not all received "precise and positive instructions concerning the 
limits of their policy." Now that these preliminary questions had been discussed and the 
scope of the debates clearly set fortn, the plenipotentiaries should now, he believed, declare 
themselves part of a "formal system." MS. Minutes, Laybach, 1820, Russian Foreign 
Office. This contains, besides the minutes, a "Report to the Emperor." 

3 Pasquier, op. cit., vol. v, p. 134. 



102 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Metternich read a communication from Ferdinand to the Allied 
sovereigns, asking them to define the intentions of the Conference 
with respect to his kingdom and to communicate their disposi- 
tions to his representative, who would wait upon them at Laybach. 
In drafting their reply, the plenipotentiaries were careful to annex 
a stern rebuke to the revolutionary government of Naples, joined 
to a refusal to deal with any member of the de facto government. 
On the other hand, they "consented" to receive a personal repre- 
sentative of the King in the person of Chevalier de Rufo. 1 

The King of Naples continued the role which had been assigned 
him by Metternich, expressing his appreciation of the action 
taken by the Powers. He begged them with feigned benevolence 
"not to proceed to extreme measures until all means of concilia- 
tion had been exhausted. The just anger of the sovereigns of the 
"Holy Alliance" having thus been appeased, Metternich next 
obtained the "approval" of Ferdinand to proceed to more active 
measures of coercion, which were communicated to Naples. 
The King, "now convinced of the futility of changing the disposi- 
tion taken by the united sovereigns," summoned the Duke of 
Calabria, Regent of the Kingdom, "to require his people to re- 
nounce all adherence to the political changes brought about by 
the revolution of July 2. 2 

The "small fry" of the Italian Princes were now admitted 
(January 26), to take cognizance of the proceedings and to justify 
the principle of "concerted action," by signing Gentz's Minutes. 3 

King Ferdinand himself had arrived on January 8. 4 This mon- 
arch, after binding himself by every conceivable oath to support 
the Constitution, had reluctantly been permitted by the de facto 
government to leave his kingdom. Once beyond the frontier, 
he cast aside the insignia of the Carbonari which decorated 

1 MS. Minutes, Laybach, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. 

2 Ibid., Third Conference, Minutes. 

3 Among these were Prince Corsini, representing the Arch-Duke of Tuscany, Count 
Daglio, representing the King of Sardinia, and Cardinal Spina, representing the Pope. 
With a single notable exception these lesser Powers approved the measures taken by the 
Conference. In answer to Metternich's somewhat complacent assumption "that the 
sovereigns of Italy would approve the resolutions," Spina said that the Pope felt obliged 
to insert in the protocol a clause to the efFect that: "As it now appears that measures 
which might bring on hostilities are contemplated, the Envoy of His Holiness is not 
authorized to take any part in the conference or to give any advice." Ibid. See Minutes 
for January 28. 

4 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, p. 59. 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 103 

his person and placed himself under the personal protection of 
Metternich. At Laybach, Ferdinand soon recovered all his 
legitimist pretensions. He listened with unkingly glee while 
the Triple Alliance planned the destruction of the Constitutional 
regime he had sworn to defend. From Pasquier's Memoires 
we learn it was only with difficulty that the King was persuaded 
to employ decent diplomatic forms in addressing the provisional 
government of his kingdom, at the head of which his son, the 
Duke of Calabria, still posed as Regent. 1 

The harmony of the proceedings was now marred by Gordon, 
the English plenipotentiary. He announced 2 that "in spite of 
the presence of a British Minister at Laybach, this envoy finds 
himself unauthorized to take part directly in the proceedings of 
the Conference." 2 The French plenipotentiary also ventured to 
ask Metternich whether Ferdinand on his return might not be 
allowed to modify the disposition taken by the Powers. 

The Austrian diplomat replied that "the Italian Powers" 
could under no circumstances "allow the establishment of insti- 
tutions incompatible with their tranquillity." Thus even the 
"liberal" formula just adopted by the Tsar — that reforms were 
justifiable if granted by a sovereign — was denied all authority. 
The tide of reaction was at its flood! 

At both Laybach and Troppau the Tsar's illusion that these 
gatherings were an administrative directorate of Europe was 
carefully respected by Metternich. "Of all the children I have 
met with," he writes in his Memoires concerning the author of 
the Holy Alliance, "the Emperor of Russia is the greatest child 
of all." 3 During long interviews, which the informal relations 
established by the gathering of the sovereigns facilitated, Metter- 
nich urged upon Alexander the necessity of further reactionary 
measures. In proving this thesis, he was again singularly helped 
by the course of events. The activities of the secret societies in 
Russia were now at their height. The Tsar's own life was threat- 
ened by men formerly associated in the movement for reform he 
had himself initiated. He even offered Metternich the support 
of Russian troops to restore Ferdinand to his throne. 4 Besides 

1 Ibid., p. 54. 

2 Session of January 25. MS. Minutes, Laybach, 1820, Russian Foreign Office. 

3 Metternich, Memoires, vol. m, p. 531. 
4 Gentz, Depeckes inedites, vol. II, p. 127. 



104 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

the news of continued revolutionary successes in South America, 
a revolution broke out beneath the very noses of the assembled 
monarchs in the neighboring state of Piedmont. Here the Liberal 
Party (profiting by the departure of the Austrian Expeditionary 
Forces, which were to restore Ferdinand's authority) declared 
for a constitution similar to those successively adopted in Spain, 
Portugal and Naples. 

It required but a few weeks for the well-drilled armies of Austria 
to overcome the resistance of the Liberals in both Naples and 
Piedmont. But the lesson had not been lost upon Alexander. 
"The period of Troppau and Laybach" (writes Grand Duke 
Nicolas) was a crisis in the life and experiences of the Emperor. 
The impression made upon him was so strong that it lasted until 
the day of his death." x 

The spectacle afforded by the European Congress held at Aix, 
Troppau and Laybach was calculated to confirm the Washington 
Cabinet in their determination to remain aloof from the "Holy 
League." In this policy they were doubtless strengthened by the 
objections of the British Cabinet — and the reports of the 
speeches made by the Liberal leaders in Parliament. 2 American 
public opinion, in spite of an earlier belief in the high-mindedness 
of Alexander, could hardly fail to be disillusioned by the trans- 
formation brought about in his character through contact with 
the reactionary statesmen who formed the majority at these 
"international" gatherings. A strong sympathy with the "revo- 
lutionaries" in Spain, Naples and Greece was naturally felt 
throughout North and South America. The author of "Novo- 
siltzov's Instructions" was about to abandon, in this atmosphere 
of "practical statesmanship," nearly all the Liberal "points" of 
the program which had insured him so much hearty sympathy 
in the New World. 3 

The sincerity of Alexander's devotion to the principles of inter- 
national solidarity, and of his conversion to Metternich's policy 

1 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhaflowitch, L'Empereur Alexandre Ier, yol. I, p. 231. 

2 In France and Great Britain Liberal opinion was aroused against the proceedings at 
Laybach. In Parliament, Mr. Mackintosh expressed the opinion that the liberty of states 
was at an end. In the House of Lords, Lord Holland bitterly attacked both the Holy 
Alliance and the Tsar. Pasquier, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 146-148. See also a dispatch from 
Poletica to Nesselrode, published in American Historical Review, vol. xvm, p. 328. 

3 A document whose language is curiously typical of the Laybach Conference will be 
found in Appendix II. It also offers a remarkable parallel if considered in connection 
with the "Red Peril" of anarchy in Russia at the present time. 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 105 

of reaction, was soon to be put to a supreme test. In the measures 
taken against the secret societies of Russia an exception had 
always been made in favor of the Hetairie, an association whose 
object was to foster the growing spirit of resistance among the 
Greek patriots to the oppression of the Turkish Government. 
A natural sympathy was felt by the Russians with their coreligion- 
aries. Moreover, a large party in Russia were convinced that the 
Empire's destiny lay in the Orient, considering Alexander's 
European adventures and his departure from Catherine's plan 
of Eastern conquest as a fatal step. The news that open revolt 
had broken out in the Moldo-Wallachian principalities, the 
autonomy of which were the fruits of Catherine's Turkish wars, 
reached Laybach shortly after the outbreak of the revolution at 
Turin. The leader of the Greek revolution was an ex-officer of 
the Russian Army, the son of a former hospodar, Alexander 
Ypsilanti. 1 Since the beginning of July, 1820, this rebel leader 
had made his headquarters at Kichenev, within Russian territory, 
where his open campaign against the Sultan had received every 
encouragement from the Tsar's officials. In his proclamation 
addressed to the Greek patriots, Ypsilanti had even ventured the 
following significant phrases: 

Should the Turks in their desperation venture to make an incursion 
upon your territory, you have nothing to fear: a great power stands 
ready to punish their insolence. 2 

Between his duty to his countrymen and their wishes and 
his devotion to his new international ideals Alexander did not 
long hesitate. He felt that the moral obligation to maintain the 
bond of the Holy Alliance outweighed any doctrine of national 
or religious solidarity. Ypsilanti was degraded from his rank 
in the Russian Army. The Russian Ambassador at the Porte, 
Baron Stroganov, was instructed to inform the Sultan that the 
Russian forces would remain strictly neutral, and that the Tsar 
wished to be considered as wholly disapproving the movement. 
To La Ferronnays, representing the Government of Louis XVIII 
at Laybach, Alexander expressed himself with all the one- 
sidedness of a doctrinaire: 

This outbreak has occurred when, as the revolutionaries believe, the 
sovereigns were occupied elsewhere. Moreover, they seem to have 

1 Pasquier, vol. v, p. 191. 

2 Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de V Europe, vol. I, p. 156. 



106 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

thought they had my approval to their course. Without paying any 
attention to what public opinion in Russia may desire, I have published 
to the whole world my disapproval of the insurrectionary movement. 

So far had Metternich's pupil traveled along the paths of re- 
action that in the outbreak of a Christian population against the 
secular tyranny of a Mussulman Sultan he now saw only the 
machinations of a group of secret societies. He could even 
stretch the mystical language of his Holy Alliance to describe 
them as "anti-Christian"! 1 

Alexander reached St. Petersburg on his return from Laybach 
on June 7, 1821. Hardly had he lost contact with the "spirit" of 
the Congress when doubts began to assail him as to the wisdom of 
his course in the Orient. From the moment he crossed his own 
frontiers he had been greeted everywhere with loud demonstra- 
tions in favor of the Greeks. Half-veiled threats and mutterings 
of dissatisfaction concerning the measures taken with respect 
to the late revolution reached him from every side. 2 In St. 
Petersburg he found Stroganov awaiting him. The Russian 
Ambassador at the Porte had been an eye witness of terrible 
scenes in Constantinople: Sultan Mahmoud had chosen Easter 
Day to perpetrate a crime peculiarly revolting to the Orthodox 
Russians. The Patriarch of the Greek Church — the leader of the 
Christian faith, which the Tsar had sworn to protect and cherish — 
had been arrested at the altar during mass. Clad in his sacred 
vestments, he had been hung by Turkish soldiers at the door of 
the profaned shrine. 

On February 28, 1822, the Porte threatened once more to inter- 
rupt the peaceful development of the diplomatic negotiations 
which Alexander (through Metternich's influence) had con- 
sented to initiate. An insolent note addressed to the Tsar 
required among other things the extradition of all Turkish sub- 
jects who had taken refuge within the Russian Empire. In order 

1 In a letter of March 10, 1821, to his confidant Golytzine in Russia he wrote in even 
stronger terms "Ypsilanti is mad. His act will not only cause his own undoing, but will 
probably drag down in his fall a great number of victims. His compatriots have no 
cannons nor military material, and it is probable that the Turks will easily crush them. 
Moreover, there is no doubt in my own mind that the first suggestion for this insurrection 
came from the Central Committee in Paris. They evidently desire to create a diversion in 
favor of Naples, and thereby to prevent us from destroying one of the chief synagogues of 
Satan, established with the single intention of propagating his anti-Christian doctrine." 
Quoted by Rain, Un Tsar ideologue, Alexandre I er , p. 403. 

2 Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, p. 331. 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 107 

to calm Alexander's renewed hostility, Metternich resorted to a 
plan which he knew would appeal to the Tsar's favorite doctrines. 
During January-February, 1822, he proposed that the whole 
question of Greek independence should be regulated by a new 
Congress of the Great Powers. This was to be held in Vienna. 

It was necessary, however, first to obtain the assent of the 
British Cabinet to a gathering wherein the question of the exist- 
ence of the Turkish Empire might be decided in accordance with 
the system "consecrated" by the "Holy Alliance." Metternich 
craftily pointed out to Castlereagh that in their exhausting 
struggle with the Turks — marked by terrible atrocities on both 
sides — the Greeks would necessarily come to a decision of their 
quarrel before its merits could be submitted to the ponderous 
judgment of Alexander's world tribunal. In the meanwhile, 
Lord Strangford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was 
given a free hand by both Metternich and Castlereagh to hasten 
an arrangement which would guarantee an early peace. 

Metternich had succeeded once more in making Vienna the 
center of world negotiations. The Russian troops, which to the 
joy of all Russian patriots had already advanced as far as Witespk, 
received orders to return to their garrisons, and a Russian envoy, 
Tatistcheff, preceded his master to the Austrian capital in order to 
commence negotiations along new lines. As a final guarantee of 
his determination to submit Russian differences with the Porte to 
the concerted action of the Powers, Alexander even consented to 
dismiss from his councils both Capo d'Istria and Stroganov, the 
principal promoters of the war movement in Russia. 

Thus while Byron sang the heroic deeds of Marco Bozzaris, 
and embarked upon the "Modern Crusade" which so moved the 
"classicists" of the early nineteenth century, while the passes of 
Thermopylae once more saw the hordes of Asia stopped and beaten 
back by Greek defenders, the diplomats of the "Holy Alliance" 
continued their negotiations. The Tsar's faith was renewed 
that an application of the formulas of his "League of Christian 
Charity and Peace" would enforce order in a distracted world. 
The enactments of another Congress were about to test once more 
the practical workings of his "sublime idea." * 



1 "Alexander loved these reunions which recalled his preponderant position in 1814 
and 1815." Ibid., p. 443. 



108 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

The Congresses of Laybach and Troppau had estranged Eng- 
lish policy from that of the "Holy Alliance." In the English 
House of Commons frequent representations were made to 
Castlereagh that the policy pursued by Great Britain in the 
Councils of the great Powers was not consistent with the ends 
pursued by a great liberal democracy. As the orators of the oppo- 
sition were ready to recall, he had "panegyrized" the objects 
of the Holy League when the news of this strange agreement had 
first been brought to the attention of Parliament, nor had his 
subsequent conduct gone far to reassure the more radical members 
of that body. 1 

The avowed policy of this League of Sovereigns was believed 
to be no less dangerous from the respectable motives alleged on 
their behalf. 2 

A contemporary writer thus summarizes the situation: 

A new era had commenced in the history of the World — a system of 
governing Europe by Congresses, instead of by separate and independent 
Governments, was established. A scheme was formed, and actually 
begun to be put in operation, to destroy throughout the globe the just 
freedom of the people. And while all this mighty machinery was being 
put in movement, England was, if not a willing, at least a passive 
spectator. 5 

It was in the midst of this "complication of affairs and jarring 
of opposite principles" that the nations learned that the three 
sovereigns of the "Holy Alliance" and the representatives of 
France and England were about to meet once more in a Congress 
at Verona, 4 at a time when these international gatherings were 
most suspicious to Liberal opinions. 

The tragic death of the Marquis of Londonderry — to which 
title Lord Castlereagh had succeeded on the death of his father — 
now brought about a fundamental change in English foreign policy. 
George Canning, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, was in no 
sense a radical. He had even been considered one of the decided 

1 Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, vol. I, p. 18. 

2 "The desire to maintain peace, and to free Europe from the 'scourge of revolution,' 
determined the three powers forthwith to proceed to destroy by force of arms the free insti- 
tutions which the Neapolitan nation had asked and obtained from their Sovereign. But 
in assigning the reasons for the selection of Naples in preference to either Spain or Portugal, 
as the object of their interference, the intention to act in the same way, as soon as possible, 
towards those two countries, was clearly manifested. . . ." Ibid., pp. 38-39. 

3 Ibid., p. 62. 

4 Verona was chosen rather than Vienna because the affairs of Italy were supposed to 
be the object of the gathering. Pasquier, Memoires, vol. V, p. 446. 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 109 

enemies of reform — but his attitude with respect to English 
interests abroad had always been approved by the lovers of con- 
stitutional liberty. 1 

Canning received the seals of the Foreign Office from the King 
on September 16, 1822. In inaugurating his policy he was 
determined not to lend the prestige of his new office either to the 
Congress in Vienna or to the subsequent gathering in Verona. 
It is, indeed, probable that Canning would have avoided, if 
possible, sending any English representative whatsoever to the 
latter gathering. 2 

The Duke of Wellington, the envoy chosen by Castlereagh, 
had been delayed on his journey to Vienna, so that his arrival 
almost coincided with the departure of the Allied sovereigns 
for Verona. 3 It, therefore, appeared advisable that this great 
man, who embodied England's prestige both at home and abroad, 
should be permitted to accompany the leaders of Europe. Wel- 
lington's instructions, moreover, were precise and complete, and 
his character gave every guarantee to Canning that they would be 
loyally carried out. He was to decline in the name of his govern- 
ment all participation, either direct or indirect, in the military 
operations in Spain, for which the Tsar Alexander now sought a 
mandate, and to forbid all access to Portugal to the armies of the 
"Holy Alliance" in the name of the ancient treaties which had so 
long united that country to Great Britain. 

The matters to be considered at the Congress of Verona 
(October-November, 1822) were arranged by Metternich accord- 
ing to a well-considered agenda. 4 The question of Greek inde- 
pendence (involving the quarrel — so dangerous for Europe's peace 

1 It was not without some hesitation that Canning had accepted the Foreign Secretary- 
ship. In the Cabinet he was about to join, certain members held principles far different 
from his own, — nor was he supported by the personal views of his Sovereign. The Duke 
of Wellington had been one of Castlereagh's supporters and was, therefore, believed to be 
strongly "predisposed towards the policy of the Continental School." In Lord Liverpool, 
however, the head of the Cabinet, Canning had a warm personal friend and admirer, and 
a "cordial approver of his system of foreign policy." Stapleton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 125-129. 

2 Ibid., p. 143. 

3 Pasquier, of. cit., vol. v, p. 446. 

4 This agenda included: 

1. The slave trade. 

2. The piratries exercised in American waters, and the question of Spanish 

colonies. 

3. The Grecian question. 

4. The Italian question. 

5. The Spanish question. 

See Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, vol. I, p. 74. 



110 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

— between the Governments of Russia, Austria and the Sublime 
Porte) was the first discussed. 

The differences between Turkey and Russia continued in the 
hands of Austria and England, as mediating Powers. The Greeks 
were, however, sternly denied the assistance — or even the moral 
support — of the new Congress. The Tsar in his distrust of 
all revolutionary movements declared them wholly unworthy 
of sympathy, and even refused to allow the delegates (waiting 
the pleasure of the Powers at Ancona) a hearing before that 
body. 1 In spite of an eloquent appeal which Andrew Mataxis 
addressed to the Pope, their delegates were finally ordered to 
return to their distracted country. 

In respect to Italian affairs, the decisions of the Congress of 
Verona were also in accord with the policy of the Holy Alliance. 
The mandate of Europe seemed permanently accorded to Austria 
to carry out the anti-revolutionary campaign proposed by Metter- 
nich, although the Pope still courageously protested against this 
tyranny. 2 Alexander, however, was careful to intimate to Aus- 
tria (with the support of the French delegation) that the exercise 
of this mandate in no way involved the permanent recognition 
of Austria's rights to the hegemony of Italy. 

With the exception of the above definite successes for the policy 
of the "Triple Alliance," — events which were in the main unop- 
posed by England or France — the course of the debates at the 
Congress of Verona now tended undeniably toward a disintegra- 
tion of the "European system." 3 

1 Debidour, op. cit., vol. !, p. 187. 

2 The astute diplomacy of the Vatican had distrusted from the beginning the "quietist" 
language of the Act of September, 1815. The King of Naples, lost to every sense of 
patriotism or personal dignity, begged that the Austrian Army of Occupation be allowed 
to remain in his dominions. 

3 Nevertheless, the Tsar's optimism remained insensible to every reproof. In a conver- 
sation with Chateaubriand, Alexander triumphantly declared himself as follows: "Can 
you now believe, as our enemies declare, that the Alliance is a vain word which only serves 
to cover private ambitions? This was perhaps true in the beginning of our system, but 
now that the civilized world is in peril, particularistic interests must be forgotten. There 
can no longer be any question of English, French, Russian, Prussian or Austrian policy; 
there only remains a general political system, which should, in the interest of all, be fol- 
lowed in common by all peoples and their rulers. I must be the first to exhibit my belief 
in these principles — convictions on which I had founded the Alliance. An occasion to 
prove this presented itself in connection with the Grecian revolt. Nothing was less in 
accord with public opinion in my country than my acts at that time. I saw, however, in the 
troubles of the Peloponnesus the signs of a revolutionary plot, and I immediately desisted 
from further action on their behalf." Quoted in Chateaubriand, Congres de V'erone, vol. I, 
pp. 221-222. 



THE ERA OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 111 

Wellington maintained that Great Britain regarded as wholly 
pernicious and dangerous the policy — approved by the Congress — 
of addressing common notes of protest to the Spanish Constitu- 
tional Cabinet. His government, he declared, had adopted as a 
basic principle of foreign policy the principle of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of other states. The English representative 
would be ordered to remain in Madrid, whether or not the repre- 
sentatives of the other Powers were ordered to withdraw. 1 

In view of the imminent intervention of France in Spanish 
affairs, Wellington, moreover, now saw fit officially to bring to 
the attention of the Congress Great Britain's intention of recog- 
nizing the Spanish-American Colonies. This action, so important 
to the common policy which the two Anglo-Saxon Powers were 
about to develop, had long been pending: 

The relations which existed between His Majesty's subjects and 
certain other parts of the world for a long time have placed His Majesty 
in a position where it will be necessary to recognize the de facto existence 
of governments formed by the different Spanish provinces in order to 
enter into relations with the latter. The relaxation of Spanish authority 
has given rise to an increase of piratry and filibustering. It is impossible 
for England to put a stop to this intolerable affliction without the 
cooperation of the local authorities along these coasts. The necessity 
of cooperation in this respect, therefore, can hardly help but lead to new 
acts recognizing the de facto existence of one or another of these self- 
constituted governments. 2 

By basing this action on commercial rather than political 
grounds, the British Cabinet sought through a policy of expediency 
to avoid raising the time-worn issue of "legitimacy" in connection 
with the Spanish colonies. But, as Wellington was well aware, 
in addition to the commercial aspects of the case, a large party in 
the English Parliament supported the constitutional pretensions 
of the South American republics in the spirit of liberal sympathy 
long upheld by the Congress of the United States. 3 

1 This note is given in ibid., p. 123. 

2 Quoted in ibid., pp. 89-90. 

3 Ibid., p. 94. 



CHAPTER VI 
EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

"It ought to be the aim of American statesmanship to prevent and frustrate 
for all time European interference with the development of the states, and 
even with the destinies of the whole Northern Continent." Hamilton's 
policy in 1781, as outlined in Oliver's Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on 
American Union. 

While the closing debates of the Congress of Verona were 
taking place, and the language of the platitudinous manifesto, 
which was to crown its labors, was in course of elaboration by the 
delegates of the "Holy Alliance," negotiations were being carried 
on in Paris with respect to the proposed French intervention in 
Spain. Chateaubriand had a final long interview with Alexander, 
whose personal influence and charm were never exerted to better 
purpose than in his negotiations with the two principal French 
envoys at Verona. Montmorency, who was almost as visionary 
and mystical as the Tsar himself, fell a ready victim to his per- 
suasions respecting an intervention in the interests of Ferdinand. 
Chateaubriand, who had been chosen by Villele to counteract 
his colleague's legitimist enthusiasm, fell a victim to his own 
childish vanity. The Tsar's flattery and a little personal attention 
from the Autocrat seem to have convinced him that the Spanish 
campaign was the surest way of restoring French prestige. Al- 
though no Russian interests were directly served, the Tsar found 
satisfaction in giving actuality to the anti-revolutionary program 
of international administration laid down at Troppau and Lay- 
bach. 

Chateaubriand now accepted the plan of an intervention in 
Spain with all the enthusiasm of an author compiling a historical 
scene. In the situation he was contriving he already saw himself 
the central figure. Only the monumental conceit of the creator 
of "Atala" could have penned the dispatches he has assembled 
in two volumes dealing with this episode — so closely connected 
with the history of Spain in South America and the promulgation 
of the Monroe Doctrine. 1 

It was in vain that public opinion in France protested against 
an enterprise to a great extent imposed upon the French envoys 
at Verona by the Tsar's conception of international duty. In 

1 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone. 

113 



114 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

vain the opposition called attention to the impropriety of the 
Constitutional King of France using his superior strength to 
crush the power of a constitutional government and to reestablish 
absolutism in a liberal state. The supporters of the Charter — 
upon which rested the restored Government of France — saw in 
the policy of intervention the first steps towards the denunciation 
of this pact. But Villele, persuaded by Chateaubriand and the 
growing influence of the Ultra-Royalists, now wavered in his 
wise determination to neglect the Tsar's advice. Only Canning's 
appeals — made through a direct correspondence with Chateau- 
briand — delayed for a time the march of the Royalist troops. 1 

The ensuing months were nevertheless to be filled with a series 
of bitter disappointments for the Tsar, and of rebufFs to his 
schemes of concerted action. Far from the center of European 
events, he followed with an anxious eye the development of the 
French intervention in Spain and the struggle of the Greeks for 
the liberty which he had denied them in the interests of a doc- 
trinaire devotion to the tenets of the Holy Alliance. Austrian 
jealousy — and the French Ministry's desire to reserve for the 
Bourbon dynasty all the laurels to be gained in the Spanish 
War — kept him from taking an active part in these events. 
Nevertheless he intimated to the Allied Powers that the nucleus 
of a Russian Army, which he pompously called "The Army of the 
Alliance," was already mobilizing in Poland. 2 Every success of 
the campaign to restore Ferdinand to his throne was followed 
by a shower of Russian decorations conferred upon all those who 
had shown the slightest deference for his advice and "policies." 

The military details of the campaign of 1823 do not fall within 
the province of this study. 3 A Bourbon prince carried the white 
standard of "Old" France across the frontier, and the numerical 
superiority of the French troops, aided by the guerrilla bands of 
the "Apostolicos," soon brought the Duke of Angouleme to the 
walls of Cadiz. Within this city the Constitutional Government 
had taken refuge, carrying with them the unwilling Ferdinand, 

1 "Negotiate at least before you invade," was Canning's common sense rejoinder to the 
elegantly phrased arguments of the author of the Memoires d 'outre tombe. "Leave the 
Spanish revolution to burn itself out within its own crater; you have nothing to apprehend 
from the eruption, if you do not open a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees. Such 
are my opinions honestly and sincerely given. Such, Lord Liverpool tells me, he believed 
to be yours before you left this country." Chateaubriand, vol. I, p. 473. 

2 See Rain, Un ideologue Alexandre I e r, p. 425. 

3 See Pasquier, Memoires, vol. v, pp. 497-499. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 115 

now a political prisoner rather than a king of Spain. In spite of 
the support platonically extended the Constitutional cause by 
public opinion in both England and the United States, it became 
evident at the end of September that further resistance was 
useless. Ferdinand VII was allowed his liberty after taking the 
most solemn oaths to refrain from reprisals toward the Constitu- 
tionalists. Scarcely had the King found safety behind the French 
lines when he gave the signal for an outbreak of reactionary 
terrorism, which has made his name execrated throughout the 
peninsula to the present day. Riego, the patriotic leader, was 
hanged at Madrid. A Royalist Government, composed of Apos- 
tolicos, carried out the whims of a maniac monarch, in face of the 
protests of the Duke of Angouleme, who returned to France in 
disgust, leaving behind him a discontented Army of Occupation. 1 

The Conservative Party in Portugal now sought to imitate the 
reactionary deeds of Ferdinand. Here, however, Canning firmly 
intervened. By the terms of a note dated March 31, Canning 
intimated to the French Government that if their troops should 
further approach the Portuguese frontier, it would be considered 
by Great Britain as a "hostile act." The Absolutist Party never- 
theless once more took up their arms against the Constitutional 
Government in spite of Canning's effort to isolate Portugal from 
the quarrels of legitimacy and liberalism. 2 

While the brief triumph of the Bourbon intervention in Spain 
was wholly gratifying to the reactionary Powers of the "Holy 
Alliance," the course of events in Spanish America was soon to 
give them cause for serious alarm. Every success of the policy 
pursued by France in Spain caused Canning to seek a counter- 
poise which might add to the influence of Great Britain in the 
affairs of the Spanish Colonies. Yet even at this time Canning 
retained hopes of preserving the monarchical system in South 
America. This is shown by the special favors he extended to the 

l Ibid., pp. 517-521. 

2 In September, 1824, the monarchs forming the Holy Alliance received a new recruit 
wholly in accord with their most obscurantist doctrines. By the death of the prudent 
Louis XVIII, his brother, the Count d'Artois, became King (Charles X) of France. 
During the years 1823-1824 the tide of reaction — which now characterized the Tsar's 
internationalism — was at its height. Metternich was wholly occupied in applying the 
repressive measures of 1820 to the German Confederation. It was time — he informed his 
master — to oblige the sovereigns of South Germany, if not to abolish their constitution, at 
least to modify them to an extent which would suppress public debates. Such was the 
strange outcome of the policies now championed by the author of the Instructions to 
Novosiltzov! 



116 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Empire founded by Iturbide in Mexico. In that continent he was 
now, however, confronted with the growing republican influences 
of the United States. In the month of July, 1823, it was learned 
in London that Iturbide's scheme to found a vast Central American 
state had ended in failure. Mexico under the influences of the 
United States was about to declare itself a federal republic. 1 

A new factor reconciling the British Cabinet to this plan was 
the ominous program of monarchical intervention urged by the 
diplomatic impresario, Chateaubriand. 2 This imaginative states- 
man now dreamed of extending the French intervention in Spain — 
where it appeared firmly established — to the colonies overseas. 
To Ferdinand VII he hinted a compromise, by the terms of which 
the colonies of South America would be transformed into a league 
of separate principalities. At the head of each of these would be 
placed a prince of the House of Bourbon, chosen from the French, 
Spanish and Italian branches. The whole of this gigantic scheme 
of reaction was to be underwritten and guaranteed by the Powers 
of the "Holy Alliance." It was at this moment, so fateful to both 
American Continents — that the British Foreign Minister made the 
first overtures for a coordination of the liberal policies pursued in 
both Great Britain and the United States. 3 

On March 31, 1823, Rush, the American Minister at the Court 
of St. James, had an important interview with Canning concerning 
the Spanish Colonies. Referring to the British note which had 
immediately preceded the invasion of Spain by the French Armies, 
he asked whether its meaning was that England would not 
remain passive under any attempt by France to bring any of the 
American Colonies "under her dominion either by conquest or by 
cession from Spain." Canning replied by asking Rush what 
he thought his Government would say to going "hand in hand 

1 See Villanueva's interesting study based upon the archives of the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, La Santa Alianza {La Monarquia en America, vol. in), p. 81. 

2 Ibid., 73. Chateaubriand ordered the French Minister at Madrid to advise sending 
a Bourbon Prince to Mexico. 

3 The determination with which Chateaubriand had carried out his policy, and the 
confidence he expressed in the ability of France to carry out the mandates of the "Holy 
Alliance," were proofs of the constant and unwavering support he had obtained from the 
Emperor of Russia. In the debates of Parliament concerning South America, Brougham, 
the great champion of South American freedom, had stated as an undisputed fact "that 
Ferdinand had been promised by the Emperor Alexander, that if the King of Spain would 
throw off the Constitutional fetters by which he was trammelled, he would assist him in 
recovering his Transatlantick Dominions." Stapleton, The Political Life of George 
Canning, vol. II, p. 46. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 117 

with England in such a policy?" The Minister expressly added 
that "he did not think that concert of action would become nec- 
essary." 1 

Canning received no direct answer from Rush, who now sought 
instructions from his government. The matter was indeed not 
formally resumed until August 22. On that date Canning set 
forth the British position as follows: 2 

1. She conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless. 

2. That the question of their recognition as independent states was 
one of time and circumstances. 

3. That England was not disposed, however, to throw any impediment 
in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and mother country 
by amicable negotiation. 

4. That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for 
herself. 

5. That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any 
other Power with indifference. 

At the same time Rush was told by Canning that if the United 
States "acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect on 
their part concurrently with England" would be the most effectual 
mode of warning France and of persuading Spain that neither of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries cherished territorial ambitions in South 
America. 2 

On August 23, Rush replied categorically to Canning's ques- 
tions, 3 assuming an identical position except with regard to recog- 
nition (which had already been made by the United States). In 
reporting the matter to his government he was careful to point 
out that while he had thought it proper to meet the spirit of the 
British proposals as far as he could, he had at the same time 
avoided any act which might be construed as pledging his govern- 
ment or to "implicate it in the federative system of Europe." 4 
This appeared the more necessary from the fact, that as Canning 
informed him on the 26th, the affairs of Spanish America were 
to form the subject of a new European Congress as soon as France 
had terminated her military operations in Spain. 

On the 28th, Rush informed Adams of the quandary in which 
he was placed by the rapid development of the situation, and of his 

1 Rush, Residence at the Court of London, vol. n, p. 11. 

2 Ibid., p. 25. 

3 Ibid., p. 26. 
* Ibid., p. 29. 



118 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

intention on his own responsibility "to make a declaration, in 
the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under 
an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy 
Alliance." This declaration, however, he made contingent upon 
"recognition by Great Britain without delay." It will thus be 
seen that if Canning had not judged it inopportune to afford the 
recognition urged by Rush (which he accorded the following year), 
that courageous diplomat would have associated the policies of his 
country and that of Great Britain on his own responsibility, sub- 
ject to the disavowal of the Department of State. 1 

On November 26 Canning informed Rush that their last inter- 
view on the subject, just a month before, had led him to conclude 
that nothing could be done between them in view of the latter's 
insistence regarding recognition. He had therefore decided that 
"Great Britain should herself, without any concert with the United 
States, come to an explanation with France," and had already had 
several conferences with the French Ambassador, 2 Prince Polig- 
nac, and had afterwards recorded them as an official Memorandum 
embodying England's "irreductible demands." This was coupled 
with a notification of the British Cabinet's unchangeable de- 
termination to withdraw from the Congressional system of the 
Holy Alliance. "England could not go into a joint deliberation 
upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with 
other Powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question, 
and whose interests were less implicated in the decision of it." 3 

In answer to Canning's contentions, Polignac was instructed 
to present a note modifying Chateaubriand's previous attitude. 
He now admitted in substance the whole of the British demands: 

That his Government believed it to be utterly hopeless to reduce 
Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain; 

That France disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail 
herself of the present state of the Colonies, or of the present situation 
of France towards Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish 
possessions in America, or to obtain for herself any exclusive advantages; 

And that, like England, she would willingly see the mother country, 
in possession of superior commercial advantages, by amicable arrange- 

1 Rush, Residence at the Court of London, vol. II, pp. 32-33. 

2 Respecting these negotiations, Canning informed Rush, very properly "that he would 
willingly furnish . . . that part which embodied the views of England, but that where those 
of France were at stake he did not feel that he had the same discretion." Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
The version of Canning's official biographer, Stapleton, treats the subsequent negotia- 
tions more fully. 

3 Stapleton, op. cit., vol. n, p. 29. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 119 

ments; and would be contented like her, to rank after the mother 
country, among the most favored nations: 

Lastly, that she abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the 
Colonies by force of arms. 

That as to what might be the best arrangement between Spain and 
her Colonies, the French Government could not give, nor venture to 
form, an opinion until the King of Spain should be at liberty. 1 

While acquiescing in the principal points of Canning's memo- 
randum, Polignac was not, however, prepared to abandon the 
principles of intervention. Referring to the conference which 
France now desired, he declared: 

That he saw no difficulty which should prevent England from taking 
part in the Conference, however she might now announce the difference, 
in the view which she took of the question from that taken by the Allies. 2 

He, moreover, made the acquiescence of France in the British 
program in South America — and by implication that of the Powers 
of the Holy Alliance — depend upon a "principle of union in govern- 
ment, whether monarchical or aristocratical," at the same time 
referring to the principles of the Spanish-American revolution as 
"absurd and dangerous theories." 3 

True, however, to his policy of reducing the Spanish-Ameri- 
can question to one of an opportunistic and commercial character, 
Canning now replied: 

That, however desirable the establishment of a monarchical form of 
government, in any of those provinces, might be, on the one hand, or 
whatever might be the difficulties in the way of it, on the other hand, 
his government could not take upon itself to put it forward as a con- 
dition of their recognition. 4 

While from the above declarations it will be seen that the aims 
of the reactionary government in France were not wholly aban- 
doned, the phrase "that it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish 
America to the state of its former relations to Spain" was the 
outstanding result the "logic of events" recognized by both par- 
ties. England now followed the example of the United States in 

* Ibid., pp. 30-31. 

2 Ibid., p. 31. "The refusal of England to cooperate in the work of reconciliation 
might afford reason to think, either that she did not really wish for that reconciliation, 
or that she had some ulterior object in contemplation; two suppositions equally injurious 
to the honor and good faith of the British Cabinet." Ibid. 

3 Ibid., p. 32. 

4 Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, vol. n, p. 32. Gentz at this time 
nevertheless believed that Canning realized the necessity of supporting the monarchical 
principle. See Gentz, Depeches inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie, 
vol. ii, p. 282. 



120 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

accrediting Consuls to the principal "provinces" of South America. 
Commissioners — a term by which the diplomatic rank of Minister 
was thinly veiled — were sent to both Colombia and Mexico. 

Canning realized that in all these transactions France repre- 
sented the policy of the Holy Alliance. But in view of the com- 
plicated negotiations which were being simultaneously carried 
on involving the integrity of the Turkish Empire, he believed it 
unwise to risk an open break with Russia and Austria. More- 
over, the interior situation in England, and the reactionary 
tendencies of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Liverpool, pre- 
vented any avowed opposition towards the Continental Powers 
with respect to the monarchical principles of "conservation" and 
"legitimacy." x 

A last attempt was now made by King Ferdinand himself to 
obtain the intervention of the three Powers. He proposed that — 

the several Powers, the Allies of His Catholic Majesty . . . establish 
a Conference at Paris; in order that their Plenipotentiaries, together 
with those of His Catholic Majesty, might aid Spain in adjusting the 
affairs of the revolted colonies. 2 

This invitation, communicated by the Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Diplomatic Agents of the Courts of Paris, St. 
Petersburg and Vienna, was couched in the most conciliatory 
language. The King of Spain even promised "to consider of the 
alterations which events had produced in his American prov- 
inces. 3 

In order to persuade England to overlook the indiscretions of 
Ferdinand VII, and to consent once more to enter into a con- 
ference with respect to Spanish-American affairs, Chateaubriand 

1 The key of Canning's policy towards the "Holy League," as set forth by biographer 
Stapleton, was as follows: 

"Still it was not by any violent transition from a practice of support to a system of 
active opposition to that Alliance, that he could have safely brought about any salutary 
results. A sudden change from one side to the other, would infallibly, by raising the hopes 
of the democratical party, have excited them to outrage, and have thus produced the 
very evil which it was intended to prevent. But, no: the dissolution of the Alliance was to 
be effected, gradually, by the withdrawal from it of the countenance of England; and the 
balance was to be held 'not only between contending nations, but between conflicting 
principles,' giving the preponderance to neither, but aiding rather the liberal side." 
Stapleton, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 134-135. 

2 Ibid., p. 34. 

3 Ibid. At the same time, however, a decree was issued by the Council of the Indies 
which showed the determination of this infatuated Monarch to replace the administration 
of the Colonies upon the same basis as they had existed before the Revolution of 1820. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 121 

memorialized Canning in a series of notes, which only succeeded 
in drawing from the British Foreign Minister a more definite 
statement of England's views with respect to all forms of inter- 
national intervention. 

It was not by perpetually creating occasions (Canning stated); it 
was not by incessant meddling with petty interests, and domestic 
squabbles in other countries, that the influence of Great Britain was to 
be maintained. On the contrary, it was more likely to be frittered away 
by such restless exertion, and to be found exhausted, or disabled from 
acting, when real occasion should arise. 1 

His disgust with the principles of the European Confederation 
was summed up in a final scathing inquiry: 

What was the influence which we had had in the Counsels of the 
Alliance? We protested at Laybach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our 
protest was treated as waste paper; our remonstrances mingled with 
the air. 1 

Meanwhile, the Republics of South America, through the force 
of arms, were assuring for themselves the right to an independent 
choice of their own form of government, the end so ardently 
desired by the Liberals in both England and the United States. 

Following the victories of Bolivar and Sucre, the former had 
been proclaimed dictator of a federation of republics, which 
included Peru, Venezuela and Greater Colombia. After the 
Battle of Ayacucho (December 8, 1824), the Spanish forces were 
shut up in the fortresses of Callao, which became the last remain- 
ing vestige of Spain's great Colonial Empire on the South Ameri- 
can Continent. There could no longer be any question of con- 
trolling the destinies of the New World through policies of inter- 
national action such as those pursued by the Emperor Alexander 
and Chateaubriand. The latter, indeed, now disappeared from 
the scene, unregretted even by the Ultra-Royalists. 2 

But the Washington Government was still ignorant of Polig- 
nac's declaration. The Monroe Cabinet were now earnestly con- 
sidering to what lengths they were prepared to go in single opposi- 
tion to the European System. 3 

1 Ibid. t p. 37. 

2 In the future he employed his undoubted talents as a writer in a prolonged opposition 
to the Villele Cabinet. 

3 Russia was now isolated in her pretensions — and Russia, as Canning held, "could 
hardly act alone." With the fall of Cadiz, Monroe and Calhoun had believed that the Holy 
Alliance would restore South America to Spain. Only the sturdy Adams maintained his 
determined composure. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 50 etseq. 



122 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

On November 19 (during an interview with Addington), 
Adams, while suggesting the difficulties that Great Britain might 
find in breaking her former close relations with her allies, declared 
that the United States would decline to attend any conference on 
South America, unless the new republics were also invited to be 
present. No Congress, he maintained, could give Europe a right 
"to stretch the arm of power across the Atlantic." In the strong- 
est terms he reflected upon the pretensions of the "Congressional 
System": "The very atmosphere of such an assembly must be 
considered by this government as infected — and unfit for their 
plenipotentiary to breathe in." "The ground I wish to take," 
wrote Adams in his Diary, "is that of earnest remonstrance against 
the interference of the European Powers by force in South 
America — but to disclaim all interference on our part with 
Europe." 

"As the Holy Alliance has come to edify and instruct us with 
their principles," he wrote in reference to Poletica's Mission of 
Exhortation, "it is due in candor to them and in justice to our- 
selves to return the compliment." 

It was Adams's temperate views that triumphed in the Cabi- 
net and the final Presidential Message of December reflected 
his desires. Moreover, as subsequent events readily proved, this 
limited association with British policy was wholly satisfactory 
to the friends of the liberal cause in Parliament. l The Monroe 
Message of December 2, 1823, was chiefly directed against the 
principles of intervention by the Powers of Europe with respect to 
matters of purely American interest. In affirming their detach- 
ment from European affairs, Monroe and Adams also placed them- 
selves in direct opposition to the system of World Congress which 
Alexander had sought to establish under the auspices of his 
League of Peace. The unanimity with which these gatherings 
of the Powers had avoided the thorny dangers of European policy 
— always complicated by particularistic interests — to join in corn- 
minatory notes and admonitions to the United States, had doubt- 
less not escaped their attention. Moreover, a question of purely 

1 "The question with regard to South America," said Mr. Brougham, "was now, he 
believed, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event had recently happened, than which no 
event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the Freemen of 
Europe; that event, which was decisive on the subject, was the language held with respect 
to Spanish America in the speech . . . of the President of the United States." Stapleton, 
vol. II, p. 46. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 123 

North American policy was still pending — the immediate cause 
of the "non-colonization clause" of the message. 

The Tsar had shown no intention of invoking the fraternal bond 
of the Holy Alliance as against the territorial expansion of the 
United States in the northern continent of America. In spite of 
his attempts at Aix-la-Chapelle to annex a territorial guarantee to 
the program of the Powers, no attempt was ever made to coerce 
the Washington Cabinet by "concerted action" in the latter's 
somewhat arbitrary treatment of the Florida question. But the 
objections which the young Republic addressed to the Conti- 
nental Powers with respect to "extending their system" to South 
America or of "controlling the destinies" of that quarter of the 
globe was accompanied by a territorial declaration which at the 
time applied chiefly to their own northern Continent. This had 
immediately in view the Tsar's famous ukase of 1821. 1 

By the terms of this decree, which had been taken as fore- 
shadowing a policy of Russian expansion on the North Pacific 
coast, the "pursuit of commerce, whaling and fishing was exclu- 
sively reserved to Russian subjects from the Behring Straits to 
51° north latitude." At the same time all foreign vessels were 
forbidden to approach "within less than one hundred Italian miles 
of the Russian settlements on that coast" under pain of confis- 
cation. 2 

When Middleton, the American Minister, stated his objections 
to Speranski, Governor of Siberia, regarding these pretensions of 
the ukase, the latter did his best to reassure him with respect to 
the policy it indicated. The Tsar, he said, had abandoned his 
original intention to make of these northern waters a mare 
clausum out of respect to the United States. Middleton, who 
was without instructions, contented himself with somewhat 
sarcastically referring to the Papal Bulls of 1493 "dividing the 
oceans between Spain and Portugal." 3 

Middleton soon observed, however, "that the conditions of the 
ukase were not insisted upon." He also learned that "they were 
signed by the Emperor without examination," and that "it was 

1 MS. Dispatches, Russia, 1822, contains a printed copy of the ukase forwarded in Mid- 
dleton's dispatch of January 9, 1822. Middleton reports the Tsar much occupied by his 
duties as the arbitrator between Great Britain and the United States in the question arising 
from Article I of the Treaty of Ghent. 

2 Bancroft, History of the Pacific States, vol. xxm, pp. 348-351. 

3 Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1822. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 



124 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

possible that his signature had been surreptitiously obtained" by 
persons interested in the trade of the Northwest coast. In short, 
while Capo d'Istria maintained, "We will not revoke or retract," 
the American envoy was at the same time informed "that 
no orders have been issued in the sense that you fear." 1 There 
is every proof that the subsequent negotitations were marked by 
the Tsar's desire to retire with dignity from the position which he 
had assumed, and the principal importance of the entire incident 
turns on the important declaration of American policy which it 
provoked and the non-colonization clause of the Monroe Message. 

The terms of the ukase had been communicated to the Secretary 
of State by Poletica in February, 1822, and caused an immediate 
protest. When Monroe inquired why the boundary, as yet 
undefined by treaty, had thus been arbitrarily settled, the 
Russian Minister replied that 51° north latitude had been chosen 
as lying half way between the Russian settlement at Novo 
Archenglsk and the most northern American settlement at the 
mouth of the Columbia River. Mention was made of the matter 
in the Presidential Message of December, 1822, but it was not 
until the new Envoy Baron de Tuyll arrived in April, 1823, that 
the matter was resumed. Under instructions from the Tsar he 
asked that the American Minister in St. Petersburg be given 
power to negotiate a settlement. This was agreed to by Adams 
and resulted in instructions to Mr. Middleton being drawn up. 

In July, 1823, de Tuyll was called to the State Department and 
told that the question had been altered by the determination of the 
United States Government to consider the whole territory of 
both North and South America "as closed in future to European 
colonization." Adams now based his case on the newly signed 
treaty with Spain which had ceded to the United States all the 
rights formerly held by that country up to the 41st degree of 
latitude north, upon the discoveries of Captain Grey and of the 
Lewis and Clarke Expedition, and doubtless upon Middleton's 
report of his negotiations in St. Petersburg. 2 

A large part of the territory affected by the ukase of 1821 was, 
pending a settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and 
the United States, held in common by these two countries. Their 

1 Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1822. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 
2 These negotiations were reported by Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, April 
19, 1824. MS. Dispatches, Russia. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 125 

interest in curbing the Tsar's pretensions was thus a mutual one, 
and, until the enunciation of the "non-colonization" principle 
in the Monroe Message, seemed likely again to give to their 
policies a similar direction. On January 5, 1824, however, 
Rush had an important interview with Canning in London. 
The former told the American Minister "that he was still embar- 
rassed in the preparation of his instructions to Sir Charles Bagot 
in consequence of the non-colonization principle laid down in the 
President's message." 1 He also asked Rush to allow the negotia- 
tions in St. Petersburg to progress separately and not conjointly, 
as previously proposed by the United States. 1 It now became 
the task of the American Minister to obtain support or at least 
toleration for "non-colonization" by enlisting the ready jealousies 
of the Powers. At a dinner at Prince Polignac's he expressed a 
hope that France would not intervene on such a principle as he had 
to meet the "known opposition of the whole British Cabinet." 
By such means the antipathies of the European Powers were 
stayed until the important principle became established by time. 2 
Meanwhile, an amicable negotiation had settled the matter of the 
ukase. Middleton signed an agreement with Russia, fixing the 
boundary at 55° north latitude in April, 1824, four months after 
the bold stand taken in Monroe's Message. 3 

Having traced the evolution of the two cardinal principles of 
the foreign policy of the United States published to the world by 
the Monroe Message, i.e. the paragraph forbidding the powers of 
Europe to extend their system to the American Continent or to 
control the destines of its inhabitants 4 and the equally important 
warning concerning any future attempts at colonization, 6 it now 

1 Rush, Residence at the Court of London, vol. II, p. 87. 

2 Ibid., p. 103. 

3 McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, vol. v, pp. 20-22. 

4 "We owe it therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the 
United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their 
part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power, we have not 
interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their 
independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration 
and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European 
Power, in any other light than the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States." Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. n, p. 218. 

6 "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by 
which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle 
in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American 
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and main- 
tain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject;) for future colonization by any Euro- 
pean Powers." Ibid., p. 209. 



126 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

becomes necessary to consider the corresponding obligation re- 
affirmed by the American Cabinet as part of this same declara- 
tion: the renewed engagement not to interfere in matters of 
purely European concern. 1 

The sincerity of the intentions thus declared was to be tested 
almost immediately by the course of European events. The 
struggle carried on by the Greek insurgents had been followed 
with sympathetic interest in the United States. Monroe had 
been inclined to empower Rush to act in concert with the British 
Government to end the horrors of their situation and even wished 
to propose an appropriation for a Minister to Greece. In his 
Message of December 3, 1822, he had declared it natural that 
"the reappearance of those people in their original character, 
contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great 
excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so 
signally displayed throughout the United States." At the same 
time he expressed a strong hope "that these people will recover 
their independence and resume their equal station among the 
nations of the earth." 2 Largely due to the influence of Adams, 
however, and his determination to avoid all interference on 
our part with Europe, the President's generous impulses were 
restrained. The Greeks were again noticed in the message of a 
year later, but the challenge it contained to Alexander's favorite 
internationalist policies had little or no application to the Gre- 
cian situation, and was indeed wholly ignored in St. Petersburg. 3 

The final settlement of the fate of these revolutionists was to 
offer the last occasion upon which the Tsar sought to apply the 
later formulas of his internationalism, and only concerns our study 
in this respect. 

To Alexander — brooding over his own misunderstanding of the 
Turkish situation — the reports of Canning's able negotiations in 
the interest both of Great Britain and of the Grecian patriots 

1 "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars 
which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, 
which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers." Richardson, Mes- 
sages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. n, pp. 218-219. 

2 Ibid., p. 193. 

3 A curious example of the point to which the prejudice has developed in America 
against entanglement in European affairs is shown in a recent Life of Clara Barton, by 
William E. Barton. The author points out that the first refusal by the United States 
to join the International Red Cross was largely the result of the popular belief that such 
an act would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 



127 



came as a bitter disillusion. This able statesman, in whom he 
recognized the arch enemy of the "Holy Alliance," had now 
induced even the wily Metternich to serve his own aims. While 
Lord Byron led another expedition of volunteers in active military 
support of the Greeks, Canning skilfully held the balance between 
the sympathies of the Liberals and the time-honored British policy 
of maintaining the prestige of the Sublime Porte. 

When, however, the French intervention in Spain had brought 
the Spanish War to a favorable conclusion, Alexander determined 
once more to appeal to his allies in support of his favorite policy 
of a "European intervention" to insure the pacification of Greece. 
With this end in view, he sought an interview with the Emperor 
of Austria at Czernowitz in October, 1823. Nesselrode was also 
sent to consult with Metternich, who was detained by illness at 
Lemberg. 

These pourparlers resulted in a compromise. While Austria 
and England were allowed to continue their negotiations at Con- 
stantinople, it was agreed that the five great Powers should at 
the same time be invited to a series of conferences at St. Peters- 
burg, where the Emperor of Russia would be afforded an oppor- 
tunity to develop his views with respect to revolution. This 
gathering was but to reveal the growing weakness of the bonds 
uniting the Holy League. 

The Tsar's last attempts to make a "European matter" of 
the Greek situation were resisted by Villele, who retained the 
Presidency of the Council under the reactionary Charles X. He 
refused to risk any action that might cause a break in Anglo- 
French relations. Even the Court of Berlin, under the domina- 
tion of Metternich ventured to withhold its assent to any plan 
for an intervention by the Powers. 

The Austrian Ambassador again and again declared that his 
master would in no case join in "coercive measures." Finally, 
after six weeks of sterile debate, the Conference avoided the 
appearance of failure by issuing a protocol (dated April 7, 1825), 
which directly avoided reference to the principal matters at issue. 
The Sublime Porte was requested to accord "spontaneously" 
measures necessary to pacify the revolted provinces. In case of 
refusal, a "mediation" was to be proposed by each of the Powers 
acting separately, the latter phrase being a concession to England's 
views. 



128 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

This complete breakdown of the principle of concerted action 
was highly resented by Alexander. The Emperor complained, in 
terms of reproachful bitterness, of the treatment which he had 
met with from his allies. At the same time he threw out hints 
that the Greek question was "not the only ground of difference" 
between Russia and Turkey; and that if Russian grievances had 
been for a time abandoned in favor of European interests, the 
failure of the conference to support the latter principle would be 
a reason for peremptorily insisting upon satisfaction regarding 
the other points of dispute. 1 

For a time it looked as though, in spite of all Metternich's 
finesse, the Turko-Russian conflict feared by the Powers of 
Europe was about to break out. The Russian Cabinet renewed 
a diplomatic protest with respect to the whole series of its com- 
plaints against the Porte. In addition to these demands, the 
mobilization of Russian troops began along the River Pruth, 
the old route of invasion from Russia to Turkey. The Tsar, 
meanwhile, set out upon a journey toward the southern provinces, 
which in the eyes of Europe took on a dangerous significance. 

At this time, however, the aspect of Grecian affairs underwent 
a sudden change. The Egyptian Army, which had energetically 
aided the Turkish forces in reducing the Greek insurgents of the 
Peloponnesus, suddenly suspended its victorious attack upon 
Nauplia. In the month of July they reembarked for Tripoli and 
Egypt. The explanation for such a merciful course of conduct 
could only be found in an English intervention. The fleets of 
Great Britain under Commodore Hamilton threatening the base 
of the Turkish Army had brought about results which the united 
protests of the Powers of the "Holy Alliance" had been unable 
to obtain. As a result of this respite, the Greek Government offered 
to Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg — the English candidate for the 
Grecian throne — the crown which the French Ministry had 
desired to confer upon a Bourbon prince. 

Thanks to Canning's diplomacy and the might of Britain's 

1 Stapleton, The Political Life of George Canning, vol. II, p. 436. Contemporary Liberal 
opinion held that this was a complete and unregretted defeat of the Tsar's principles. 
"The admission by one of the members of the Holy Alliance of that which this pro- 
posal implies, that there 'were interests which would justify nations in taking their own 
measures with regard to countries in a state of civil war,' was at once giving up one of 
the principles to which that Alliance had most pertinaciously adhered, and consequently 
was an acknowledgment that their principles (England having set them at defiance) were 
no longer tenable in practice." Ibid., p. 437. 



EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 129 

sea power, the Greek question seemed about to reach a settlement. 
Alexander (through Mme. de Lieven, wife of his Ambassador in 
London) sought a reconciliation with the British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. But before undertaking the mediation that the 
Tsar now appeared willing to place solely in his hands, Canning 
demanded that the Russian Armies be withdrawn from the 
Pruth, and even threatened, if this were refused, to occupy the 
Morea and the Islands of the Grecian Archipelago. 

But a dramatic turn of affairs was about to follow this final 
abdication by Alexander of his favorite principle of European 
intervention. On September 1, 1825, he had left St. Petersburg 
for the South. Failing health, not reasons of a military nature, 
was the cause of this journey. In a little town on the Asiatic 
borders of his vast Empire, the final act in the life drama 
of the Tsar-Idealist was about to be played. Far from the scenes 
of his triumphs and disappointments, the conqueror of Napo- 
leon — the dreamer of a Holy Alliance which should unite the 
nations of the world in bonds of "Justice, Christian Charity and 
Peace" — was to end his full and eager life beneath the shadow of 
disappointment and failure. 

Sensitive to the opinion of his contemporaries, the Tsar suffered 
acutely from the misunderstanding and suspicion that greeted 
every new effort to give practical effect to his international poli- 
cies. 1 Nor could he hide from himself the fact that in Russia 
his popularity had fallen to the lowest ebb from his readiness to 
sacrifice national interests to the welfare of the doctrinaire ideal 
of European Federation. 

A morbid detestation of revolution at home and abroad became 
the guiding principle of his policy. He seems to have regarded the 
growing danger of his own assassination with a certain fatalism — 
whether arising from an increasing mental lethargy or from a kind 
of heroic indifference, it is hard to say. But with respect to the 
repressive policy of the Holy Alliance he remained adamant. 
In July, 1825, but a few months before his death, he sermonized 
the French Minister at length upon the dangers of coming to any 
agreement with the insurgents of San Domingo. 2 "In the great 
struggle we are carrying on the issue is between good and evil — 

1 Rain, Un Tsar id'ealogue Alexandre I er , p. 425. 

2 Dispatches of the French Minister to the Foreign Office, quoted in Grand Due 
Nicolas Mikhailowitch, L'Empereur Alexandre I**, vol. II, p. 530. 



130 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

law against fact — order against license. The present unfortunate 
example is both risky and dangerous . . . The recognition of 
the independence of the United States led directly to the French 
Revolution." 1 

Yet now and again a bright ray of his old time liberalism came 
to lighten the abyss of obscurantism into which he was plunged. 
As the end approached he seems to have renewed the dreams and 
visions of his younger days. To Karamzine, the great historian, 
who urged upon him the fact that his "years are numbered" 
while Russia still awaited fulfillment of the promise of his earlier 
reign he replied: "I shall yet give my Empire her fundamental 
rights!" 2 A promise made under the shadow of death yet as 
vain as those which had preceded it! To all who surrounded him 
Alexander remained to the last the "impenetrable sphinx." 3 

It became evident to his entourage that following the failure of 
his Grecian policy, the Tsar did not himself know what ends he 
wished to pursue. He seems to have feared the accusation of 
being under the influence of the liberal Canning as much as 
he dreaded reminders of his subservience to the reactionary 
Metternich. Much of this hesitancy was doubtless due to 
illness. That Alexander's physical condition was now serious had 
become evident to all who surrounded him. Recurrent attacks of 
erysipelas frequently confined him to his bed. Morbid suspicions 
preyed upon his mind. 4 

Moreover, the conviction was daily growing clearer to the Tsar 
that he was the center of a vast conspiracy aimed at his throne, and 

1 Nevertheless, Alexander remained to the end popular in the United States. Under 
date of July 2, 1825, Clay, acting in the name of the Cabinet, urged the intervention of the 
Tsar to bring about a cessation of hostilities between the King of Spain and the insurgents 
of Cuba and Porto Rico. Middleton in this connection wrote: "The proposition . . . 
has been communicated to the Allied Cabinets and I am of the opinion that the majority 
will agree." Mr. Middleton to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1825. MS. Dispatches, 
Russia. 

2 Rain, op. cit., p. 437. 

3 Grand Due Nicolas Mikhailowitch, op. cit., vol. i, p. 309. "I do not believe," 
wrote La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, "that it is possible to find anyone more convincingly 
frank and loyal in his conversation. One always leaves him under the impression that here, 
at last, is a Prince who unites to the qualities of a Christian knight all the attributes of a 
great sovereign. He also gives the impression of a man of intelligence and energy. Well! 
on the other hand, bitter experience and the whole story of his life teaches us that he can 
not be trusted." Letter of May 19, 1823, La Ferronnays to Chateaubriand, Archives 
of the French Foreign Office, quoted by Rain, op. cit., p. 426. 

4 He often asked the favorite Madame Narychkine — of whose fidelity he also had well 
founded reasons to doubt — "to tell him frankly whether his conduct was not a source of 
ridicule" to the courtiers of his entourage. He often talked of abdicating the throne 
with an earnestness that recalled his youthful days. Comtesse de Boigne, Memoirs, 
vol. in, pp. 156-157. 






EUROPE AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 131 

even at his life. The preparations for his eagerly anticipated 
journey to South Russia (July, 1825) were interrupted by definite 
reports of an alarming nature concerning the machinations of the 
"Sects," a Russian officer of English origin named Sherwood 
revealing to his master the plots of a revolutionary nature which 
afterwards became fully known through the trials of the Decem- 
brists. 

After a tiresome journey lasting for more than two weeks 
Alexander arrived at the little city of Taganrog near the shores 
of the Black Sea, where he was shortly afterwards joined by the 
Tsarina. Freed from the cumbersome etiquette of the court 
and the grinding military routine which disturbed his leisure at 
St. Petersburg, the Tsar appears to have rallied from his state of 
nervous depression. A renewed period of friendship — even of 
marital affection — reunited him to the much-tried Empress Eliza- 
beth. But the nervous fever of activity which devoured him 
soon drove him forth upon another journey. Against the advice 
of his physician, he attempted a tour of inspection in the provinces 
of the Crimea. Returning to Taganrog on November 17, he 
immediately took to his bed with a burning fever. 

In spite of his precarious condition, he refused the medicines of 
his physicians, Wylie and Stofregen. It became apparent to all 
that the will to survive his disillusions was lacking — and only his 
splendid physique rebelled at the final surrender. On the 27th 
a priest was sent for in haste to give him the last communion, of 
which he partook with touching piety and devotion. He died 
on December 1, 1825. x 

1 In spite of the autopsy signed by five physicians, a strange tradition still current in 
Russia declares that the Tsar lived for many years after the date ascribed to his death. 
He is identified as the monk "Feodor Kousmitch," who lived as a hermit in the wilds of 
Siberia. In Russia, the author was assured of this fact by the son of an official, who pre- 
tended that his father had known the Tsar during this exile. 



APPENDIX I 

TERRITORIAL GUARANTEES AT THE CONGRESS OF 
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1818 1 

The result of the protocol of November 15 — although expressing 
the benevolent intention of the Allied Powers, as well as those of 
the great Association of Europe — nevertheless leaves much to be 
desired. Another agreement more positive in its terms and more 
conservative in its principles will be needed in the future. The 
best means to obtain the ends desired would be the signing of a 
treaty to which the Powers signatory of the Recess of Vienna 2 
and the subsequent Acts of Paris would adhere. This alone could 
mutually guarantee the integrity of their rights and the inviola- 
bility of their possessions as defined by the above-mentioned 
Recess and Treaty of Paris of the year 1815. 

Such a guarantee of solidarity ought to be explicit and contain 
a definition of mutual obligations. His Imperial Majesty finds 
the basic principles — and a definition of the meaning and tenor of 
such a treaty — in the fraternal bond of September 14/26, 1815. 3 
A proof of the immutability of these principles is to be found in 
the imposing unanimity with which they were accepted by the 
governments of Europe. 

If the Allied Powers share this view and judge it opportune 
and necessary to base their diplomatic acts and formulae on the 
principles consecrated in the act mentioned (thereby ensuring 
to the alliance the guarantees of peace and security which are 
the fruit of this pact), the Emperor of Russia is ready to make any 
sacrifice to accomplish this result. His Minister is ordered to 
place himself in direct relation with the Allied Cabinets to discuss 
projects of a treaty along this line 

To the above was annexed the following: 

PROJECT OF TREATY 

The transactions which have taken place among the Powers since 
the year 1814, and especially the measures taken at the Congresses of 
Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, have had as their guiding principle the 
desire to establish in Europe a system of durable peace founded on the 
basis of a territorial guarantee among the Powers. The courts of 

*MS. Treaty proposed by Alexander at Aix-la-Chapelle contained in a folio marked 
Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, in Archives of Russian Foreign Office. 

2 The Final Act of Vienna. 

3 The Holy Alliance. 

J.OO 






134 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

Austria, France, Holland, Prussia and Russia have judged it expedient, 
following the spirit of these general transactions, to make more definite 
declarations concerning their reciprocal relations. The following dis- 
positions have, therefore, been taken: 

Reciprocal Guarantees 

1st. The conduct of the nations will be guided by a rule binding upon 
each and all; an engagement to remain within the present territorial 
limits fixed in Europe by the last treaties, and an intention not to 
attempt to expand these same, unless with the approval of the Alliance 
or in the case of voluntary agreements. 

2d. They mutually guarantee the respective territories as fixed by 
these treaties and promise to make common cause against any state 
seeking to trouble the general peace. This clause shall become imme- 
diately effective. 1 

3d. They agree to notify the Government of Great Britain of the 
above clause, inviting H. B. M.'s government to use its good offices to 
obtain the results desired if necessary without requiring its active co- 
operation or full adhesion (the latter, however, they will always be ready 
to receive). 

4th. The German Confederation will be invited to form a part of the 
present system. 

5th. In view of the fact that a too wide extension of the system of 
reciprocal guarantees mentioned above would only tend to weaken and 
render more difficult the attainment of the ends desired, the Powers 
agree not to make further similar propositions to the other powers. 2 

1 Compare Article X of the Treaty of Versailles. 

2 There is no record that the principles embodied in the above interesting document — 
preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg — were ever formally- 
debated by the delegates at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The not unnatural reluc- 
tance of all the Powers — with the exception of France and Russia — to add to the already 
complicated system of treaties uniting the Allies may have forestalled consideration of this 
earlier "territorial guarantee." 



APPENDIX II 

WORLD REVOLUTION AFTER THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: 

TROPPAU 1 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been directed to add 
to the annexed account of the Conference of Troppau certain 
explanations concerning the objects of the present reunion of the 
Allied Cabinets. The first aim of these deliberations has had 
for its object to save the world from the plague of revolutionary 
anarchy. A union of the great Powers delivered Europe from the 
military despotism which gave birth to the revolutions in France. 
Their independence attained, the nations disarmed, and each 
hoped to see its own population enjoying the blessings of a general 
peace under the auspices of the great agreement which had assured 
to the nations of Europe complete security, both within and 
without. New manifestations of solidarity have surrounded with 
fresh guarantees this happy state of affairs, and the nations 
appeared during several years to obtain a breathing spell fol- 
lowing the long-drawn period of their misfortunes . . . Neverthe- 
less, the revolutionary struggle had left its mark upon the whole 
of Europe — and in its trail more ideas perverted by the errors 
and calamities of the century. These latter theories arose in 
the midst of the events of the revolution, and, first raised to power 
by its fatal influence, dropped to obscurity through the ensuing 
peace. The sects have, therefore, neglected no means to prevent 
the progress of a durable pacification. No artifice has been spared 
to sow discord among the Allies. No effort has been overlooked 
in their desire to drag down the nations or thrones by provoking 
the people to revolt. This latter effort has been especially 
directed against the countries wherein revolution has long exer- 
cised its influence. In Spain, Naples and Portugal they were, 
unfortunately, successful. In turn overwhelmed, the downfall 
of these three states shows to the world the continued exist- 
ence of that revolution from which it had thought itself forever 
free. Thus scarcely reconstructed, the edifice of Europe finds 
itself attacked at its very foundations: international law, religion 
and Christian morality. At a time when each of the governments 
is endeavoring to discover the real needs of its nationals and seek- 

1 MS. Memoir dated November, 1820, from folio marked Troppau, 1820, in the Archives 
of the Russian Foreign Office. 

135 



136 THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

ing to satisfy these aspirations by constructive measures, their 
pure intentions are suddenly paralyzed. If Europe had merely 
opposed silence to the enemy already triumphant throughout 
the territory of the two peninsulas, the results of the obligations 
contracted in 1814, 1815 and 1816 would have in turn been de- 
feated. Isolated and without help, the states of Europe could 
only have compromised with the revolutionary despotism . . . 

The revolutionaries attempted to persuade the people that 
absolute power is leagued against the rights of nationality. It 
was, therefore, essential to convince them that true sovereign 
power must prevent and punish crime and insurrection, and this 
only in order to ensure the enjoyment of the peaceful rights of 
its subjects. The enemies of government seek to represent the 
reunion of Troppau as dominated by the three Courts of Austria, 
Prussia and Russia. They maintain that the spirit of the Triple 
Alliance is opposed by another formed of the Constitutional 
states — England, France, Holland, Central Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the two Americas. It is, therefore, indispensable to 
demonstrate the contrary and to show them that at Troppau the 
great Powers in Europe were gathered to deliberate with respect to 
the stabilization of the European system. This was the fact that 
rendered necessary the reunion of the five Cabinets. The first 
problem to be considered was consequently the reconciliation of 
the respective views of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia 
and Russia so that the policy and system adopted by these Powers 
toward the revolutionary party should be identical. This was a 
difficult task, one rendered possible through energy inspired by 
love of the right. 

Austria by its position is called upon to assist the Powers 
with its advice, and more actively, in Italy, where the situation is 
only assured by a partial treaty concluded with H. M. of Sicily. 
The Treaty of June 12, 1815, Austria contends, should, therefore, 
disappear. Acting as a mandatory of the European Powers, 
she should play the most important part in the great task of 
reconciliating Naples, both to the King and to the laws of society. 
France still forms the center of sects, whose ambition it is to 
overthrow all monarchical government. She, therefore, can not 
be expected to cooperate successfully at the present time. Act- 
ing as a support to the general cause, she should hope for the 



APPENDIX II 137 

assistance of the Powers . . . Great Britain, now at the zenith of 
riches and civilization, appears for the moment to be engulfed by 
her own prosperity. The proof of this is to be found in the 
domestic troubles which menace the Royal family, its August 
Chief and its most zealous servants. Under these circumstances, 
the government can not be counted among the number of active 
members of the European Alliance, and should be happy to keep 
its rank as an Allied court. It can best aid by not holding forth 
false hopes to the authors of the great catastrophe. Prussia, 
fully occupied by internal relations to the federal states of Ger- 
many and by new relations with Austria, has not been able to 
consider in advance the difficult questions confronting the united 
Cabinets. To Russia alone, therefore, thanks to its strong posi- 
tion, this duty appears in harmony with the engagements already 
taken, etc. 



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1817-41. 

_ Nouveaux supplemens au Recueil de Trait'es . . . depuis 1761 jusqu'a present . . . 

3 vols. Gottingen, 1839-42. 

Article in Revue d'Histoire diplomatique, vol. VIII. 1894. 



Metternich, Prince of. Memoires. 8 vols. Paris, 1881-86. 

Mikhailowitch, Grand Due Nicolas. L'Empereur Alexandre I<*. Essai d'etude 

historique. 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1912. 
Moore, John Bassett. A Digest of International Law. 8 vols. Washington, 1906. 
. "Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism," in Columbia University Quarterly, 

September, 1915. New York, 1915. 
Nesselrode, Comte de. Letters and Papers, 1760-1850. 11 vols. Paris, 1904-12. 
Nicholas Bergasse: A Defender of Old Tradition under the Revolution. Paris, 1910. 
Pasquier, Memoires du Chancelier, 1789-1830. Published by d'Audiffret-Pasquier. 

6 vols. Paris, 1893. 
Phillips, Walter Alison. The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European 

Alliance, 1813-1823, as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace. 

London, 1914. 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. xxxi. New York, 1916. 
Polovstov, A. Correspondance diplomatique des ambassadeurs et ministres de France 

en Russie et de Russie en France de 1814 a 1830. Russian Society of Diplomatic 

History. 
Pradt, l'Abbe de. U Europe apres le Congres d'Aix-la-Chapelle, paisant suite au Congres 

de Vienne. Paris, 1819. 
Rain, Pierre. Un Tsar ideologue: Alexandre 1" (1777-1825). Paris, 1913. 
Reddaway, William F. The Monroe Doctrine. Cambridge, 1898. 
Richardson, James D. AlCompilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 

1789-1897. Washington,gl896-99. 



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Rush, Richard. A Residence at the Court of London, Comprising Incidents, Official and 

Personal, from 1819 to 1825. 2d series. 2 vols. London, 1845. 
Schnitzler, J. H. Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia under the Emperors 

Alexander and Nicholas. 2 vols. London, 1847. 
Schuyler, Eugene. American Diplomacy. New York, 1886. 
Shepherd, William R. Latin America. New York, 1914. 
Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817. (Anonymous.) 

Kirk and Mercein, New York, 1817. 
Societe imperiale de I'histoire Russe, Proceedings of. 

Sorel, Albert. L' Europe et la Revolution Francaise. 8 parts. Paris, 1893-1904. 
Stapleton, Augustus Granville. The Political Life of the Right Honorable George 

Canning, from his acceptance of the seals of the Foreign Department, in September, 

1822, to the period of his death, in August, 1827, together with a short review of foreign 

affairs subsequently to that event. 3 vols. London, 1831. 
Talleyrand, Memoires du Prince de. Publies avec une preface et des notes par le Due de 

Broglie. 5 vols. Paris, 1891. 
Tatistcheff, Serge. Alexandras If et Napoleon, d'apres leur correspondance inedite, 

1801-1812. Paris, 1891. X 
Vandal, Albert. Napoleon et Alexandre I er . 3 vols. Paris, 1898. 
Villanueva, Carlos A. La Santa Alianza. (La Monarquia en America, vol. in.) 

Paris, n. d. 

. Bolivar y el General San Martin. (La Monarquia en America, vol. I.) Paris, n. d. 

Waliszewski, Kazimierz. Le fils de la grand Catherine, Paul If, empereur de Russie, sa 

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partie inedits. Paris, 1912. 



INDEX 



Adams, John Quincy, 1, 50, 61, 71; position 
with regard to Holy Alliance, 91 et seq.; 
position with regard to European inter- 
ference in America, 122. 

Aix-la-Chapelle: Treaty of, 21, 44-5, 59, 
61, 67; Congress of, 69 et seq.; results of 
Congress of, 83; territorial guarantees of 
Congress of, 133-34. 

Alliances: of Tsar Paul with Napoleon, 8; 
Anglo-Russian, 12-3; of Tilsit, 16-7; 
France, Austria and Great Britain, 27. 
See also Treaties. 

Allied General Staff, proposed, 74. 

Anglo-Russian Alliance, attitude toward 
France, 13. 

Angouleme, Duke of, leader of French in- 
vasion of Spain, 114-15. 

Arcis-sur-Aube, battle at, 19. 

"Armed Neutrality," 8, 10. 

Austerlitz, defeat of Third Coalition at, 15- 
6. 

Austria, 1, 58, 97, 136; recognition of Na- 
poleon by, 11; on side of Allies, 19; party 
to Treaty of Alliance, 28; opposition of, to 
international congresses, 72; negotiations 
with Great Britain at Constantinople, 
127. 

Bagot, Sir Charles, 125. 

Balance of power, Alexander's principle of, 
15. 

Bancroft, cited, 123. 

Banda Oriental, 67, 88. 

Baronov, Russian Governor of American 
colonies, 59-60. 

Barton, William E., cited, 126. 

Bennett, member of Parliament, attack 
upon Holy Alliance, 43-4. 

Bergasse, Nicholas, influence of, on Alex- 
ander, 32, 34-5, 38-9. 

Berlin Decree, 46. 

Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, 18. 

Bey of Algiers, 58. 

Bey of Tunis, 58. 

Blockades, paper, forbidden by Congress of 
Powers of the North, 10. 

Bodega Bay, Russian colony at, 59-60. 

Bogdanovitch, cited, 4. 

Boigne, Comtesse de, cited, 130. 



Bolivar: cited, 60; dictator of South 
American republics, 121. 

Bonaparte, Joseph, assumption of royal 
authority by, 61. 

Borgo, Pozzo di, Russian envoy, 65-6, 70. 

Boyce, Myrna, cited, 45. 

Brest, 46. 

Brougham, member of Parliament, opposi- 
tion to Holy Alliance, 42-3. 

Buenos Aires, 61; independence of, 78. 

Byron, Lord, expedition in support of 
Greeks, 107, 127. 

Campbell, George W., United States 
minister to Russia, 88 et seq, 97. 

Canning, George, 2, 74; Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 108; foreign policy of, 109, 
114; intervention in Portugal, 115; state- 
ment in regard to colonies, \\7 et seq.; 
negotiations with regard to Greece, 
126-27. 

Caracas, 61; political and commercial con- 
cessions granted to, 78. 

Carlsbad, 48; Congress of, 96. 

Castlereagh, Lord, 28, 47, 73, 107-8; in- 
fluence of, at Chaumont negotiations, 22; 
at Congress of Vienna, 26; support of 
Holy Alliance, 42-3, 71, 74-5, 84; pro- 
posal to admit France to Treaty of 
Alliance, 73; reservations of, 83; opposi- 
tion to Troppau Congress, 98, 100. 

Catherine, Empress, grandmother of Alex- 
ander, 3, 17, death of, 5. 

Caulaincourt, Napoleon's envoy at Chatil- 
lon, 20. 

Chateaubriand: cited, 60, 71, 109 et seq.; 
interview with Alexander, 113; plan of 
French intervention in Spain, 116. 

Chateau-Thierry, French victory at, 19. 

Chatillon, Congress of, 19. 

Chaumont, Treaty of, 2, 12, 20-1, 29, 45-6, 
71, 73-4. 

Choiseul-Gouflier, Mme. de, cited, 23, 30, 33 . 

Clay, Henry, 64. 

Cleland, R. G., cited, 60. 

Clery, Robinet de, cited, 77, 96. 

Colombia, independence of, 121. 

Confederation of the Rhine, 22. 

Congresses. See individual headings. 

143 



144 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 



Constantine, Grand Duke, brother of 
Alexander, 3. 

Constantinople, negotiations between Aus- 
tria and Great Britain at, 127. 

Continental System, effort to attach 
Alexander to, 17. 

Copenhagen, British victory at, 9. 

Correa, Portuguese Minister, 88. 

Cretenau-Joly, Jacques, cited, 73. 

Crimean War, outbreak of, 39. 

Czartoryski, Prince, 26, 35; cited, 4-5, 
7,12, 16; as Prime Minister, 8; influence of. 
on Alexander, 9, 25; appointed Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, 10-1. 

Dashkov, Russian envoy to the United 
States, 49-50, 62-3, 80, 85. 

Debidour, A.: cited, 20, 26-7, 56 et seq., 
64,72-3,99, 105,110. 

Denmark: attempt to separate, 9; at 
Congress of Powers of the North, 10. 

Diderot, 3. 

Divine Right of rulers, 55. 

Dunning, W. A., cited, 47. 

Dupuis, Charles, cited, 17. 

Elba, return of Napoleon from, 27, 32. 

Elizabeth, Empress, 131. 

Embargo, English, on vessels, 8. 

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, cited, 44. 

Era of Good Feeling in the United 
States, 50. 

Erfurt, meeting of Alexander and Talley- 
rand at, 17. 

Eynard, Charles, cited, 32-3. 

Federation, proposed, of small states, 15. 

Feree-Champeniose, La, battle at, 19. 

Ferdinand VII, Spanish King, 58, 67; 
restoration of absolutism and the In- 
quisition by, 56; tyranny of, 60; trouble 
with South American colonies, 64; 
attempt to restore, to the throne, 114-15; 
proposal of international conference, by, 
120-21. 

Ferronnays, French representative at Lay- 
bach Congress, 105. 

Finland, "free hand" given Russia in, 17. 

Fischer, Danish Admiral, 9. 

Florida, 65; controversy over, 61-2; Amer- 
ican invasion of, 64; cession of East, 
to United States, 92. 

Ford, C, cited, 32. 

France: alliance with Great Britain and 



Austria, 27; Alexander's policy toward, 
56; payment of indemnity by, 73; ad- 
mitted to Treaty of Alliance, 74; state- 
ment of, in regard to Spain and colonies, 
118-19; Sects in, 135. 

Frankfort, 55. 

Frederick William III, Prussian King, 10, 
17, 56, 96. 

Friedland, Russian defeat at, 17. 

Garde, Le Comte A. de la, cited, 24. 

Garden, cited, 8, 10, 16, 18. 

Gentz, Frederick de: cited, 24, 31, 37, 
72, 74-5, 77, 97 et seq., 119; at Vienna 
Congress, 29; attacks upon Jacobinism, 
95-6; at Laybach Congress, 101. 

German Confederation, 59; action of 
Metternich with regard to, 96. 

Ghent, Peace of, 26, 59. 

Goebel, Julius, cited, 70. 

Golder, F. A., cited, 47, 50. 

Golytzine; Alexander's letter to, 29; in- 
fluence of, on Alexander, 32. 

Gordon, English plenipotentiary at Lay- 
bach Congress, 101, 103. 

Grand Confederation of the Powers of 
Europe, 23. 

Great Britain, 136-37; agreement with 
provisions of Congress of the Powers of 
the North, 10; agreement with Russia, 
12; attitude toward France, 15-6; party 
to Treaty of Reichenbach, 18; subsidies 
advanced by, 20; war with the United 
States (War of 1812), 26, 93; party to 
Treaty of Alliance, 28; attitude toward 
Holy Alliance, 41 et seq.; opposition to 
action regarding Barbary pirates, 57-8; 
as an American power, 59; opposition to 
international congresses, 72; at Aix-la- 
Chapelle Congress, 75-6; opposition to 
international naval measures, 82; recog- 
nition of Spanish American colonies, 111; 
attitude toward Spanish American col- 
onies, 117; negotiations with Austria at 
Constantinople, 127; settlement of Gre- 
cian question, 128. 

Greece, resistance to Turkish oppression, 
105 et seq., 126 et seq. 

Grenada, political and commercial con- 
cessions granted to, 78. 

Greville, Charles C. F., cited, 45. 

Grimm, 3. 



INDEX 



145 



Hanover, Prussian evacuation of, 10. 
Hanse Towns, acceptance of Holy Alliance 

by, 47. 
Hardenberg, Prussian Liberal Minister, 56. 
Harris, Levett, American charge d'affaires 

at St. Petersburg, 48-9, 55, 58, 62. 
Havre, 46. 

Hetairie, Pan Grecian Association, 57, 105. 
Hildt, John C, cited, 51, 60, 64. 
Holland, 136; proposed restoration of, 13; 

acceptance of Holy Alliance by, 47. 
Humboldt, Prussian Liberal Minister, 56. 
Hyde de Neuville, French Minister to 

United States, 61. 
Impeytany, cited, 39. 
Instructions to Novosiltzov, 9, 11 et seq., 

26, 29, 32, 67, 104. 
International Maritime Police, proposed, 81. 
Istria, Capo d', 70; adviser to Alexander, 
25, 49, 58; foundation of Hetairie by, 
57; at Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 77, 80, 
86; dismissal of, 107. 
Italy, 109-10, 136. 
Iturbide, attempt of, to found Empire in 

Mexico, 115-16. 
Jacobinism, 3, 95; of Laharpe, 5; of Alex- 
ander, 55. 
Josika, Baron, cited, 55. 
Joyneville, C, cited, 7. 
Juntas, 61; revolt of South American, 58. 
Kalisch, Treaty of, 12, 18, 21, 46. 
Kichenev, 105. 
Koslov, Russian Consul in the United 

States, 53. 
Kraft, tutor of Alexander, 4. 
Kronstad, English expedition against, 9. 
Krudener, Baroness de, influence of, on 

Alexander, 32-3, 35, 38. 
Laharpe, Frederick Cesar, 25, 47; tutor of 
Alexander, 3 et seq., 32; dismissal of, 
5; return as adviser, 8; cited, 39. 
Landskoi, Count, 3. 
Lansing, Robert, cited, 25. 
La Rothiere, French defeat at, 19. 
Laybach, Congress at, 101; effect on 

English policy of Congress at, 108. 
League of Nations, proposed by Alexander, 

13-4. 
League of Neutrals, 9-10. 
League of Sovereigns, 38-9; policy of, 108. 
League to Suppress Piracy, 82. 



Leipzig, Battle of Nations at, 19-20. 
Leopold, of Saxe-Coburg, 128. 
Lewis and Clarke Expedition, 124. 
Liberalism; opposition to Holy Alliance, 
41-2; of Alexander, 55; in Germany, 96; 
in Spanish colonies, 97; in Piedmont, 104. 

Lieven, Count, Russian Ambassador in 
London, 40-1, 50, 62-3. 

Liverpool, Lord, reactionary tendencies of, 
120. 

Londonderry, Marquis of, 108. 

Louisa Augusta, Princess (Empress Eliza- 
beth), 4. 

Luxembourg, Prussian occupation of, 27. 

McMaster, John B., cited, 92, 125. 

Mahmoud, Sultan; opinion of Holy Alli- 
ance, 57; atrocities of, against Russians, 
106. 

Maistre, Joseph de, cited, 40. 

Martens, Georg F. de, cited, 9, 19-20, 23, 
28, 31, 55, 73. 

Masson, tutor of Alexander, 4. 

Mataxis, Andrew, 110. 

Mediation: plan of Ferdinand for, 75 et 
seq., 83 et seq.; Russian plan of, 79. 

Metternich, 20, 29, 82; criticism of Alex- 
ander, 2, 55-6; cited, 25, 32, 37-8; 
at Congress of Vienna, 25 et seq.; at 
Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 83; action 
against Sects and Jacobinism, 95-6; at 
Troppau Congress, 99; at Laybach 
Congress, 102-3; at second Vienna Con- 
gress, 107; at Verona Congress, 109-10. 

Mexico, attempt to found Empire in, 
115-16. 

Middleton, American Minister to Russia, 
123-24. 

Mikhailowitch, Grand Due Nicolas, cited, 
4, 22, 26, 30, 41, 104, 130. 

Monroe, President, 50, 71, 126. 

Monroe Doctrine, 1, 113, 122. 

Montmiriel, French victory at, 19. 

Montmorency, 113. 

Moore, John Bassett, cited, 60, 93. 

Moscow, burning of, 18. 

Muraviev, tutor of Alexander, 4. 

Naples, Kingdom of, 102; activities of 
Sects in, 135. 

Napoleon, 11; Tsar Paul's alliance with, 8; 
Alexander's opposition to, 16-7; in- 
vasion of Russia by, 18; abdication of, 22, 
33; return from Elba, 27, 32. 



146 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE 



Nelson, English Admiral, 9. 

Nesselrode, Comte de, cited, 46, 66, 77, 88. 

"New Order," theory of self-determination, 

12-3. 
Non-colonization, principle of, 124—25. 
Non-intercourse act, 46. 
Novosiltzov, unofficial adviser of Alexander, 

8; Instructions to, 9, 11 et seq., 26, 29, 32, 

67, 104. 
Orders in Council, 46. 
Pallas, tutor of Alexander, 4. 
Palmella, Count, Portuguese envoy to 

Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 81. 
Paris, 3, 55; First Treaty of, 2, 21 et seq.; 

Second, 28. 
Parker, Hyde, English Admiral, 9-10. 
Pasquier, Chancelier du, cited, 30, 32, 41, 

71-2, 74, 76, 97 et seq. 
Paul, Tsar, father of Alexander, 3; assassi- 
nation of, 7-8; alliance with Napoleon, 8. 
Pavlovsk, 4. 

Pensacola, capture of, 64. 
Peru, independence of, 121. 
Phillips, Walter Alison, cited, 11, 20, 22, 

28, 72. 
Piedmont, revolution in, 104. 
Pinkney, United States Minister to Russia, 

49, 63. 
Pitt, William, 57; reply to Novosiltzov, 12, 

15-6; promise to support Russia and 

Prussia, 18. 
Pizarro, M., Spanish Minister of Affairs, 

65. 
Poland: proposed restoration of, 21, 26, 29; 

Alexander's policy in, 56. 
Poletica, Chevalier, successor to Dashkov, 

53, 80; efforts to join United States to 

Holy Alliance, 85 et seq., 91 et seq. 
Polignac, Prince, French Ambassador, 

statement of French demands, 118 et seq. 
Polovstov, cited, 64 et seq., 78. 
Port Mahon, proposed cession to Russia of, 

58. 
Portugal, 109; participation in Treaty of 

Paris, 23; proposed military measures 

against, 64; revolution in, 98; activities of 

Sects in, 135. 
Powers of the North, Congress of, 10. 
Pradt, Abbe de, cited, 84. 
Prussia, 1, 97, 136; participation in Con- 
gress of Powers of the North, 10; recog- 



nition of Napoleon, 11; party to Treaty 
of Reichenbach, 18; formation of federal 
union in, 21; occupation of Luxembourg, 
27; opposed to international congresses, 
72; Liberalism in, 96. 

Rain, Pierre, cited, 3, 5, 18, 24, 28 et seq., 
106, 114, 130. 

Rambouillet Decree, 46. 

Reddaway, William F., cited, 121. 

Reichenbach, Treaty of, 2, 18-9. 

Revolutions, 7; in Sicily and Spain, 97-8; 
in Portugal, 98; in Piedmont, 104. 

Richardson, James D., cited, 125-26. 

Richelieu, Duke, of 51; French Minister at 
Vienna Congress, 28, 61; at Aix-la- 
Chapelle Congress, 72 et seq. 

Riego, leader of uprising in Spain, 97; 
execution of, 115. 

Rivadavia, representative of junta of 
Buenos Aires, 88. 

Ross, British attache, 7. 

Rousseau, 3. 

Rufo, Chevalier de, representative of 
Naples, 102. 

Rush, Richard, American Ambassador to 
Great Britain; cited, 88; negotiations 
with Canning regarding colonies, 116 et 
seq., 125. 

St. Mark, capture of, 64. 

Samborski, Father Andrew, religious tutor 
of Alexander, 4. 

Sardinia, proposed reestablishment of 
Kingdom of, 12-3; acceptance of Holy 
Alliance by, 47. 

Saxony, acceptance of Holy Alliance by, 47. 

Schnitzler, J. H., cited, 40. 

Schuyler, Eugene, cited, 57. 

Schwartzenberg, Austrian military com- 
mander, 19. 

Sects, revolutionary societies, 56, 95, 131, 
135-36. 

Serbia, 57. 

Shepherd, William R., cited, 58. 

Sicily, revolution in, 98. 

Slave trade: move to abolish, 81, 93; dis- 
cussed at Verona Congress, 109. 

Sorel, Albert, cited, 11-2, 16-7, 19-20, 23^1. 

Spain, 136; restored to Bourbons, 21; party 
to Treaty of Paris, 23; Alexander's 
policy toward, 56; as an American power, 
59; mediation with colonies, 75 et seg.; 



INDEX 



147 



barred from Aix-la-Chapelle Congress, 
76; treaty with the United States, 92; 
Liberalism and revolution in, 97-8; pro- 
posed invasion by France, 113-14; ac- 
tivities of Sects in, 135. 

Speranski, Governor of Siberia, 35, 123. 

Stapleton, Augustus G., cited, 98, 108-9, 
116 et seq. 

Stein, Prussian Liberal Minister, 56. 

Stewart, Lord, representative of Great 
Britain at Troppau Congress, 98. 

Strangford, Lord, British Ambassador at 
Constantinople, 107. 

Stroganov, Count, 6; unofficial adviser of 
Alexander, 8; Russian Ambassador to 
Turkey, 105-6; dismissal of, 107. 

Stuart, Sir Charles, 65. 

Subsidies, advanced by Great Britain, 
18, 20. 

Sweden: at Congress of Powers of the 
North, 10; party to Treaty of Paris, 23. 

Switzerland, 7-8; as an independent state, 
21 ; acceptance of Holy Alliance by, 47. 

System of 1815, 2, 28, 39, 83, 97. 

Talleyrand: interview with Alexander, 17; 
cited, 20, 22 et seq.; formula of "legiti- 
macy" of, 26; dismissal of, 27-8. 

TatistchefF, Serge, cited, 12, 16; Russian 
Ambassador to Spain, 58, 64, 66; sale 
of ships to Spain by, 63; envoy to second 
Vienna Congress, 107. 

Third Coalition, 15; defeat of, 16. 

Tilsit, alliance of, 16-17. 

Toeplitz, Treaty of, 2, 19, 46, 96. 

Tolstoy, Grand Marshal Count, 24. 

Treaties: of Concert, 16; of Alliance, 28, 
55, 64. See also individual headings. 

Troppau, Congress at, 98 et seq., 135 et 
seq.; effect of Congress of, on English 
policy, 108. 

Tucuman, Congress of, 61. 

Turkey: Alexander's policy toward, 57; 
oppression of Greeks, 105 et seq., 126 
et seq. 

Tuyll, Baron de, Russian Minister to the 
United States: instructions to, 51-2; 



negotiations of, regarding colonization, 
124. 

United States: foreign policy of, 1; war with 
Great Britain, 26, 93; attempt to draw, 
into European affairs, 44-5; attitude 
toward Holy Alliance, 45 et seq., 84 et 
seq., 104; Era of Good Feeling in, 50; 
effort to bring, into Holy Alliance, 58, 
78-9, 94; invasion of Florida, 64; in- 
fluence of, on European affairs, 67; 
proposed to membership in International 
Maritime Police, 81-2; diplomatic policy 
of, 84 et seq.; Treaty with Spain, 92. 

Vandal, Albert, cited, 16-7. 

Venezuela: political and commercial con- 
cessions granted to, 78; independence of, 
121. 

Verona, Congress of, 34, 108 et seq. 

Vertus, 37; review of Russian Army at, 30, 
40. 

Vienna, Congress of, 2, 23 et seq., 45, 57, 59, 
71; second Congress of, 107. 

Villanueva, C. A. de, cited, 60-1, 116. 

Villele, 113-14, 127. 

Voltaire, 3. 

Vorontzov, Russian Ambassador to Great 
Britain, 9. 

Waliszewski, K., cited, 7. 

Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, proposed union 
with Russia, 25. 

Washington, Treaty of, 92-3. 
Waterloo, campaign of, 27, 30. 
Wellington, Duke of, 64-5; opposition to 

Allied General Staff, 74; envoy to second 

Vienna Congress, 109, 111; reactionary 

tendencies of, 120. 
Westphalia, Treaty of, 14. 
World War, 1. 
Wurttemberg, Kingdom of, 97; acceptance 

of Holy Alliance, 47. 
Young Liberal Circle, object of, 6; return to 

St. Petersburg of, 8. 
Ypsilanti, Alexander, leader of Greek 

revolution, 105. 



iOHVj 



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